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THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
DISABILITY ACCOMMODATIONS 
MICHAEL ASHLEY STEINt 
The Americans with Disabilities Act provides a clear mandate that 
disabled workers be provided with "reasonable" accommodations, but 
does not meaningfully articulate the standards by which reasonableness 
ought to be measured. Until now, neither courts nor commentators have 
provided a systematic model for analyzing accommodation claims. This 
Article articulates an initial law and economics framework for analyzing 
disability-related accommodations. In doing so, it demonstrates how 
accommodations span a cost continuum that can be divided into areas of 
Wholly Efficient and Semi-Efficient Accommodations to be funded by 
private employers, Social Benefit Gain Efficient Accommodations where 
the costs should be borne by the public fisc, and Wholly Inefficient 
Accommodations that ought not be provided. It also delineates the 
boundaries between each category, and explains why the entities designated 
should bear the accommodation costs assigned to them The analysis of 
disability accommodations uses, questions, and at times goes beyond the 
neoclassical economic model of the labor market, and also engages 
arguments from the jurisprudence of social justice. By utilizing both these 
fields, this Article stakes out a unique perspective on disability 
accommodations, and provides an avenue for continued discussion and 
debate over how disability accommodations ought to be measured. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADAY requires 
employers to provide "reasonable" accommodations to "qualified" 
workers with disabilities.2 Yet, in spite of this very clear mandate to 
provide reasonable accommodations, the statute leaves as a "great 
unsettled question" the matter of what can or should be considered a 
reasonable accommodation.3 Specifically, Title I delineates the 
boundary between reasonable and unreasonable as an otherwise 
undefined point at which a requested accommod~tion engenders an 
"undue hardship" to the providing employer.4 In determining whether 
a given disability-related accommodation is reasonable, interested 
parties5 are advised to take into consideration the totality of an 
employer's circumstances. These include its size, location, economic 
condition, and the number of people it employs.6 The ADA does not, 
however, provide any further guidance as to how these considerations 
ought to be weighted or balanced. 
Not surprisingly, courts have failed to expressly utilize a 
balancing approach that enunciates what values, if any, they assign to 
these factors. Instead, federal judges usually rule as a matter of law on 
whether particular ADA-requested accommodations were reasonable 
without articulating how they reached those decisions.7 At the district 
court level, this is mainly due to the prevalence of summary judgment 
and other pretrial motions that are granted overwhelmingly in 
defendants' favor.8 Consequently, cases reaching the courts of appeals 
predominantly focus on whether district court judges abused their 
discretion in granting pre-jury dismissal motions, and do not engage 
in de novo balancing tests of reasonability.9 This is true even for 
Judges (nee Professors) Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi, who in 
1. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12,111-12,117 (2000). 
2. !d.§ 12,112(b)(S)(A). 
3. Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable 
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 8 (1996). This prescient work is examined in greater detail 
infra in Part II.B.l. 
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(10)(A) (defining "undue hardship" as "an action requiring 
significant difficulty and expense"). 
5. These parties can include a worker with a disability seeking an accommodation, an 
employer considering the viability of its provision, or a court rendering a determination of 
reasonability in the event that a conflict arises between the two. 
6. 42 u.s.c. § 12,111(10)(B). 
7. See infra Part LB. 
8. See infra Part I. B. 
9. See infra Part LB. 
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their academic roles are among the more august doyens of law and 
economics scholarship. For although both Judges Posner and 
Calabresi have opined that an assessment of an accommodation's 
reasonableness necessitates application of cost-benefit analysis,10 
neither has enunciated how, in practical terms, such a standard should 
be applied. Their analyses, however, do offer valuable insights into 
some factors that a judge or policymaker might consider when 
assessing accommodations through a cost-benefit framework. 11 
Moreover, very few empirical studies and almost no legal 
scholarship exist regarding what in fact constitutes a reasonable ADA 
accommodation. Professor Peter Blanck conducted the leading 
empirical study of accommodation costs, which found the majority of 
those studied reasonable,12 and has subsequently argued for this 
phenomenon being typical of other employers. As for legal 
scholarship, four theoretical estimations have been published that 
provide some useful thoughts about determining the reasonableness 
of Title I accommodations. First, Professors Pamela Karlan and 
George Rutherglen raise the possibility of applying negligence 
analysis to disability-related accommodations.13 Second, Professor 
J.H. Verkerke argues that the ADA acts efficiently in matching 
disabled workers with reasonably accommodated jobs appropriate to 
their skill sets. 14 Third, Professor Christine Jolls avers that the ADA's 
reasonable accommodation mandates act as a disincentive to 
increasing employment among the disabled.15 Most significantly, 
Professors Stewart Schwab and Steven Willborn offer a tort-like 
proposal based on Judge Learned Hand's classic BPL balancing test 
for how employers might model their hiring preferences and thus 
reasonably accommodate workers with disabilities.16 These scholars, 
10. VandeZande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542--43 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.); 
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J.). 
11. See infra Parts I.C.1-2. 
12. Peter David Blanck, Communicating the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
Transcending Compliance: 1996 Follow-up Report on Sears, Roebuck and Co. (1996), at 
http://www.annenberg.nwu.edu/pubs/sears/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2003) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journa[). 
13. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 31-32. 
14. J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journa[). 
15. Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223,276-77 (2000). 
16. Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace 
Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1269 (2003). Judge Hand enunciated this standard 
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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however insightful their work, nonetheless do not offer 
comprehensive guidance on how a judge (or, in theory, a 
policymaker) ought to go about balancing accommodation costs, and 
who should bear those costs when assessing the reasonableness of 
ADA accommodations. 
By the same token, very little scholarship has looked beyond the 
ADA's boundaries (however they are fixed) to examine what types of 
disability-related accommodations society, rather than employers, 
ought to support, and why. Two recent articles provide some clues to 
this dilemma in the course of arguing from within the ADA's 
precincts that employers ought to bear part of the responsibility of 
helping people with disabilities avoid welfare dependence. 17 Professor 
Samuel Bagenstos maintains that a motivating factor of the Supreme 
Court's ADA decisions is the desire to keep people with disabilities 
in the workplace rather than on welfare.18 This normative goal of 
dependency avoidance, he argues, was likewise one of the prime 
considerations that impelled the statute's passage.19 Professor Amy 
Wax advances this normative goal of independence by averring that 
employer-provided workplace accommodations can improve overall 
social utility so long as disabled workers are somewhat productive.20 
Nevertheless, she believes that minimum wage and equal pay 
legislation will ultimately prevent employers from hiring and 
retaining those workers with disabilities, even though it is 
economically beneficial to society as a whole to do so.21 The 
arguments that Bagenstos and Wax make are extremely thought-
provoking on the general notion of avoiding dependency, as well as 
useful in understanding some reasons why ADA accommodations are 
viewed as desirable. At the same time, they do not adequately 
delineate the reasons that society ought to provide disability-related 
accommodations that are otherwise inefficient for private employers, 
17. Along with the article by Schwab & Willborn, supra note 16, these two articles are the 
product of a symposium I had the pleasure of convening. See generally Symposium, Disability 
and Identity, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 907 (2003). 
18. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 921, 97t'H!5 (2003). 
19. /d. at 954. 
20. See Amy L. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity, and "Real Efficiency": A Unified Approach, 
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1421, 1423 (2003) (analyzing "the cost-effectiveness of the ADA"). 
21. /d. at 1424. 
84 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:79 
or where the line should be drawn between private inefficiency and 
public efficiency.22 
Stepping into the breach left open by judges and commentators, 
this Article will offer some suggestions on how to economically 
conceptualize disability-related accommodation costs. It will then 
suggest who should bear the costs for each of the possible 
circumstances. I hope that in offering some thoughts on the matter 
this Article will provoke further dialogue on this overlooked area of 
legal analysis. When making my assessment of disability-related 
accommodations both within and without the ADA's provenance, I 
will utilize, question, and at times go beyond the neoclassical 
economic model of the labor market, as well as engage arguments 
from the jurisprudence of social justice. By using both economic and 
social justice arguments, this Article stakes out a unique perspective 
on the ADA. 
Part I sets forth what the ADA requires in the provision of 
accommodations and describes the usual manner in which claims for 
ADA accommodations are handled by federal courts. It then analyzes 
two cases decided by Judges Posner and Calabresi, respectively, in 
which neither engaged a detailed reasonable accommodation analysis, 
but where each provided insight into some of the considerations that 
could inform a cost-benefit analysis. 
Part II reviews empirical work tending to show that 
accommodation costs are either minimal, nonexistent, or even cost-
effective. It then sets forth pertinent analyses provided by Pamela 
Karlan and George Rutherglen, J.H. Verkerke, and Christine Jolls. 
Next, Part II details a proposal by Stewart Schwab and Steven 
Willborn which suggests the application of the classic BPL balancing 
standard for negligence liability to ADA accommodations, but also 
leaves much unresolved. Last, Part II adumbrates articles by Samuel 
Bagenstos and Amy Wax that, respectively, lay the groundwork for 
reasoning that ADA-type accommodations can enhance social 
welfare beyond the statute's confines. 
Part III begins by explaining the methodology employed in my 
proposed law and economics framework for assessing disability-
22. Nor do they need to in order to achieve their goals, which they do admirably. I have 
made two very preliminary attempts. See Michael Ashley Stein, Empirical Implications of Title I, 
85 IOWA L. REV. 1671, 1684 (2000) [hereinafter Stein, Empirical lmplicationsl; Michael Ashley 
Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers with Disabilities, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 314,325-28 (2000) [hereinafter Stein, Labor Markets]. 
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related accommodations. Operating primarily within the boundaries 
of the neoclassical economic model of the labor market, I 
nevertheless diverge from previous scholarship by challenging three 
of the baseline presumptions adopted by scholars who have written 
on the topic: (1) the belief that employers' hiring and retention 
practices relating to disabled workers are efficient; (2) the assumption 
that disabled workers are less productive than their nondisabled 
counterparts; and (3) the overall perception that the existing labor 
market status quo is an equitable one. I thus go beyond the precincts 
of typical neoclassical economic schemas. Finally, as a prelude to the 
accommodation cost continuum presented in Part IV, Part III 
describes the measuring variables that will be used in the framework, 
respectively, willingness to pay, disabled profit, average profit, and 
social benefit gain. 
Part IV conceptualizes disability-related accommodation costs as 
existing on a continuum. These expenses range from Wholly Efficient 
Accommodations (some of which are provided voluntarily and others 
which would be provided voluntarily barring a market failure), to 
Socially Efficient Accommodations (including ·Semi-Efficient 
Accommodations coerced through ADA litigation because they 
extract a differential cost from employers, and Social Benefit Gain 
Efficient Accommodations where individual workers and general 
society benefit, but employers do not), to Wholly Inefficient 
Accommodations (where the only economically feasible option is 
exclusion of these workers from the labor market). In setting forth 
the accommodation cost continuum, Part IV organizes thematically 
the various disability-related accommodations into the following 
categories: Pareto Optimal Accommodations, where the 
accommodations are wholly efficient to employers; Kaldor-Hicks 
Welfare Enhancement Accommodations, which include both Semi-
Efficient Accommodations and Social Benefit Gain Efficient 
Accommodations; and Wholly Inefficient Mandates. At the same 
time, Part IV also delineates who should bear the costs for each type 
of these accommodations, and why. I conclude by canvassing areas 
for future research as a means of facilitating what I hope will become 
a rich and ongoing debate. An Appendix sets forth the value 
assumptions used in Part IV's pr.oposed accommodation cost model. 
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I. THE ADA AND THE COURTS 
The ADA requires employers to provide "reasonable" 
accommodations to "qualified" employees with disabilities.23 In so 
doing, the statute defines reasonableness as something less than an 
undue hardship, a figure calculated in the context of an employer's 
financial circumstances.24 Although application of this standard would 
seem to mandate detailed factual analyses, Title I claims are routinely 
dismissed on defendants' motions before they reach a jury or other 
factfinders, through the determination that accommodations are 
unreasonable as a matter of law.25 Because courts of appeals do not 
review these rulings de novo,26 the appellate courts have not provided 
much guidance on the subject. Contrary to this trend, however, a pair 
of opinions by Judges Posner and Calabresi provide insight on the 
type of analyses that might be used when assessing ADA 
accommodation claims. 
A. ADA Accommodation Requirements 
Title I of the ADA governs the conduct of "covered entit[ies]," 
defined as private employers, employment agencies, labor 
organizations, and joint labor-management committees.27 These 
entities, which for the sake of convenient reference I will call 
"employers," are prohibited from discriminating against qualified 
individuals with disabilities in all aspects of the employment 
relationship.28 
Congress defined a person with a disability29 as one who has "a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(5)(a) (2000). 
24. /d. § 12,111(10)(B). 
25. See infra Part LB. 
26. See infra Part LB. 
27. 42 u.s.c. § 12,111(2). 
28. Specifically, the hiring, promoting, firing, and "other terms, conditions, and privileges 
of employment." /d. § 12,112(a). Employers of fewer than twenty-five workers, federal 
government or Native American-owned corporations, and private membership clubs are 
excluded from coverage. !d. § 12,111(5)(B)(i)-(ii). 
29. Congress adopted the definition of disability whole cloth from the Rehabilitation Act, 
Pub. L. No. 93-1I2, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000)), in 
part as the result of a political compromise among cross-disability rights groups and groups who 
represented people with specific disabilities. Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, 
Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and 
Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 81, 85 (2002). 
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the major life activities of such individual,"30 who has a history of such 
impairment/' or who is regarded as having one.32 The subject of who 
is an individual with a disability, let alone a "qualified" individual 
with a disability, has been the focus of much case law33 and legal 
scholarship,34 and is likely to continue as a source of contention.35 For 
now, it suffices to say that Supreme Court decisions require 
disabilities to be significant ones,36 as measured in their mitigated 
states,37 with any attendant limitations impairing a wide range of 
functional activities.38 
To be covered by the ADA, individuals with disabilities must 
also be "qualified." This means that only those individuals capable of 
performing the essential job functions of the respective positions 
sought, either with or without provision of reasonable 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A). See generally Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" 
Protection From Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions 
of the Definition of Disability, 42 VJLL. L. REV. 409 (1997) (maintaining that the definition of 
disability is deleteriously misconstrued). 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(B). Breast cancer survivor Patricia Garrett, the named plaintiff in 
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), an employment 
action precluded on sovereign immunity grounds, id. at 360, is one example. See generally Jane 
Byeff Korn, Cancer and the ADA: Rethinking Disability, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 440-52 (2001) 
(arguing for the construction of past and present incidents of cancer as a disability). 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(C). See generally Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social 
Cognition, and "Innocent Mistakes", 55 V AND. L. REV. 481 (2002) (applying cognitive 
psychology literature to describe how and why members of society, including employers and 
judges, might consider a nondisabled person disabled). 
33. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999) ("[Tlhe determination of 
whether an individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures that mitigate the 
individual's impairment .... "). 
34. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 17 (collecting articles and notes analyzing the ADA). 
35. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability", 86 VA. L. REV. 
397, 445-84 (2000) (arguing that disability should be conceived as subordination resulting from 
the stigmatization of an individual on the basis of a physical or mental impairment); Mark 
Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 877-91 (2001) (proposing 
that norms are best enforced as group, rather than individual, protections because the larger 
societal benefits stemming from the prevention of market discrimination relate to the 
incorporation of those groups into the social and economic mainstream). 
36. See, e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483-89 (holding that severely myopic twins who were 
precluded from positions as global airline pilots were not disabled within the meaning of the 
ADA because their visual impairment was commonplace). 
37. !d. In fact, one commentator gleans from Sutton a duty to reasonably mitigate one's 
own disability. Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act 18-42 
(2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
38. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) ("(T)o be 
substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that 
prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance 
to most people's daily lives. The impairment's impact must also be permanent or long term."). 
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accommodations, are covered by the Act.39 Thus, a completely blind 
applicant would not be qualified for a position as a truck driver, 
where the essential job function is the ability to drive.40 She would, 
however, be qualified for a position as a molecular biochemist, where 
the essential job function of miscerating substances is either 
achievable through the applicant's own abilities, or through provision 
of accommodation in the form of Braille or other coded indicators.41 
Reasonable accommodations can encompass a wide range of 
individualized adjustments to existing workplace conditions, but are 
mainly conceptualized as falling into one or both of two categories. 
The first category requires the alteration or provision of a physical 
plant,42 such as ramping a stair to accommodate the needs of an 
employee who uses a wheelchair. These type of accommodations 
involve "hard" costs, meaning that they invoke readily quantifiable 
out-of-pocket expenses.43 Purchasing and installing a ramp, for 
example, is usually a one-time expenditure with a fixed and knowable 
cost. 
The second type of accommodation involves the alteration of the 
way in which a job is performed.44 This might mean not requiring a 
wheelchair-using store clerk to stack high shelves. These sort of 
accommodations bring into play "soft" costs, which are more difficult 
to quantify.45 This hypothetical employee might require a fellow 
39. 42 u.s.c. §12,111(8) (2000). 
40. Nonetheless, in Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999), the Supreme 
Court upheld the dismissal of a driver with monocular vision, whose driving competence was 
not in question, on the ground that his functional method of seeing violated Department of 
Transportation regulations. /d. at 567-78 (1999). 
41. The nexus between these standards was described in the Senate report on the ADA as 
follows: 
If a person with a disability applies for a job and meets all selection criteria except 
one that he or she cannot meet because of a disability, the criteria must concern an 
essential, non-marginal aspect of the job, and be carefully tailored to measure the 
person's actual ability to do an essential function of the job .... However, the criteria 
may not be used to exclude an applicant with a disability if the criteria can be satisfied 
by the applicant with a reasonable accommodation. 
S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 37-38 (1989). 
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(9)(A) (requiring an employer to make "existing facilities used 
by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities"). 
43. See Stein, Empirical Implications, supra note 22, at 1677 (noting that most ADA studies 
focus on these "hard" costs). 
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(9)(B) (allowing job restructuring or modification, variation in 
existing methods of administration, and the provision of readers or interpreters). 
45. See Stein, Empirical Implications, supra note 22, at 1677 (claiming that existing "studies 
do not adequately appraise 'soft' costs, including nonphysical plant expenses 0 such as educating 
human resource personnel"). 
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worker to stack the high shelves while she staffed the register. Her 
circumstance might also necessitate that a human resource manager 
meet with other employees to explain the change in their daily duties, 
or that a supervisor be required to learn how to take these alterations 
into consideration when evaluating overall job performance. 
Two overlooked systemic points are worth noting. First, 
disability-based accommodations, when required,46 can involve hard 
costs, soft costs, or both.47 Second, because ADA Title III requires 
that places of public accommodation be made readily accessible,48 
some employment-related accommodation costs should be subsumed 
by employers in their guise as owners or operators of those venues if 
they are otherwise ADA-compliant.49 ·In this case, assuming that the 
store did not fall within any Title III exception,50 the owner would 
have been required to install an entry ramp as a reasonable 
modification even without the presence of a disabled employee.51 
Workplace accommodations become an undue hardship upon 
employers when they require "significant difficulty or expense,"52 as 
measured against the totality of an employer's financial 
46. Sometimes disability-based accommodations are not required. Just as with nondisabled 
persons, people with disabilities vary in their productivity. In Part lll.B.2, I discuss the 
misperception among economic commentators that all disabled workers are inherently less 
productive than their nondisabled counterparts. Nevertheless, as explained below, because this 
Article addresses the reasonability of accommodations, I address this possibility parenthetically 
and in footnotes. 
47. See generally Stein, Empirical Implications, supra note 22. 
48. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12,181-12,189. 
49. However, barring suit, many venues are not readily accessible. For example, the 
Empire State Building complied with the ADA's regulations only after being targeted for 
litigation by the Department of Justice. Lindsey Gruson, Getting to Top of Empire State: 
Opening the Way for Disabled, N.Y. nMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at B3. The confluence of Titles I and 
Ill is not a point that I have seen referenced in any scholarship assessing ADA 
accommodations. 
50. Most of the exceptions are predicated on size, although there are also exclusions for 
historical buildings (when fundamentally altered), places of worship (unless a space that is 
rented to the public is involved), as well as ecumenical defenses that undue burdens or direct 
threats were created. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,181-12,189. 
51. !d. § 12,181. At the same time, the confluence between Title I and Title III access is 
incomplete. Absent the presence of a disabled employee, employers are not under a duty to 
make areas not open to the public accessible. So although the store owner might have to ramp 
the entry, he would not have to make the storeroom accessible. The disparity is intended to 
shield public accommodation owner/operators until such time that they become employers. See 
generally Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and 
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413 
(1991) (discussing some of the political compromises which facilitated the ADA's passage). 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(10)(A). 
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circumstances.53 Beyond the actual cost of an accommodation,54 
considerations include the following: "the overall financial 
resources," "size," and "number of persons employed" at the 
facility;55 "the effect on expenses and resources," location, structure, 
"and functions of the workforce"; as well as the general "impact" of 
the accommodation.56 More concretely, these factors could include 
the actual cost of the ramp, the amount of store space lost to the 
ramp, the profitability of the store, the number of employees, and the 
job modification's impact on the store's day-to-day operation. If the 
store was part of a larger organization, an assessment of 
reasonableness could also take into account the store's other 
locations, and whether it made sense to have the wheelchair-using 
employee work full time at another location (for example, one with 
lower shelves or an abundance of clerks to stack the higher ones), or 
alternate between locations (while operating the register or meeting 
customers at each). 
Thus, the ADA provides a large number of factors to be 
considered when assessing the reasonableness of any given 
accommodation. At the same time, however, the law fails to offer 
substantial guidance as to how an employee, employer, judge, or 
policymaker ought to balance those factors beyond the proviso that 
an accommodation is reasonable until it engenders an undue 
hardship.57 
B. The Usual Course of ADA Accommodation Litigation 
As a result of the requirement that disabled individuals be 
"qualified" to receive protection,58 ADA claimants have the burden 
of pleading prima facie cases of discrimination to survive defendants' 
summary judgment motions and proceed to trial.59 This procedural 
53. !d. § 12,111(10)(8). 
54. !d. § 12,111(10)(B)(i). 
55. ld. § 12,111(10)(B)(ii)-(iv). 
56. /d. 
57. Accordingly, there is truth to Justice O'Connor's extrajudicial statement that the 
central difficulty with the scope of ADA coverage is the "uncertainties as to what Congress had 
in mind," Charles Lane, O'Connor Criticizes Disabilities Law as Too Vague, WASH. POST, Mar. 
15, 2002, at A2, although not for the reasons she proffered. 
58. 42 u.s.c. § 12,111(8). 
59. See, e.g., Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a 
prima facie case of discrimination requires that a plaintiff establish that her physical impairment 
"substantially limit[ed] one or more ... major life activit[y]"); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 
(D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[T]he requirement of only a minimal prima facie showing strips the 
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device authorizes federal trial judges to dismiss cases only when there 
exists "no genuine issue as to any material fact."60 However, following 
the Supreme Court's Celotex trilogy,61 some commentators have 
argued that it is improper to grant summary judgment in employment 
discrimination cases,62 a proposition with which some courts agree.63 
Although the Supreme Court held in McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green64 that the burden of persuasion required for Title Vlr5 
plaintiffs to survive motions for dismissal is minimal,66 in actual 
practice the parallel burden appears higher for Title I plaintiffs.67 This 
is so despite language in the ADA indicating that Congress defined 
discrimination as, among other causes,68 the denial of reasonable 
accommodations69 in order "to provide clear, strong, consistent, 
defendant of the ability to remain silent as to its motive while recognizing the plaintiff's ultimate 
obligation to prove that motive's illegality."). The same is true for those proceeding under the 
Rehabilitation Act. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (lOth Cir. 
1981) ("The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that he was an otherwise 
qualified handicapped person apart from his handicap, and was rejected under circumstances 
which gave rise to the inference that his rejection was based solely on his handicap."). 
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 56( c). In deciding whether to grant motions for summary judgment, it is 
axiomatic that courts view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. JACK H. 
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 458-65 (3ded. 1999). 
61. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 477 U.S. 574 (1986). 
62. Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 2229, 2234-35 (1995); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The 
Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 203-{}6 
(1993). For a general indictment of the device, see Samuellssacharoff & George Loewenstein, 
Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 118--19 (1990) (exploring the 
deleterious effects of summary judgment on the litigation process, its pro-defendant bias, and 
the possibility of its abuse by defendants). 
63. For example, the Eleventh Circuit held in an ADEA case that, "[a]s a general rule, 
summary judgment is not a proper vehicle for resolving claims of employment discrimination." 
Delgado v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 815 F.2d 641, 644 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Lynn v. 
Deaconess Med. Ctr., 160 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1998) (chastising the district court on the 
ground that "summary judgment should seldom be used in discrimination cases"). 
64. 411 u.s. 792 (1973). 
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(e)17 (2000). 
66. /d. 
67. The characterization is premised on the statistical evidence presented below, infra 
notes 74-78. The qualification reflects the absence of a Supreme Court ruling on point. See 
generally Lucinda A. Castellano, Surviving Summary Judgment in the ADA Employment Case 
(Part/), 24 COLO. LAW. 1301 (1995); Lucinda A Castellano, Surviving Summary Judgment in 
the ADA Employment Case (Part 2), 24 CoLO. LAW. 1785 (1995). 
68. 42 u.s.c. § 12,112(b)(l)-(7) (2000). 
69. !d.§ 12,112(b)(5)(A). 
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enforceable standards addressing" disability-related discrimination.70 
This practice also contravenes circumstances which appear from a 
common sense perspective to necessitate just the type of factual 
inquiry that should defeat motions for summary judgment, namely a 
determination by a jury based upon the set of facts presented by the 
opposing parties.71 Additionally, this practice oftentimes prevents the 
type of functional inquiry that appears to be envisioned by the 
statute.72 
At least partly in consequence of district courts' procedural 
practice of granting defendants' motions for summary judgment and 
other pre-jury dismissal devices,73 an· American Bar Association 
report found that employers prevailed in more than 92 percent of 
Title I cases between 1992 and 1997,74 a rate only exceeded by 
defendants in prisoners' rights claims.75 A primary result of this 
propensity to use summary judgment and other procedural devices is 
that federal district courts avoid applying the factors enumerated by 
the ADA when assessing the reasonableness of accommodations: 
when issuing rulings the typical memorandum, often unpublished, 
70. /d. § 12,101(b )(2). 
71. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 60, at 458-65. 
72. Id. 
73. There is likely to be more going on here than "only" the judiciary's alleged aversion to 
Title I cases. The inquiry is especially pertinent to the quasi-voluntary portion of the 
accommodation cost continuum, see infra Part IV.A.2, wherein the ADA is intended to act as a 
corrective to cognitive market failure, but empirically does not. 
74. Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 
22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 403 (1998). A subsequent study of 1998 
outcomes indicates that the employers' win rate increased to 93 percent. Ruth Colker, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 
(1999). The empirical study by Colker substantiates these findings, but with greater nuance, 
concluding that a large measure of plaintiff losses under the ADA are because "[c]ourts are 
abusing the summary judgment device" by "refusing to send normative factual questions" to 
juries. /d. at 101. This is especially true, she avers, of the presumably factual question of whether 
a given accommodation was reasonable. /d. at 101-02; cf Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. 
Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why Are So Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment 
Motions, and Would They Fare Better Before a Jury? A Response to Professor Calker, 19 REV. 
LITIG. 505, 508--10 (2000) (arguing, based on empirical studies, that Title I claimants would fare 
dramatically better if their claims reached a jury). For a follow-up study on jurors' positive 
sensitivity to ADA claims, see Daniel R. Gallipeau, Juror Perceptions and the ADA, in ALI-
ABA, 2 ADVANCED EMP. LAW. & LITIG. 485, 488 (2000). 
75. See Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and 
Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1578 (1989) (setting forth data establishing the low success 
rate of prisoner plaintiffs in civil rights litigation). 
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grants the moving party's motion (usually, the defendant'st and 
tersely dismisses the case.n In turn, the cases brought to the courts of 
appeals primarily focus on the propriety of the district court judges' 
grants of summary judgment and similar dismissive motions.78 
Because the standard of appellate review of these orders is abuse of 
discretion, the determination of which is predicated upon the 
established trial court record, appellate court judges do not engage de 
novo in tests of reasonability.79 Therefore, the initial aversion of 
district court judges to articulate, quantitatively, the grounds for their 
decisions continues as the litigation ascends the procedural ladder.80 
Thus, what differentiates disability claims in degree (rather than in 
kind) from, say, negligence claims, is that while each applies a 
balancing test to individual circumstances to assess alleged liability,81 
the incidence of pre-jury dismissals in the former has helped preclude 
the development of predictive standards.82 
A good illustration of this phenomenon may be seen in the 
procedural history and rulings underlying the Supreme Court's 
decision in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett. 83 After injuring his back 
handling baggage for U.S. Airways, Robert Barnett transferred to a 
then-vacant, less physically strenuous position in the airline's 
mailroom.84 When that position opened up to bidding under the 
airline's seniority-based system,· it became apparent that employees 
senior to Barnett would seek the position.85 Accordingly, Barnett 
76. But see, e.g., EEOC v. Prevo's Family Mkt., No. 1-95-CV-446, 1996 WL 604984, at *2-4 
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 27, 1996), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 135 F.3d 1089 (6th Cir. 1998) (granting 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as to defendant's liability for disability discrimination 
for conditioning his continued employment upon an HIV examination). 
77. Colker, supra note 74, at 119-25. 
78. !d. at 108. Between 1992 and 1997, for instance, 87 percent of all Title I decisions 
appealed were from pro-defendant dismissals or grants of summary judgment. 
79. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595-98 (1986). 
80. To be fair, this method of adjudication is not unique to disability discrimination claims, 
and is in fact the result of a standard convention for clearing cases from the trial calendar on 
motions days. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 
1994 WIS. L REV. 631, 631-39; Proceedings of the Seminar on Procedures for Effective Judicial 
Administration, 29 F.R.D. 191, 202 (1961). 
81. The negligence standard, and its potential analogue for accommodation claims, is 
discussed infra in Part II.B.2. 
82. A basic tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence is the creation of predictable standards 
so that future litigants can have a sense of their respective rights and duties. 1 JAMES KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 442-43 (1971) (1826). 
83. 535 u.s. 391 (2002). 
84. /d. at 394. 
85. !d. 
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requested permanent assignment to the mailroom as a reasonable 
accommodation under the ADA.86 U.S. Airways refused to so 
reassign Bhrnett (presumably on the grounds of undue hardship), and 
Barnett lost his job.87 He subsequently sued the airline alleging 
disability-based discrimination for failure to reasonably accommodate 
his disability.88 
The district court granted U.S. Airways's motion for summary 
judgment on the ground that "the uncontroverted evidence shows 
that the U.S. Airways seniority system has been in place for 
'decades,"' hence "any significant alteration of that policy would 
result in undue hardship. "89 In making this ruling, the trial judge made 
no representation that he had given any weight to the factors 
enumerated in the ADA for assessing the reasonableness of 
accommodations. A non-exhaustive list of considerations that he 
could have weighed, several of which were presented in evidence, are 
the following: the airline's financial resources; the out-of-pocket cost, 
if any, of the accommodation; the number of the airline's employees, 
including those affected by the seniority system; the relative 
geographical location of the airline's employees; the situs, number, 
and functions of U.S. Airways's mailrooms; the actual impact, 
financial and otherwise, of Barnett's jumping the seniority queue; and 
the likelihood of other employees requesting similar 
accommodations. Instead of weighting these considerations, the trial 
judge opined that even had he accepted arguendo Barnett's 
contention that the ADA required a "case-by-case approach," he 
would still have issued the same ruling.90 According to the court, this 
was because a seniority system was "fundamental," and so any 
alteration to it would inherently prove an undue hardship.91 The 
district court also ruled that the requested accommodation would 
constitute an undue hardship upon U.S. Airways's "non-disabled 
employees,"92 but did not explain why this was so.93 
86. /d. 
87. /d. 
88. /d. at 394-95. 
89. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, No. C-94-3874, (N.D. Cal. July 29, 1996), reprinted in 
App. to Pet. for Cert., at 96a (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
90. /d. 
91. /d. 
92. /d. 
93. One plausible explanation for the court's ruling is that it believed that allowing disabled 
employees to jump the seniority queue would raise the airline's labor costs. This would be true, 
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment on the ground that violating U.S. Airways's "legitimate 
seniority policy" was per se unreasonable.94 Like the district court that 
preceded it, the appellate panel did not explain why altering the 
seniority system in this individual circumstance was unreasonable. At 
the same time, the court noted that the case was one of first 
impression, and hence one that offered the opportunity to delineate 
an area of law.95 Sitting en bane, a panel of the Ninth Circuie6 vacated 
the initial appellate panel decision97 and reversed the district court, 
holding that the seniority system was only one "factor in the undue 
hardship analysis. "98 It held, moreover, that " [a] case-by-case fact 
intensive analysis is required to determine whether any particular 
reassignment would constitute an undue hardship to the employer."99 
Such an assessment could, presumably, require trial courts to balance 
the factors required in the ADA, although the Ninth Circuit did not 
explicitly call for this appraisal.100 
Once before the Supreme Court, the issue of whether the 
specifically requested accommodation was reasonable became 
for instance, if nondi~abled workers would in tum demand higher wages to offset diminution in 
seniority rights. For a discussion of "sunken labor costs" in this context, see Seth D. Harris, Re-
Thinking the Economics of Discrimination: US Airways v. Barnett, the ADA, and the 
Application of Internal Labor Market Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal). Such reasoning could also explain why the court considered the 
interests of the nonjoined third party employees to be relevant. This last point is not strictly 
parenthetical. From a purely economic perspective, the interests of certain third parties could be 
construed as valid externalities to be considered in an efficiency calculus. Whether any of the 
above motivated the court is only a matter of conjecture in the absence of an articulated reason. 
94. Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 196 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd en bane, 228 F.3d 
1105 (9th Cir. 2000). . 
95. /d. at 988. 
96. Employing a panel, rather than the entire court, is a practice unique to the numerically 
large and geographically dispersed Ninth Circuit, whereas the other circuits require that all 
sitting judges participate. See generally RESTRUcruRING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990); 
Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statistical Study of Judicial Quality, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 711 (2000). 
97. This is the usual procedural course, the theory being that the larger constituted tribunal 
then "speaks" for the entire circuit. See generally Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the 
Federal Courts: A Proposal for Increasing the Use of En Bane Appellate Review, 54 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 805 (1993). For a novel proposal that a rotating en bane court be empanelled so as to 
ensure uniform as well as apolitical decisions, see Michael Abramowicz, En Bane Revisited, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1618-22 (2000). 
98. Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000). 
99. /d. 
100. /d. 
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tangential,101 with the Court ruling as a matter of law that a requested 
accommodation that conflicts with a seniority system is ordinarily 
unreasonable.102 At the same time, the Court also held that an 
employee could endeavor to show special circumstances where it 
might be reasonable to make an exception to an established seniority 
system, thus compelling his employer to grant an accommodation (in 
Barnett, reassignment). 103 Even so, the Court's ruling begs the very 
question of what factors might come into consideration and how they 
are to be weighted by a court when taking into account the 
reasonableness of an accommodation.104 
Two points are worth emphasizing at this juncture. First, owing 
at least in part to the incidence of summary judgment and other 
pretrial procedural devices, neither federal trial court nor appellate 
court judges have engaged in the type of systematic balancing analysis 
provided by the ADA and encouraged in this Article.105 Second, in the 
two cases discussed in the next Section, the respective appellate 
courts adopted opposing views as to whether the Title I claimants 
should have survived motions for summary judgment.106 Hence, the 
federal courts have not provided predictive guidance on how to 
construe the reasonableness of ADA-required accommodations. 
C. Judges (nee Professors) Posner and Calabresi 
A pair of opinions by Judges Posner and Calabresi, respectively, 
held that a proper assessment of what is a reasonable accommodation 
under the ADA (or the Rehabilitation Act, whose provisions, as well 
as jurisprudence, were adopted by the ADA) requires a cost-benefit 
analysis. Although neither applied such a test quantitatively, their 
opinions limn some of the issues to be considered when making such 
assessments. These insights are especially useful coming from 
101. This is surprising because certiorari was granted on this very question. Br. for Pet'r at i, 
U.S. Airways, 1nc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (No. 00-1250). 
102. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,394 (2002). 
103. !d. at 406. 
104. The ruling, contrary to the assertions of some disability rights advocates, also 
"indicate[s] that the Court would consider some accommodations reasonable, even if the 
Justices are currently unwilling to elaborate upon the actual standard in either their rulings or 
dicta." Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Employment Policy, and the Supreme Court, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 607, 629 (2002). 
105. See infra Part IV. 
106. See infra Parts I.C.1-2. 
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individuals who are not only judges, but also venerable law and 
economics scholars. 
1. Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration. 
Lori Vande Zande, a paraplegic wheelchair user, was employed by 
the State of Wisconsin as a program assistant in the housing division 
of the Department of Administration (DOA).107 Her duties covered a 
range of tasks, including compiling fact· sheets, administratively 
assisting the director of the department, and, ironically, working on 
disability-related issues. 108 Her responsibilities were apportioned 
flexibly, depending on work availability.109 
Early in Vande Zande's tenure, the DOA twice moved to 
facilities that were not generally accessible to physically disabled 
persons. Both times, the DOA modified some of the plant,110 and 
provided accommodations specifically for Vande Zande.111 Although 
DOA continued to seek Vande Zande's input on a number of 
accommodations issues,112 an intractable sticking point was the design 
of a kitchenette with a thirty-six-inch high counter that was too high 
for Vande Zande to use.113 Ultimately, the DOA installed a thirty-
four-inch high counter across the hall near the accessible bathroom, 
because rebuilding the kitchenette would have cost as much as 
$2,000.114 
Another issue of contention was Vande Zande's requests to 
work at home, stemming from her development of pressure ulcers, an 
107. VandeZande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 851 F. Supp. 353,355 (W.D. Wis. 1994), affd, 44 
F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995). 
108. /d. at 355. 
109. /d. However, Vande Zande was not permitted, for reasons unexplained in the opinion, 
to devote more than 5 percent of her time to disability-based issues. /d. 
110. These accommodations included retrofitting a women's bathroom, installing a ramp 
into the office, relocating and redesigning the women's locker room, providing a smaller 
conference room table, installing a full-length mirror in the bathroom, mounting paddle handles 
on one sink, and placing a grab bar on a cot. I d. at 356-57. 
111. These accommodations included providing her with a door on her office so that she 
could telephone her physician in privacy, purchasing customized furniture, and altering its 
policy on photocopier use. /d. at 355-56. 
112. One facilities designer spent more than sixty hours discussing and researching building 
design with Vande Zande; a second consulted with her fifteen times on her personal office 
furniture. /d. at 356. 
113. /d. 
114. /d. at 357. 
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ailment common to paraplegics.115 On three occasions, VandeZande's 
doctor recommended that she remain at home for four to six weeks to 
allow the ulcers to be open to the air."6 After the first request, Vande 
Zande was allowed by the DOA to work at home. 117 On the second 
occasion, Vande Zande's supervisor stated that he did not believe 
there was sufficient work to occupy her full time at home."8 On the 
third occasion, her manager again determined that "he could not 
foresee" having that type and quantity of work that could be 
performed from Vande Zande's home.119 Vande Zande responded 
with a written request for reasonable accommodation in the form of 
work-at-home. 12° For the next eight weeks, Vande Zande worked at 
home full time and was paid full time wages by the DOA for all but 
sixteen and one-half hours, during which she used paid sick leave.121 
About midway during this interval, Vande Zande informed her 
supervisor that she could perform a wider range of activities if, in lieu 
of the laptop computer previously provided, the DOA would issue 
her a desktop computer and laser printer.122 The DOA refused 
because of the expense involved.123 Soon thereafter, Vande Zande 
transferred to the Department of Social Services and initiated suit 
against the DOA and her immediate supervisors under both the 
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act for failure to accommodate her 
disability.124 Specifically, she contended that the refusal to modify the 
115. See generally STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICfiONARY 1903 (27th ed. 2000) (describing 
symptoms and diagnosis of decubitis ulcers). 
116. VandeZande, 851 F. Supp. at 357. 
117. /d. 
118. /d. The inference is that Vande Zande continued to work at the office, but the opinion 
is vague on this point. 
119. /d. at 358. 
120. /d. 
121. /d. 
122. /d. 
123. /d. 
124. /d. at 359. Parenthetically, in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356 (2001), the Supreme Court held that Congress did not validly abrogate state 
sovereign immunity in enacting Title I of the ADA as it applied to states in their role as 
employers. !d. at 360. Hence, Vande Zande could not now bring this suit in federal court unless 
the state waived its sovereign immunity. Furthermore, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), 
appears to erect a substantial barrier to redress in state court. See id. at 712 ("[T)he powers 
delegated to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the 
power to subject nonconsenting states to private suits for damages in state courts."). Some 
exceptions to this general prohibition may exist, but those appear to rely on peculiarities of state 
law. See Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Coils. and Univs. for N.E. III. Univ., 207 F.3d 945, 
952 (7th Cir. 2000) (ruling on the same issue, Judge Easterbrook included state courts in the list 
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kitchenette and to permit work at home constituted unfounded 
denials of reasonable accommodation requests, and thus comprised 
disability-related discrimination.125 
In an opinion laudable for its inclusion of detail, but 
representative of other decisions in avoiding an empirical weighting 
of relevant factors, Chief Judge Crabb granted the DOA's motion for 
summary judgment.126 In pertinent part, she found that the DOA's 
failure to make the entire kitchenette accessible did not violate the 
ADA as a matter of law because VandeZande had complete use of 
the facility with the exception of the kitchen sink, and because a sink 
was readily available in the accessible restroom.127 Judge Crabb also 
held, as a matter of law, that the DOA had reasonably 
accommodated Vande Zande even if the "accommodation fell short 
of perfection" in not covering two days' work over an eight-week 
period.128 In so ruling, the court elucidated ·and analyzed the 
competing legal arguments made by the parties (namely, whether the 
accommodation claims were reasonable), but did not empirically 
evaluate the evidence presented in light of the standard mandated by 
the ADA.129 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court in a unanimous 
opinion by Chief Judge Posner.130 Noting that the concept of what 
constituted a reasonable accommodation was "at the heart of this 
case,"
131 Judge Posner set out to define the term. For Posner, the 
meaning of "accommodation" was evident: an alteration to the 
workplace that enabled an employee with a disability to work. It was 
of other possible avenues for plaintiffs seeking such relief because of Illinois's approach to 
sovereign immunity waiver and Illinois state law). 
125. VandeZande, 851 F. Supp. at 360-61. She also contended that the state had engaged in 
a pattern or practice of disability-based discrimination by failing to accommodate her, and that 
the state had discriminated against her in its hiring and promotion policies. /d. at 354. The 
former is not relevant to the discussion of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation; the 
latter was voluntarily abandoned. /d. 
126. /d. at 363. 
127. /d. at 361--62. 
128. /d. at 360-61. 
129. /d. The Chief Judge's opmwn was nonetheless considerably more detailed and 
informative than the vast majority of its analogues. 
130. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 1995). Joining the 
Chief Judge were Judge Engel, sitting by designation from the Sixth Circuit, and Judge 
Easterbrook, who five years later wrote the opinion in Erickson v. Board of Governors of State 
Colleges and Universities for Northeastern Illinois University, 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000), 
shielding state entities from Title I suits on the ground of sovereign immunity. /d. at 951. 
131. VandeZande, 44 F.3d at 543. 
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the term "reasonable" that caused. difficulties. 132 Vande Zan de 
maintained that the term "mean[t] apt or efficacious" in reference to 
her particular disability, but not in reference to any absolute cost.133 
Although accommodations must be efficacious (they would otherwise 
not be accommodations), Judge Posner opined that the remainder of 
VandeZande's definition could not be correct.134 Its application, in his 
vie.w, would require Wisconsin to expend unlimited resources (even 
to the extent of raising taxes) for what might be "a trivial 
. ,135 Improvement. 
Instead, drawing an analogy to the law of negligence, Judge 
Posner held that the term "reasonable requires something less than 
the maximum possible care,"136 unless it becomes an undue burden "in 
relation to the benefits of the accommodation to the disabled worker 
as well as to the employer's resources."137 Nor was it necessary to 
quantify an undue hardship ceiling on such costs. So long as the cost 
was proportionate, it could, in theory, be one which "exceeded the 
benefit however slightly."138 Turning to the two issues on appeal, the 
court held that the request to wholly reconstruct a kitchenette was 
not reasonable because the impact upon Vande Zande's work was 
trivial. 139 As for VandeZande's request to work at home, the DOA 
had already far exceeded any ADA accommodation requirement. 
Placing the DOA under any further obligation would punish the state 
"for its generosity" and ultimately "hurt rather than help disabled 
workers. "140 
Thus, by requiring a workplace alteration to be expedient and 
proportionate to the benefits conferred, even if the cost slightly 
exceeds the benefits, Judge Posner's opinion offers insight as to what 
132. /d. at 542. 
133. /d. 
134. /d. 
135. /d. at 542-43. 
136. !d. at 542. This negligence analogy was taken up by Karlan and Rutherglen, supra note 
3, at 31-32, and further developed by Schwab and Willbom, supra note 16, at 1269. See 
discussion infra Parts 11.8.1-2. 
137. VandeZande, 44 F.3d at 543. 
138. !d. at 542. 
139. !d. at 545-46. 
140. /d. at 545. Although it was not explained in Judge Posner's opinion how this might 
happen, one effect he might have had in mind was creating a deterrent against hiring future 
workers with disabilities. This is one of the possibilities that Verkerke explores. See supra note 
14, at 921-23. Jolls explores the even wider implication that the very existence of the ADA, 
even absent actual accommodations, likewise creates such deterrence. See supra note 15, at 280. 
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constitutes a reasonable accommodation. At the same time, he did 
not indicate where those lines ought to be drawn. 
2. Borkowski v. Valley Central School District. In Borkowski v. 
Valley Central School District/41 a public school teacher with a 
disability who had been denied tenure sued the school district under 
the Rehabilitation Act.142 As a result of a motor vehicle accident prior 
to her employment, Kathleen Borkowski suffered serious 
neurological damage that limited her memory, concentration, 
balance, and mobility.143 She discussed these impairments with school 
district officials when interviewing for a library teacher position.144 
Borkowski was appointed to a routine three-year probationary 
position and assigned to two elementary schools within the district. 
Her duties also included teaching library skills.145 During the 
provisional period, Borkowski's performance was regularly evaluated 
by three of the district's personnel, one of whom reported positively. 
Conversely, one negative assessment concluded that Borkowski had 
trouble controlling her class and that she sat during the lesson.146 
Having reached the end of her probationary term without the grant of 
tenure, Borkowski resigned.147 She initiated suit to challenge the 
district's decision.148 The district court granted summary judgment for 
the defendant, and Borkowski appealed.149 
The Second Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment on 
the ground that material issues of fact remained unresolved, and 
remanded the case back to the district court.150 Writing for a 
unanimous panel, Judge Calabresi151 rhetorically asked much the same 
question as had Judge Posner: "[W]hat is a reasonable 
accommodation, and what is an undue hardship?"152 He agreed with 
141. 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995). The district court opinion was unpublished, hence all 
citations are to the Second Circuit's decision. 
142. /d. at 135. 
143. /d. at 134. 
144. /d. 
145. /d. 
146. /d. 
147. /d. 
148. /d. at 135. 
149. /d. at 134. 
150. /d. No subsequent decision is reported. 
151. He was joined in the decision by Judge Walker and by Chief Judge Newman, who also 
wrote a separate concurring opinion. I d. at 144. 
152. /d. at 136. 
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Judge Posner that the term "reasonable" was a relational one that 
"evaluates the desirability of a particular accommodation according 
to the consequences" it will engender, both as to benefits and to 
costs.153 It was thus reasonable "only if its costs are not clearly 
disproportionate to the benefits that it will produce."154 Moreover, the 
concept of undue hardship was likewise a relational term that "looks 
not merely to the costs that the employer is asked to assume, but also 
to the benefits to others that will result."155 Consequently, employers 
are required "to perform a cost/benefit analysis."156 It was not clear 
what the essential job functions of Borkowski's position were,157 
whether the provision of a reasonable accommodation (for example, 
a teacher's aide) would have assisted her performance of those 
duties/58 and whether she was denied tenure solely due to her 
disability.159 In addition to these three unresolved factual issues, the 
district had not presented any evidence as to undue hardship.160 As a 
result, Judge Calabresi held that the grant of summary judgment was 
premature.161 
Judge Calabresi's opinion in Borkowski corroborates the opinion 
of Judge Posner in Vande Zande. Both opinions agree as to the 
necessity of engaging in a cost-benefit analysis regarding the 
reasonableness of a given accommodation, and about some of the 
boundaries that could be applied. However, like Judge Posner, Judge 
Calabresi did not apply those standards empirically to the case at 
issue. The next Part evaluates existing empirical data and academic 
analysis of the costs of disability-related accommodations. 
II. EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND ACADEMIC THEORIES 
Empirical studies of accommodation costs suggest that many of 
the engendered expenses are either nominal, or even cost-effective, 
because of the concomitant external benefits that are captured by 
providing employers. The results of these studies are, however, 
153. !d. at 138. 
154. !d. 
155. !d. at 139. 
156. !d. 
157. !d. at 140. 
158. !d. at 141. 
159. !d. at 143. 
160. !d. at 142. 
161. !d. at 143. As an initial matter, the Second Circuit acknowledged that Borkowski might 
not be able to prove her assertions, but remanded the case for further factual inquiry. !d. at 134. 
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qualified by their flaws. Theoretical analyses of disability 
accommodations by legal academics offer some insight on 
accommodations, especially as to how an ADA balancing test could 
parallel that of negligence actions. At the same time, these treatments 
do not fully address how to ascertain the reasonableness of 
accommodations. 
A. Accommodation Studies 
Very few empirical studies have examined what constitutes a 
reasonable accommodation. This is especially surprising in view of the 
established field of employment antidiscrimination laws that regularly 
receive analytical attention, the ability to extend existing research 
models to the ADA, and the sizable number of people that Title I 
affects. However, the analyses that have been conducted suggest that 
the quantifiable costs of accommodation are negligible. These studies 
also raise the possibility of external benefits to employers that might 
make the provision of accommodations cost-effective, and even 
profitable. The studies are not without flaw, and so their findings 
should be treated with caution. 
1. Quantifiable Costs. The leading empirical study of 
accommodation costs, conducted by Professor Peter Blanck, 
concluded that many of these expenses were recurrently nonexistent 
or minimal.162 Specifically, Blanck's examination of some 500 
accommodations made by Sears, Roebuck and Co. from 1978 to 1997 
established that the company provided nearly all of the 
accommodations at minimal cost. From 1978 to 1992, the average out-
of-pocket expense for an accommodation was about $120.163 From 
1993 to 1996 that average dropped to $45.164 Overall, 72 percent of 
accommodations required no cost, 17 percent carried an expenditure 
of less than $100, one-tenth cost less than $500, and only 1 percent 
162. Blanck and his colleagues from The Law, Health Policy, and Disability Center at the 
University of Iowa continue to study the costs of accommodation, especially as these interact 
with corporate cultures. Most of their results are available at http://disability.law.uiowa.edu/ 
lhpdc/civilrights/ada.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
163. Blanck, supra note 12, at 19. 
164. ld. 
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required inputs of between $500 and $1,000.165 A handful of other 
surveys have borne similar results.166 
2. External Benefits. Some studies go even further than the 
results reported by Blanck, suggesting that employers capture 
tangible benefits when they provide accommodations. Essentially, 
these studies argue that the provision of accommodations are often 
profitable for employers. One federal agency, for example, found 
that, on average, for every dollar spent on accommodation, 
companies saved $50 in net benefits.167 Thus, although more than 
one-half of accommodations cost less than $500, in two-thirds of 
those cases companies enjoyed net benefits exceeding $5000. 168 This 
is based on quantitative evidence finding that disabled workers 
receiving accommodations had lower job turnover rates169 and 
165. /d. 
166. For example, the Job Accommodation Network reported to Congress that the typical 
accommodation cost was $200. President's Committee on the Employment of People with 
Disabilities, Report to Congress on the Job Accommodation Network (July 26, 1995) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) (hereinafter President's Committee}; see also Peter David Blanck, 
The Emerging Role of the Staffing Industry in the Employment of Persons with Disabilities: A 
Case Report on Manpower Inc. 29 (1998), at http://disability.law.uiowa.edu/lhpdc/publications/ 
documentslblancketaldocs/Manpower_report.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(reporting that accommodation costs were "minimal"); Rita Thomas Noel, Employing the 
Disabled: A How and Why Approach, 44 TRAINING & DEV. J., Aug. 1990, at 26, 31 (reporting 
that over 80 percent of accommodations cost less than $500). 
167. See President's Committee, supra note 166. 
168. /d.; see also James G. Frierson, The Legality of Medical Exams and Health Histories of 
Current Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 J. REHABILITATION ADMIN. 
83, 86 (1993) (describing how one company saved $4 million annually and another $310,000 
annually by providing necessary accommodations). 
169. Blanck reports that 60 percent of workers with disabilities remained in their jobs, as 
opposed to 40 percent of able-bodied ones. Moreover, the cost of each job turnover averaged 
$2,800. Blanck, supra note 12, at 29. 
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equivalent or lower absenteeism rates, 170 thus saving their 
employers replacement expenses. 171 
In addition to more readily calculable benefits, Blanck has also 
described "ripple effects" emanating from the provlSlon of 
accommodations,172 including economic benefits that may be difficult 
to quantify initially, but which are eventually internalized by 
employers. Among these desirable consequences are purported 
higher productivity,173 greater dedication,174 and better identification 
of qualified candidates for promotion. 175 Employers may also enjoy 
fewer insurance claims, reduced post-injury rehabilitation costs/76 an 
improved corporate culture,177 and more widespread use by workers 
170. See Gretchen Adams-Shollenberger & Thomas E. Mitchell, A Comparison of Janitorial 
Workers with Mental Retardiltion and Their Non-Disabled Peers on Retention and Absenteeism, J. 
REHABILITATION, July-Sept. 1996, at 56, 59 (finding no statistically significant difference in rates of 
absenteeism between janitorial workers with mental retardation and their nondisabled peers); Rick A. 
Lester & Donald W. Caudill, The Handicapped Worker: Seven Myths, 41 TRAINING & DEV. J., Aug. 
1987, at 50, 51 ("[H)andicapped workers have lower absenteeism ... than nonhandicapped people."); 
J .E. Martin et al., Work Attendance in Competitive Employment- Comparison Between Employees Who 
Are Non-Handicapped and Those Who Are Mentally Retarded, 23 MENTAL RETARDATION 142, 145 
(1985) ("[A]ttendance records of ... workers who are mentally retarded are at least as good as [those 
of] their nonhandicapped peers."); Dolores Ondusko, Comparison of Employees with Disabilities and 
Able-Bodied Workers in Janitorial Maintenance, J. APPLIED REHABILITATION CoUNSEUNG, Summer 
1991, at 19, 22-23 ("There was no indication that the number of absences is different between able-
bodied employees and ... employees with disabilities."). 
171. See Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the 
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 378 (1997) 
(arguing that these positive benefits of employing disabled workers are widespread). 
172. BLANCK, supra note 12, at 29. 
173. Patricia M. Owens, Editorial, Manager's Journal: Employee Disabilities Needn't Impair 
Profits, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1999, at A22 ("Savvy employers have figured out that a can-do 
attitude for employees with impairments is good for profits and productivity."). 
174. See, e.g., Stuart Silverstein, Work & Careers: On the Job with More Help from New 
Technology, More Disabled Join the Work Force, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1998, at C5 (quoting 
EarthLink's vice president: "What you find are employees who probably are more focused and 
more dedicated to doing quality work."). 
175. See Thomas W. Hale et al., Persons with Disabilities: Labor Market Activity, 1994, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1998, at 3, 3 (relating that the disabled are less likely to work in 
high paying positions relative to the nondisabled). 
176. Blanck, supra note 12, at 26-27. 
177. See id. at 8 (quoting Sears Chairman and CEO: "When Sears hires, works with, and 
accommodates qualified employees with disabilities, Sears enhances its ... employee morale"). 
For fun, compare the account of corporate culture in HARVEY MACKAY, SWIM WITH THE 
SHARKS WITHOUT BEING EATEN ALIVE: OUTSELL, 0UTMANAGE, 0UTMOTIV ATE, & 
0UTNEGOTIATE YOUR COMPETITION (1988), with SCOTT ADAMS, DILBERT AND THEW A Y OF 
THE WEASEL (2002). 
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without disabilities of efficiency-enhancing technologies previously 
utilized exclusively by their peers with disabilities.178 
Beyond these ripple effects, accommodations may also result in 
"positive externalities," which may (eventually) in turn benefit 
employers, but that are even more difficult to quantify. One such 
externality is public cost savings,179 including the reduction of 
disability-related public assistance obligations, which is currently 
estimated at $120 billion annually. 180 Although studies show that 
hiring people with disabilities can lower taxpayers' general burdens181 
and benefit the national economy,182 the specific effects upon 
individual employers as taxpayers remain unclear. 
More attenuated as far as their impact (if any) upon individual 
employers, as well as being increasingly difficult to quantify, are the 
benefits to society that can issue from employing disabled workers.183 
These benefits can include placing people with disabilities in a 
position to exercise the responsibilities of citizenship,184 
178. For instance, the nonvisually impaired employees of a large insurance company 
assimilated voice-recognition technology originally provided as an accommodation. See Heidi 
M. Berven & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with Disabilities Act Pan II: 
Patents and Innovations in Assistive Technology, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 9, 
85--89 (1998) (discussing faults of cost-benefit paradigms in determining whether employers 
suffer undue hardship and explaining the "ripple effect"). 
179. These, however, are directly to the public, and not to employers. Conceivably, though, 
the savings eventually inure to firms in the form of lower taxes, including those accommodations 
intended to support workman's compensation, disability insurance, and support programs. 
180. DAVID I. LEVINE, REINVENTING DISABILITY POLICY 1 (lnst. of Indus. Relations, 
Working Paper No. 65, 1997) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). One report estimated that 
for every one million disabled people employed, :'there would be as much as a $21.2 billion 
annual increase in earned income; a $1.2 billion annual decrease in means-tested cash income 
payments; a $286 million annual decrease in the use of food stamps; a $1.8 billion decrease in 
Supplemental Security Income payments; 284,000 fewer people using Medicaid and 166,000 
fewer people using Medicare." See Patricia Digh, People with Disabilities Show What They Can 
Do, H.R. MAGAZINE, June 1998, at 140, 144 (citing Rutgers University economist Douglas 
Kruse). . 
181. See, e.g., Taxpayer Return Study California Department of Rehabilitation Mental 
Health Cooperative Programs (Oct. 1995) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (finding that for 
every disabled person employed, California taxpayers saved an average of $629 per month in 
costs); The JWOD Program: Providing Cost Savings to the Federal Government by Employing 
People with Disabilities (Feb. 6, 1998) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (listing survey 
results and reporting that the federal government saved $1,963,206 over the course of the study 
by employing 270 people with disabilities). 
182. See generally Thomas N. Chirikos, Aggregate Economic Losses from Disability in the 
United States: A Preliminary Assay, 67 MILBANK Q., Supp. 2, at 59 (1989). 
183. Admittedly, I am unsure if these benefits are possible to quantify. 
184. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 63-101 
(1991) (exploring the connection between work and citizenship in a democracy); Vicki Schultz, 
2003] DISABILITY ACCOMMODATIONS 107 
acknowledging that capable individuals have either a "right" or an 
imperative to work,185 permitting the disabled to achieve dignity 
through labor and productivity,186 and realizing the values of a diverse 
society.187 The value of these gains, as well as what any of them are 
worth to individual employers, is not necessarily negligible, even if it 
is unclear. The expenses extracted for achieving these benefits 
therefore must be evaluated closely when determining whether to 
place such costs upon employers, as opposed to spreading the costs 
among the public through taxes or other state-governed devices.188 
Nevertheless, individual employers arguably benefit from a 
collective climate in which citizens value the identities they achieve 
from being productive more than they value the relief of being excused 
from productivity. How and when to allocate the costs of maintaining a 
culture of productivity raises a host of issues, including criticisms of 
those law and economics studies utilizing wealth as a value,189 the 
continuing commodification debate,190 questions about the perspective 
Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1881, 1886 (2000) (noting the importance of work as 
"constitutive of citizenship"). 
185. See Gregory S. Kavka, Disability and the Right to Work, 9 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 262,264 
(1992) (arguing for a morally- and economically-based right to work for disabled citizens). 
186. See Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National 
Employment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 129 (1998) ("Work 
contributes to self-esteem by conferring a sense of mastery over the environment and 
reaffirming to the worker that he or she is making a contribution to society."). 
187. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2000) (arguing for the workplace as a "vehicle of civic engagement"). 
188. The impact of dignitary benefits exceeds the scope of this Article. 
189. The critiques were heralded by several professors. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, 
MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 95, 111-22 (1988) (critiquing the adoption of wealth 
maximization as a benchmark for efficiency); Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-
Benefit Standard, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 135 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001). 
190. See generally Richard Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law, 
146 U. PA. L. REv. 1419 (1998) (noting the difficulty of evaluating, in monetary terms, certain 
values and goals). 
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of policymakers/91 and differences of opinion on the advantages (and 
possible obligations) of investing in human capital.192 
Regardless of the resolution, if any, that is reached as to what types 
of hard-to-quantify benefits are to be accorded significance, an account 
that incorporates some of the more difficult-to-quantify benefits listed 
above is far more encompassing and informative than the existing, 
narrower approach. 
3. Limitations. Although propitious for those wishing to 
advocate on behalf of the inherent reasonableness of ADA 
accommodation, reliance upon the studies set forth in the above 
Section requires a good deal of caution. Because corporate cultures 
and economies differ, the conclusions drawn from studies of specific 
corporations may not be representative of other enterprises. Results 
are unlikely to be representative if unexamined enterprises are 
dissimilar in size or economic prowess, or engage in unrelated 
business activities. Therefore, it may be inaccurate to extrapolate very 
small sample group results from particular enterprises onto employers 
• 1193 m genera. 
191. See SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL 
REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 117-28 (1996) (discussing the social alienation resulting from the 
failure of doctors and medical science to diagnose--or fail to diagnose-an illness or medical 
condition which can result in the loss or denial of governmental assistance and other benefits); 
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Law and Economics: Paradigm, Politics, or Philosophy, in LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 233, 237-46 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1998) (exploring the effects of political and 
philosophical biases on the discipline of law and economics and its applications under two 
different approaches: the Chicago School and the Reformist School). 
192. Compare, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 
70 J. POL. ECON. 9 (1962) (praising investment in human capital because it will "improve the 
physical and mental abilities of people and thereby raise real income prospects"), with Ruth 
Colker, Hypercapitalism: Affirmative Protections for People with Disabilities, Illness and 
Parenting Responsibilities under United States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 213, 217-20 (1997) 
("(T]he United States has not facilitated long-term investment in human capital through social 
market protection. If our choices were based on a careful study of the experience of other 
countries rather than unexamined rhetoric, we might make different and more humane 
choices."). For an international perspective, see RUTH COLKER, AMERICAN LAW IN THE AGE 
OF HYPERCAPITALISM 62-99 (1998) and CLEMENT FUEST & BERND HUBER, WHY Do 
COUNTRIES SUBSIDIZE INVESTMENT AND NOT EMPLOYMENT? 1-21 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 6685, 1998). 
193. See generally DIANA C. PHEYSEY, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES: TYPES AND 
TRANSFORMATIONS (1994); EDGAR H. SCHEIN, THE CORPORATE CULTURE SURVIVAL 
GUIDE: SENSE AND NONSENSE ABOUT CULTURE CHANGE (1999). For an interesting, context-
specific study of which cultural conditions lend themselves to success, see G. Mitu Gulati et a!., 
When a Workers' Cooperative Works: The Case of Kerala Dinesh Beedi, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 
1427-28 (2002). 
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In addition, the studies do not report the costs of sought-after 
accommodations that were ultimately not provided, presumably due 
to expense. As a result, the median cost of accommodations might be 
meaningfully higher than those reported.194 Finally, the studies focus 
on "hard" costs: expenses engendered by altering physical plant (for 
instance, providing stair-free access). 195 Such studies do not 
adequately appraise "soft" costs, including nonphysical plant 
expenses, such as educating human resource personnel.196 Because 
soft cost outlays can be significant, or even predominant, the actual 
costs of accommodation might be greater than those described by the 
above analyses. 
Ultimately, the accuracy of the few studies assessing the costs of 
providing accommodations to workers with disabilities have to be 
verified, refuted, or debated further through subsequent empirical 
testing. These studies may show accommodation costs to be more or 
less expensive than they are currently perceived, but additional and 
rigorous analysis is necessary in order to better understand the impact 
of accommodations costs. 
B. Accommodation Scholarship 
Although existing legal scholarship on the ADA raises some 
valuable points for considering accommodations as a whole, it offers 
little guidance on how to ascertain the reasonableness of 
accommodations. A recent publication by Professors Schwab and 
Willborn proposes one approach to this issue,197 while a pair of articles 
by Professors Bagenstos198 and Wax,199 respectively, lend insight into 
why extra-reasonable accommodations ought to be provided. 
1. General Accommodation Scholarship. Although not directly 
on point as far as evaluating the reasonableness of ADA 
accommodations, three articles are worth noting to the extent that 
194. See, e.g., President's Committee, supra note 166. 
195. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
196. Set forth above in text, these accommodation expenses originate in 
42 U.S. C.§ 12,111(9)(8) (2000). See supra note 44. 
197. See Schwab & Willborn, supra note 16, at 1264-65 (advocating the adoption of a tort 
law reasonableness standard in determining what constitutes reasonable accommodation under 
the ADA). 
198. See Bagenstos, supra note 18. 
199. See Wax, supra note 20. 
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each raises issues that will later become pertinent to my proposed law 
and economics framework.200 
In an early and prescient article addressing the ADA, Professors 
Pamela Karlan and George Rutherglen suggest the possible extension 
of Title I's accommodation mandate to members of other, more 
traditionally protected groups.201 As a result, employers might be 
required to "offer increasingly flexible scheduling options that would 
enable more women with childcare responsibilities to undertake 
particular jobs,"202 and members of racial and ethnic groups would 
receive individualized training and education to mitigate socially 
based shortfalls.203 As a "profound" innovation,204 they argue, the 
ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement created an 
"opportunity to rethink employment discrimination law more 
generally."205 In divining the parameters of accommodations, whether 
ADA or more broadly extended, Karlan and Rutherglen elaborate on 
Judge Posner's reasoning in Vande Zande206 and conclude that all 
factors involved in assessing reasonableness suggest a comparison to 
negligence law.207 In weighing competing interests, negligence 
assessment "requires reasonable conduct, and implicitly requires no 
undue burden; it, too, is usually applied on the facts of each case; and 
it, too, is usually enforced through individual claims."208 
Professor J.H. Verkerke maintains in a recent article that the 
ADA acts efficiently in placing disabled workers with jobs 
appropriate to their skill sets.209 Applying a theory he previously 
articulated in the context of sex- and race-based discrimination,210 
200. See infra Part IV. 
201. See Karlan & Ruthergien, supra note 3, at 38. 
202. /d. at 39. 
203. !d. at 40. 
204. /d. at 41. 
205. /d. at 38. 
206. /d. at 32 & n.lOO (citing VandeZande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538,542-53 (7th 
Cir. 1995)). 
207. Among the parallels noted were "the substantive standard for reasonable 
accommodation, the wide range of factors that are relevant to the issue of undue hardship, and 
the procedures for enforcement through individual claims in court." /d. at 32. 
208. /d. 
209. Verkerke, supra note 14, at 903. 
210. J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 115, 133-54 (1998) (sex-based discrimination); J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in 
Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 273, 361-83 (1995) (race-based 
discrimination). 
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V erkerke examines the dynamic upon disabled workers of the 
phenomenon of "matching, churning, and scarring," by which he 
means the hiring into an inappropriate position, discharging from that 
position, and precluding the individual from retaining such position.211 
V erkerke argues that the presence of people with disabilities in the 
workplace "creates precisely the conditions necessary" for these 
inefficient circumstances to occur, especially when a disability is not 
readily visibly apparent and is concealed from an employer .212 
Nevertheless, he avers that the ADA acts as "a significant legal 
intervention" to compel efficiency in the labor market.213 By 
according reasonable accommodation protection to qualified 
individuals with disabilities, the statute "constrains employers whose 
private gains from discharging disabled employees" would in the 
ordinary course of business compel them to pass those workers onto 
other employers or onto public assistance programs.214 Finally, 
Verkerke offers five principles to aid the interactive process in 
determining the labor market efficiency of corresponding 
accommodations to workers with disabilities. These include 
distinguishing between high and low risk jobs, imposing "reasonable 
limits" on accommodation costs, encouraging workers to share 
common accommodation costs, reducing accommodation expenses 
through better matching devices, and creating "presumptions that 
generalize by occupation."215 
Finally, and perhaps most globally, Professor Christine Jolls 
identifies the circumstances under which an accommodation 
mandate,216 including the disability-related one contained in the 
ADA, is theoretically likely to reduce a given group's employment 
level or wages, the conditions under which both employment levels 
and wages are prone to be reduced, and those under which neither is 
likely to occur.217 The degree to which antidiscrimination restrictions 
on employment and wage differentials are apt to bind both 
accommodated and nonaccommodated groups is pivotal to Jolls's 
211. Verkerke, supra note 14, at 941. 
212. /d. at 957. For a cursory discussion of two interesting issues not raised by Verkerke, i.e., 
the timing of notice for individuals with not readily discemable (but highly prejudiced) 
disabilities and the attendant question of constructive notice, see infra note 414. 
213. Verkerke, supra note 14, at 903. 
214. /d. 
215. /d. at 941. 
216. E.g., Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). 
217. J oils, supra note 15, at 254. 
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model.218 In the case of workers with disabilities, Jolls posits that 
restrictions on employment differentials are unlikely to be binding, 
while restrictions on wage differentials are likely to bind.219 Thus, 
Jells's model predicts that Title I's reasonable accommodation 
mandates will reduce the relative employment rate of workers with 
disabilities while either increasing their wage levels or leaving them 
unchanged.220 In reaching this conclusion, Jolls confirms the findings 
of two empirical studies of the post-ADA employment effects on 
workers with disabilities. These two studies find a relative reduction 
in the employment rate of workers with disabilities concurrent with 
either a neutral or beneficial effect on wages.221 Although the 
underlying studies can be challenged for a number of reasons,222 as 
218. Jolls finds that where restrictions on wage and employment differentials are binding, 
the relative wage and employment level of disadvantaged workers to non-disadvantaged 
workers will rise or remain the same. Id. Where restrictions on wage differentials are binding 
but restrictions on employment differentials are not binding, the relative wage level of the 
disadvantaged worker will rise or remain the same while the relative employment level will fall. 
Id. Where restrictions on wage differentials are not binding, regardless of the presence or 
absence of binding restrictions on employment differentials, relative wages will fall while the 
relative employment levels will rise where the value of the accommodation exceeds its cost, 
remain the same where the value of the accommodation equals its cost, and fall where the value 
of the accommodation is less than its cost. !d. 
219. !d. at 273-81. 
220. I d. at 288-90. 
221. See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? 
The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 931 (2001) (providing 
statistical results of post-ADA employment and wage effects for workers with disabilities); 
Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 
J. HUM. RESOURCES 691, 700-05 (2000) (concluding that the ADA resulted in a relative 
employment decrease for workers with disabilities). The studies employ harmonious 
frameworks to explain their results. Professor DeLeire uses data panels of men aged eighteen to 
sixty-four from the Study of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) from 1986 to 1993. See 
DeLeire, supra, at 705. DeLeire concludes that the ADA's passage resulted in an average 7.2 
percent decrease in the employment levels of men with disabilities relative to that of men 
without disabilities. /d. Over the same time, DeLeire reports no relative change in workers with 
disabilities' relative earnings. /d. 
Professors Acemoglu and Angrist's results, culled from the 1988-1997 Current 
Population Study (CPS) data for both men and women aged twenty-one to fifty-eight, generally 
corroborate DeLeire's findings, but provide more nuanced detail. See Acemoglu & Angrist, 
supra, at 930. Acemoglu and Angrist find that across the twenty-one to thirty-nine age group, 
the relative employment levels of workers with disabilities declined by 10 to 15 percent with 
respect to hours worked per week. Id. at 932. For the forty to fifty-eight age group, they 
conclude that there was no effect upon women with disabilities relative to their peers without 
disabilities. /d. However, men's employment levels decreased significantly. /d. The relative wage 
levels of workers with disabilities appeared to remain unchanged. /d. 
222. See, e.g., Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, Part Ill: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
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can lolls's conclusions,223 the point to bear in mind is that several very 
capable economists believe that ADA accommodations act as a 
disincentive to the voluntary hiring of people with disabilities. 
2. BPL Balancing: Schwab and Willborn. In an article entitled 
Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities,224 Stewart 
Schwab and Steven Willborn highlight what they view as distinctions 
between the ADA and Title VII.225 The authors see the ADA's 
accommodation mandates as extending beyond the more traditional 
type of antidiscrimination requirements contained in Title VII.226 This 
is because the ADA requires not only "soft preferences" (meaning 
the rendering of equally situated people equally),227 but also "hard 
preferences" (by which they mean something beyond equality; for 
instance, affirmative action/28 for people with disabilities. 
To assess which accommodations are reasonable, Schwab and 
Willborn take up the analogy to negligence law first noted by Judge 
Posner in Vande Zande229 and later briefly discussed by Karlan and 
Rutherglen.230 They propose applying Judge Learned Hand's seminal 
statement of competing duties of care.231 In United States v. Carroll 
Towing Co.,232 Judge Hand balanced the burden (B) of care against 
the potential of a resulting injury (L), reduced by the probability (P) 
of the likelihood that an injury would occur.233 When B < PL a person 
LAB. L. 271, 293-312 (2000) (presenting detailed econometric challenges to the two post-ADA 
employment studies). 
223. For example, John Donohue questions parts of Jolls's work on the ground that a 
central theoretical underpinning of her accommodation model is simple partial equilibrium 
theory. John J. Donohue III, Understanding the Reasons for and Impact of Legislatively 
Mandated Benefits for Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 897, 909-12 (2001). This theory has 
been brought under fire by another empirical study of minimum-wage analysis which seemed to 
disprove the assumption that minimum-wage laws reduce employment levels. /d. at 909--10. 
Because these latter results call partial equilibrium theory into question, it also calls Jolls's 
accommodation model into question. /d. at 910. 
224. Schwab & Will born, supra note 16. 
225. /d. at 1233-37. 
226. /d. at 1200. 
227. /d. at 1209. 
228. /d. at 1211-12. 
229. VandeZande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538,542 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussed supra 
Part l.C.1). 
230. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 32; see also supra notes 201--08 and 
accompanying text. 
231. Schwab & Willbom, supra note 16, at 1268--71. 
232. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
233. /d. at 173. 
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who does not take precautions is liable in negligence. In the event 
that B > PL, a person who did not take precautions will not be liable 
for harm even if an accident arose from that failure. 234 
As an example of how the BPL criteria could be applied to ADA 
accommodations, Schwab and Willborn offer the following 
hypothetical: 
The reviewing court would compare the burden of the 
accommodation to the employer (B) against the gains to the 
disabled worker (L), discounted by the likelihood of the 
accommodation achieving its goals (P). Thus, if the accommodation 
would cost the employer $200 and have an eighty percent chance of 
benefiting the person with a disability by $1000, the BPL analogy 
would label the accommodation reasonable and require it. On the 
other hand, if the accommodation would cost the employer $2000 
and have an expected benefit of $800, the accommodation is 
unreasonable and need not be undertaken.235 
Notwithstanding the elegant simplicity of BPL analysis,236 and 
despite very strong contributions of law and economics analysis to 
tort law analysis,237 Schwab and Willborn recognize several attendant 
234. /d. On the larger question of duty as social contract, which goes beyond the boundaries 
of this Article, see generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of 
MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998), and Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and 
Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996). 
235. Schwab & Willbom, supra note 16, at 1269. 
236. Successive, economic-based treatments have been presented, most prominently, by 
Richard Posner. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 
(1972) (arguing that the BPL formula presents an economically efficient method of applying 
negligence law). But see Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the "Hand 
Formula", 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES lN LAW 145, 145 (2003) (criticizing Posner's advocacy in 
support of an increased use of the BPL formula on the ground that Hand himself did not 
regularly utilize it). 
237. See generally Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care 
Owed to Others? Law and Economics in Conflict, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 19 (2000) (discussing the 
contributions of economic efficiency to tort law and proposing that "courts reconceptualize 
negligence in order to take account of risk to everyone"); William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1985) 
(discussing "whether the principal doctrines of products liability law are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the common law is best understood as an endeavor (which need not be 
conscious) to promote economic efficiency"); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The 
Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981) (introducing the "positive 
economic theory" and then showing how its model "can be used to decide whether negligence 
or strict liability is the more efficient liability standard in particular circumstances"); A. Mitchell 
Polinsky, Optimal Liability When the Injurer's Information About the Victim's Loss is Imperfect, 
7 INT'L REv. LAW & ECON. 139 (1987) (explaining that a "central result in the economic theory 
of liability is that if an injurer's liability equals the victim's loss, then either the rule of strict 
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issues that would have to be addressed in determining the 
reasonability of accommodations.238 For example, the P portion of the 
BPL analysis is at risk of underestimation in circumstances where the 
accommodation does not achieve its intended result.239 Of greater 
significance is settling on a uniform measure by which to compare 
costs and benefits. Specifically, one must consider how to quantify 
and select the external benefits to be used in the calculus raised 
earlier in this Article.240 In addition, Schwab and Willborn assert that 
the ADA itself may act as an impediment to the provision of 
accommodations, because it places the entire cost on employers and 
does not allow disabled workers to pay for all or part of their 
accommodations.241 As '! result, they conclude that "BPL analysis 
seems to be missing something" and suggest that the scope of the 
ADA be expanded so as to allow disabled workers to bear some or all 
of their own accommodation costs.242 
3. Toward Independence: Bagenstos and Wax. Two recent 
articles, by Samuel Bagenstos243 and Amy Wax,244 respectively, 
examine, as a policy matter, the way in which employer-sponsored 
ADA accommodations for people with disabilities can be generally 
beneficial for society. Both articles operate from within the 
boundaries of the ADA. Thus, both of these scholars, writing 
separately, endorse the notion of dependence-avoidance by the 
disabled as advantageous both for that group of individuals as well as 
for society at large. In addition, each article operates on the 
liability or the rule of negligence can induce the injurer to behave properly"); Steven Shaven, 
Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980) (comparing "strict liability and 
negligence rules on the basis of the incentives they provide to 'appropriately' reduce accident 
losses"); Steven Shaven, Torts in Which Victim and Injurer Act Sequentially, 26 J.L. & ECON. 
589 (1983) (studying "the effect of liability rules on accident avoidance in situations where 
potential victims and potential injurers act sequentiany"). 
238. For instance, is what is relevant in this analysis the gain to the disabled worker, or the 
gain to the employer in terms of the worker's productivity? See Schwab & Wilborn, supra note 
16, at 1269-71. Both seem relevant to me, but it is unclear how to incorporate that in the 
formula. 
239. Schwab & Willborn, supra note 16, at 1269. 
240. See supra Part ll.A.2. 
241. Schwab & Winborn, supra note 16, at 1271. 
242. /d. This is a frequently made economic argument, and one to which I win return infra 
Part lll.B.3. 
243. Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 967. 
244. Wax, supra note 20, at 1423. 
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assumption that employers, rather than society, ought to bear the 
costs of such accommodations.245 
Attempting to explain the Supreme Court's ADA 
jurisprudence,246 Samuel Bagenstos suggests that a motivating factor 
in the Court's decisions is the desire to keep people with disabilities in 
the workplace rather than on welfare.247 Dependency-avoidance, he 
argues, was likewise one of the prime considerations that impelled the 
statute's passage, which was "sold to a significant extent as a means of 
welfare reform."248 Supporting this assertion with a wealth of 
evidence,249 Bagenstos concludes that overreliance on this notion of 
dependence-avoidance by disability rights advocates ultimately 
engenders risk to their cause because it acts to vitiate 
counterarguments in favor of governmental interventions on behalf of 
unemployed workers with disabilities.250 
Continuing her research cycle on welfare rights and reciprocity,251 
Amy Wax advances her own theory about the ADA's normative goal 
of independence for people with disabilities.252 Employer-provided 
245. See Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 954 ("[M]any of the [ADA's] strongest supporters .... 
sold the statute as a means of avoiding the social costs of dependency by moving people off of 
benefits rolls and into the work force."); Wax, supra note 20, at 1425-26 ("[T]he ADA [may] be 
seen as a way for taxpayers to unload some of the costs of supporting the disabled population 
onto employers .... "). 
246. This is a common theme in his writing. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with 
Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1492 (2001) (suggesting that the 
Court's decisions can be viewed through the lens of risk regulation, with the Justices deferring 
to technocratic, scientific risk regulation); Bagenstos, supra note 35, at 484-532 (proposing that 
the Court's definition of disability could be seen as extending ADA protection only to those 
individuals subject to disability-related stigma). 
247. Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 97<Hl5. 
248. /d. at 927. 
249. Bagenstos relies on legislative findings, case law, and the history of the Disability 
Rights and Independent Living Movements. !d. at 953-1000. 
250. See id. at 1016 ("[T]he effort to use welfare reform arguments to reframe 
'independence' as being essentially coextensive with agency and antipaternalism becomes 
increasingly strained as people with disabilities must rely on more and more outside assistance 
to achieve that 'independence."'). 
251. See AmyL. Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, 8 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 477, 501-16 
(2001) (arguing for conditional reciprocity as an appropriate basis of social welfare policy); Amy 
L. Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political 
Economy of Welfare Reform, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 261 (Winter/Spring 2000) 
(exploring the possibility and potential impact of constitutional recognition of economic welfare 
rights, both in regards to social insurance and need-based transfers). 
252. See Wax, supra note 20, at 1423 (arguing that one can defend the ADA without 
assuming that the productivity levels of a disabled person and an otherwise qualified able-
bodied person are or can be made the same). 
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workplace accommodations, she argues, can improve overall social 
utility so long as disabled workers are able to perform the "core 
elements"253 of the job at issue.254 For even if "many disabled persons" 
are less productive than nondisabled ones,255 Wax argues that the 
alternative of labor market exclusion resulting in social welfare 
expenditures is ultimately more expensive to society as a whole.256 
Nevertheless, Wax asserts that minimum wage and equal pay 
legislation prevent employers from hiring and retaining workers with 
disabilities, even though it is economically .beneficial to society as a 
whole to do so.257 
These two articles offer very thoughtful treatments on the issue 
of why avoiding welfare dependency for people with disabilities is a 
laudable, congressionally endorsed, socially efficient goal that should 
influence one's thinking about disability-related work 
accommodation. At the same time, because they both operate within 
the confines of Title l's boundaries, they do not delineate under what 
circumstances the general tax base ought to provide disability-related 
accommodations that are otherwise inefficient for private employers, 
or where the line should be drawn between private inefficiency and 
public efficiency. 
In sum, Karlan and Rutherglen briefly explore the possibility of 
applying a negligence analysis to the ADA-type accommodations that 
they propose extending to members of protected groups. V erkerke 
claims that in allocating accommodations, the ADA serves as an 
efficient hiring and termination device for the labor market. And, in 
examining the effects of accommodation mandates, Jolls concludes 
that the legislation of ADA accommodations acts as a disincentive to 
hiring disabled workers. Schwab and Willborn offer the most concrete 
analysis by proposing that accommodation costs be measured using a 
BPL type standard, while articles by Bagenstos and Wax offer 
reasons for why extra-reasonable accommodations should be 
provided to disabled workers. Collectively, these scholars have 
contributed valuable insights to understanding ADA-type 
253. /d. at 1421. 
254. See id. at 1426 (noting that given sufficient productivity by the disabled employee, the 
result for society as a whole may be "net positive"). 
255. !d. at 1423. 
256. See id. at 1424 (arguing that if labor markets tailored for marginal productivity force 
employees to hire disabled persons at excessive wages, the result may be costly for taxpayers). 
257. See id. (demonstrating that labor markets may be distorted when minimum wage and 
equal pay statutes set a floor on compensation). 
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accommodations and employment discrimination law more generally, 
but have not proffered a means by which to define the boundaries of 
reasonableness.258 Building on this scholarly framework, Part III sets 
forth the methodological assumptions underlying the proposed 
accommodation cost framework established in Part IV. 
III. METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
Working mainly within the framework of the neoclassical 
economic model of the labor market,259 but with some reservations, 
the methodology and assumptions I describe in this Part differ from 
existing treatments in three ways.260 First, the proposed framework 
questions the neoclassical labor market model presumption that 
employers act efficiently in regard to employees with disabilities. 
Second, the model does not assume that disabled workers are per se 
less productive than nondisabled ones, although it certainly 
recognizes and provides for this eventuality. Third, the model 
challenges the received wisdom of the equitable nature of the labor 
market status quo. Moreover, the framework offered in Part IV also 
goes beyond the boundaries of the traditional labor market model in 
acknowledging that some accommodations can be reasonable from an 
ADA point of view while at the same time not necessarily prove cost-
efficient from an employer's perspective.261 This is the area I denote as 
"semi-efficient," wherein the reasonableness of any given 
258. I wish to stress that this comment is descriptive rather than critical. The above articles 
succeed on their own merits and did not need to address this issue. 
259. A note on nomenclature is warranted at this point. Some economists, as well as a few 
law professors, might consider the use of the term "neoclassical economic model of the labor 
market" as overly expansive. For example, some commentators might equate "neoclassical 
economics" or "price theory" or "neoclassical price theory" with what is referred to as the 
"perfect competition model." Thus, when Robert Bork argued that antitrust enforcement 
should rest on "price theory," he was criticized for claiming that reliance on price theory implied 
reliance on all of the assumptions of the perfect competition model. It is certainly true that the 
perfect competition model is a neoclassical model, and thus an application of price theory, but 
there are also lots of economic models that are forms of neoclassical price theory-models that 
depart in one or more ways from the perfect competition model. In sum, "neoclassical" may be 
said to encompass a fairly large expanse of economic theory. Nonetheless, I am in good 
company in using the concept monolithically. See generally John J. Donohue III, Discrimination 
in Employment, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICflONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 615, 
615-23 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
260. By contrast, the variables set forth in the Appendix are consistent with general law and 
economics notions. 
261. Additionally, within a Kaldor-Hicks welfare enhancement scheme, these 
accommodations are also socially inefficient. See infra Appendix, Section D. 
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accommodation is measured (as the ADA requires) against the 
totality of an employer's resources. Thus, moving away from an 
absolute cost-benefit analysis, there are areas of contingent 
reasonableness in which the same accommodation can be reasonable 
for some employers, but not for others. This section of the continuum 
is incongruent with traditional neoclassical economic analysis, yet 
nonetheless is to a large extent exactly what constitutes reasonable 
ADA accommodations. 
A. The Neoclassical Economic Model 
The comprehensive normative goal of neoclassical economics is to 
design efficient legal regimes.262 As such, the model begins from the 
premise that markets for goods and services operate efficiently. As part 
of this postulate it is assumed that markets determine prices, free 
bargaining is the norm, and knowledge is completely and symmetrically 
disseminated, resulting in prices based on production.263 Under this 
theory, market forces also discipline employers with irrational (and thus 
inefficient) tastes against particular groups by driving those employers 
from the market.264 This economic Darwinism occurs because 
employers' discriminatory hiring practices add to business costs, and 
result in comparative losses by diminishing profit margins.265 Exercising 
distaste (or socially negative preferences )266 also raises the net -product 
margin of nondiscriminatory competitors who engage same-group 
employees at reduced wage levels.267 Resting on this foundation, the 
neoclassical economic paradigm posits that in the context of an efficient 
and properly functioning labor market, employers hire workers with the 
greatest net productivity. This utility is calculated by subtracting total 
labor cost from total production benefit (a calculation that I adopt 
below).268 Because workers with disabilities are viewed as requiring 
262. See MARK PERLMAN & CHARLES R. MCCANN, JR., THE PILLARS OF ECONOMIC 
UNDERSTANDING: IDEAS AND TRADITIONS 301 (2000) (describing the market as a "model of 
allocative efficiency"). · 
263. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 
185,226-28,313-14 (7thed. 1998). 
264. See BARRY CLARK, POLffiCAL ECONOMY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 196 (1991) 
(describing how discriminating employers incur higher wage costs by. bypassing otherwise 
qualified workers, thus losing market share). 
265. /d. 
266. The seminal writing on "distaste" is by Nobel Prize-winning economist, and now journalist, 
Gary S. Becker, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 39-45 (2d ed. 1971 ). 
267. CLARK, supra note 264, at 196. 
268. See infra Appendix, Section B. 
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costly inputs in the form of accommodations, an employer, if sufficiently 
unconstrained by regulations so that she can act of her own preference, 
would rationally choose nondisabled employees.269 
As a result of these two premises, the neoclassical economic 
model concludes that when employers are forced to hire disabled 
employees against their own considered judgment, these employers 
bear costs that they would not have otherwise borne. Consequently, 
Title I accommodations are inherently inefficient because they reduce 
the utility an individual employer is able to achieve. Title I's 
requirements are also undesirable because they compel private 
employers (as opposed to, say, the general tax base) to bear the costs of 
an inefficient social policy. Thus, exclusion of people with disabilities 
from the employment sphere is the result of rationally efficient 
decisionmaking, not overt discrimination, or a more benign 
discrimination resulting from the reliance on statistical discrirnination.270 
The most thorough evaluation (and concise criticism) of Title I 
from a neoclassical economic perspective was published by Professor 
Richard Epstein after passage of the ADA, but prior to promulgation of 
its regulations.271 Although therefore somewhat precipitate,272 it was also 
prescient in that successive literature closely followed his analysis in 
269. If this employer was also unconstrained as to wage regulations, then it could be that 
disabled employees would sort down to a level beneath their abilities, either by being placed at 
less valuable positions or by accepting lower wages at equally valuable places of employment. 
As an example, a disabled lawyer from Harvard might end up either at a less prestigious (and 
remunerative) firm than a comparable, nondisabled lawyer, or end up at an equally prestigious 
firm than that of the comparable nondisabled lawyer by accepting lower wages. Both firms 
might well be happy to have Harvard graduates, especially if the less prestigious one ordinarily 
is unable to attract those alumni. These scenarios engage inter alia some of the assertions that 
Jails, supra note 15, at 232-33, raises about the binding nature of wage regulations. See also 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 487-88 (1992); Calker, supra note 192, at 217-19 (mentioning similar 
concepts in regard to investment in human capital); Schwab & Willborn, supra note 16, at 1271 
(raising similar assertions in the context of disabled workers self-accommodating through 
reduced wages). 
270. As one commentator put it, the statute "would not be necessary if these 
[accommodations] were beneficial to employers as they automatically act in ways that promote their 
self interests." Thomas H. Barnard, Disabling America: Costing Out the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 41,58 (1992). 
271. EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 480-94. I am grateful to Professor Epstein for his courtesy and 
friendship. Although I disagree with almost all his views on employment discrimination law, and 
have therefore utilized his work as a counterpoint to my own, he has always been open to 
exchanging ideas and I have learned much from him. For an elegant evaluation of the above work, 
see John J. Donohue III, Book Review, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1477 (1993). 
272. Epstein recently reprised many of his arguments in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY OR MORE OPPORTUNITY? THE GOOD THING ABOUT DISCRIMINATION (2002). 
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applying the neoclassical economic labor market model to the ADA.273 
This is equally true of the recent scholarship described above274 to the 
extent that it also adopts methodological assumptions common to the 
neoclassical economic model. 
Not all the assumptions impelling Epstein's analysis are adopted 
whole cloth by everyone utilizing law and economics schemas. 
Moreover, other variations and interpretations of the neoclassical 
model (whether or not applied to the labor market) exist.275 
Additionally, two major factors distinguish Epstein's take on ADA 
accommodations from that of other economically inclined authors. The 
first differentiating feature is his normative solution to the difficulties 
raised by Title I. A longtime advocate of libertarianism,276 Epstein 
argues that the ADA (as well as all other regulations governing the 
labor market) ought to be abrogated on efficiency and autonomy 
grounds.277 This is not a position currently taken by any of the other 
authors in the field, although some concur with a corollary of that 
proposition, namely, that disabled workers should be allowed to 
underbid their services.278 
The second major notion that separates Epstein from more 
traditional neoclassical economic analysis is his recommendation that 
273. See, e.g., Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an 
Employer's Financial Hardship Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 
VAND. L. REV. 391,397 (1995) (criticizing the undue hardship standard as it relates to employee 
accommodation); Mark A. Schuman, The Wheelchair Ramp to Serfdom: The Americans with 
Disabilities Act, Liberty, and Markets, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 495, 500--02 (1995) 
(arguing that the ADA imposes severe liberty restrictions through its employer accommodation 
mandates); Ron A. Vassel, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Cost, Uncertainty and 
Inefficiency, 13 J.L. & COM. 397, 406-10 (1994) (promoting a free market solution to disability 
based employment discrimination); Christopher J. Willis, Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act: Disabling the Disabled, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 715, 725-50 (1995) (proposing the 
repeal of the ADA on the grounds that it is economically inefficient, decreases societal net 
wealth, and is harmful to its intended beneficiaries). 
274. See supra Part II.B. 
275. See Michael Ashley Stein, Disability and Employment: Alternative Approaches to 
Traditional Empirical Research, in EMERGING WORKFORCE ISSUES: W.l.A., TICKET TO WORK, 
AND TRANSITION 95-96 (L. Robert MeConnell ed., 2001) (describing some alternative metrics). 
276. See generally Symposium, The Works of Richard A. Epstein, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
655,783-803 (2000) (noting Epstein's marriage of utilitarian and libertarian thought). 
277. See EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 484 (arguing that "successful enforcement under the 
guise of 'reasonable accommodation' necessarily impedes the operation and efficiency of 
firms"). 
278. That is, disabled workers may accept salaries below equivalent values. This latter 
proposal, which also animates Schwab and Willbom's treatment, see supra Part II.B.2, is 
discussed infra Part III.C, in the context of questioning the equitable nature of the labor 
market's status quo. 
122 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:79 
deference be paid to the prejudicial tastes of employers and third parties 
(in the form of customers and/or other employees) when assessing the 
cost of a given accommodation.279 This is an unusual proposal from a 
methodological standpoint. Although law and economics assessments 
are expected to account for all possible costs and benefits when 
assessing the efficiency of any given policy,280 it is atypical when 
calculating social good to give weight to preferences arising from 
socially undesirable criteria.281 These can include tastes that are illegal, 
such as murder, or objectionable, like sadism.282 Imagine, for example, 
an economic analysis in which value was accorded to the tastes of Ku 
Klux Klan customers who object to interacting with Asian-American 
account executives; or, to use a less extreme example, customers who 
are not members of an infamous hate group, but who nonetheless feel 
that they can better relate to account executives whose native language 
(they presume) is English.283 
Moreover, another difficulty with accepting irrational preferences 
as they relate to disabled workers is that doing so incorporates a 
misperception that disability is central to determinations that can also 
be universally human. Thus, the "awkward" feelings that Epstein 
imagines will be engendered in nondisabled individuals who have to 
279. Epstein would require this deference even under his preferred regime, one in which the 
ADA was ultimately abrogated. EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 486-88. 
280. See generally COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 2 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001). 
281. In response to this concern, Professors Adler and Posner create the welfare equivalents 
(WE) measure, or the amount of money that would be paid to or by an individual so that on the 
right theory of well-being that individual is as well off there as she would be in the status quo. 
/d. at 270. Accordingly, because an employee's preference to work only with a given class of 
persons is not based on a valid theory of well-being, it would not be included in the calculus. 
This is because inclusion of an invalid preference would result in upholding undesired 
prejudices that, even if extant in the status quo, are detrimental to society. !d. at 269 (describing 
"distorted" preferences as those which do not "enhance [a] person's well-being"). 
282. Besides Epstein, one article avers that additional externalities, all negative, should be 
considered at greater length when weighing the reasonableness of Title I accommodations. See 
Jason Zarin, Beyond the Bright Line: Consideration of Externalities, the Meaning of Undue 
Hardship, and the Allocation of the Burden of Proof Under Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 511, 519 (1998) (arguing that considering the effect of 
externalities "improves the accuracy" of a cost-benefit analysis of the burden of an 
accommodation). Harlan Hahn addresses this distaste on a sociological level. Harlan Hahn, 
Advertising the Acceptably Employable Image: Disability and Capitalism, 15 POL'Y STUD. J. 551, 
566 (1987). 
283. This is not to be confused with workplace rules (illegal under Title VII) that forbid the 
speaking of any language other than English at the worksite, as was the case in EEOC v. 
Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 911 (N.D. Ill. 1999). See also S. Craig Moore, 
English-Only Rules in the Workplace, 15 LAB. LAW. 295,295-308 (1999). 
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interact with a disabled worker.284 Yet, a worker's attitude, personality, 
and demeanor are factors irrespective of disability that ultimately 
determine the comfort of interaction. Without a doubt, Oscar the 
Grouch would associate poorly with his peers and function poorly in a 
customer relations department (or, worse still, as an anger-management 
consultant). This would, however, be because of his attitude, rather than 
his physical difference of being green and furry.285 Similarly, it can be 
expected that the rational responses of others will ultimately be 
influenced by whether individuals with disabilities conduct themselves 
in the ways that disagreeable people without disabilities do, or whether 
they behave agreeably.286 
In spite of these two significant departures, to date the analyses 
grounded in the neoclassical economic paradigm otherwise dovetails 
with Epstein's view. In sum, Epstein (and through him as a proxy, other 
economic commentators) relies on three main assumptions from which 
flows the conclusion that the potential benefits to employers associated 
with reasonable accommodations are economically inefficient. 
Respectively, these are the overall efficient functioning of the labor 
market, the inherently lower productivity of disabled workers, and, 
accordingly, the equity of the labor market's status quo.287 
B. Challenges to the Neoclassical Economic Model 
Although this Article utilizes the general neoclassical economic 
model of the labor market, it challenges three basic assumptions of the 
framework as it pertains to workers with disabilities: (1) the notion that 
the labor market functions efficiently in allocating employment 
opportunity to disabled workers; (2) the underlying assumptions that 
284. EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 486--87. 
285. A display at the National Museum of American History's Behring Center is available at 
http://www.si.edu/resource/faq/where/oscar.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal). By 
contrast Grover, who is blue and furry, would be very good at either job. That Cookie Monster, 
who is also blue and furry, would not, only underscores the individual nature of job matching. 
286. Consequently, as far as academic assessments go, deferring to prejudicial irrationalities 
about disabled workers, in contrast to acknowledging and then discounting those preferences, is a 
controversial method of applying otherwise conventional law and economics criteria and should not 
be impugned to other writers from that field. Such inclusion would also result in continuation of the 
same biases that the ADA was meant to counteract. Thus, at the very least, justification is required 
for such atypical accession to irrational preferences. See Michael Ashley Stein, Market Failure and 
ADA Title I, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR 
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 193, 200-01 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 
2000) (arguing that reacting negatively to the difference of disability is "not inherently 
different" from other responses of exclusion now viewed as prejudicial). 
287. EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 484-85. 
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the paradigm uses when assessing those employees' productivity; and 
(3) the proposition that the status quo baseline of the existing labor 
market is an equitable one. 
1. Labor Market Efficiency. The first flawed assumption in the 
neoclassical economic model of the labor market governing workers 
with disabilities is the unqualified acceptance of its efficiency. The 
paradigm posits that employers acting rationally will hire and 
maintain workers with the greatest net product, while those who act 
irrationally will be disciplined by market forces and driven from 
competition. This premise, which is taken as a standard economic 
assumption by many law and economics practitioners and should, in 
the normal course of events be accurate, has questionable factual and 
normative elements as applied to the reality of disabled workers' 
experiences in the labor market.288 
A primary objection to categorically applying the neoclassical 
law and economics model to the labor market is factual. To begin 
with, the standard economic model of analysis is premised on 
complete and symmetrical distribution of information to all actors 
within a given market.289 Yet not all markets function equally in this 
respect. Although an economic account of how information is 
disseminated might be true of financial markets whose extensive 
reporting requirements are rigorously enforced by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC),290 no parallel structure exists in the 
labor market. A very clear example of information asymmetry in the 
context of disabled workers may be seen in a December 2002 study 
by the General Accounting Office (GA0),291 which found that only a 
288. In explaining this assertion, the scholarship of Professors Cass Sunstein and John Donohue 
is instructive in positing that competitive markets not only fail to eliminate discriminatory 
practices, but can also extend them. See John J. Donohue Ill, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1411, 1423 (1986) (rejecting the argument that market forces will "restore the 
nondiscriminatory equilibrium by disciplining discriminators"); John J. Donohue III, 
Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1337, 1348 (1989) (noting that although competitive market forces tend to discipline 
discriminators, the same market forces "do not always operate at the optimal speed"); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, in REASSESSING CIVIL RIGHTS 22,36 (Ellen 
F. Paul ed., 1991) (illustrating how competitive markets may perpetuate discrimination through 
"economically rational response[s]" to the desires of third parties, "stereotyping," or "limited 
investments in human capital"). 
289. ANINDYA SEN, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 159-{iO (1999). 
290. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION§ 9.6 (4th ed. 2002). 
291. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BUSINESS TAX INCENTIVES: INCENTIVES TO 
EMPLOY WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES RECEIVE LIMITED USE AND HAVE AN UNCERTAIN 
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"very small proportion"292 of businesses utilized either the two 
available federal tax credits for hiring disabled workers,293 or the 
barrier removal deduction,294 which would make their premises 
accessible to disabled customers (and, with some overlap, workers 
with disabilities).295 Respectively, the two hiring incentives provide 
for $2,400 and $5,000 (combinable) per annum, per eligible disabled 
worker;2% the public accommodation credit allows for as much as 
$15,000 per year.297 Thus, a relatively simple vehicle to compensate 
employers for accommodation costs-one which, if the Blanck 
position outlined above is believed, could make accommodating 
disabled workers an even more profitable proposition298-was 
reported by the GAO as being severely underused.299 To remedy this 
informational failure, the GAO Report recommends "improving 
government outreach and education efforts."300 Consider the 
possible ramifications if the GAO had suggested that the 
government parallel the SEC's reporting requirements in reverse, 
with every corporate taxpayer receiving a document along with its 
annual tax return briefing it on the possible benefits of employing 
disabled workers. Furthermore, the liquidity of financial market 
commodities does not extend to almost any other market, including 
that for employment services,301 where the value of individual 
IMPACf (GA0-03-39 Dec .. 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0339.pdf (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. I thank my colleague Professor John 
Lee for bringing this study to my attention. 
292. !d. at 2. 
293. These tax cuts are, respectively, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 51 
(2000), and the Disabled Access Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 44(a) (2000). 
294. See 26 U.S.C. § 190 (2000) (providing a credit for "architectural and transportation 
barrier removal expenses"). 
295. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text. 
296. GAO REPORT, supra note 291, at 2. 
297. !d. 
298. See supra Parts II.A.1-2. 
299. GAO REPORT, supra note 291, at 11-14. The availability of these measures is not, 
however, totally neglected. See, e.g., Linda Nelsestuen & Mark Reid, Coordination of Tax 
Incentives Associated with Compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 TAXES 37, 
38--42 (2003) (reporting on the availability of the ADA tax incentives for eligible employers). 
300. GAO REPORT, supra note 291, at 25. It also recommended two measures not related to 
informational asymmetry: increasing the amount of employer incentives and expanding the types 
of businesses eligible beyond the ADA's floor of fifteen employees. !d. 
301. The same liquidity does not extend to the absolute fungibility of those workers, 
although Verkerke's article works from this very premise by positing the mobility of disabled 
workers (otherwise there would be no future mismatching opportunities). Verkerke, supra note 
14, at 910-11. But see Marjorie L. Baldwin & Edward J. Schumacher, A Note on Job Mobility 
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workers may be more difficult (although certainly possible )302 
to determine. 
Information asymmetry may also exist as to the possible tastes of 
employers and third parties toward workers with disabilities. Although 
empirical surveys of Fortune 500 executives,303 senior executives,304 and 
coworkers305 uniformly report favorable attitudes toward employing 
disabled individuals, available data fails to evince significant increases in 
the relative employment rate among disabled individuals.306 Two 
alternative conclusions can be drawn from this apparent paradox: either 
cognitive dissonance causes the individuals surveyed to believe they 
favor disabled employment when in reality they do not, or those 
interviewed truly do espouse pro-disabled sentiments, but because of an 
information asymmetry, this preference does not manifest itself when 
these individuals act on behalf of corporations.307 Judging from the 
shortage of disability awareness and management programs instituted 
by corporations as part of their business practices, the latter conclusion 
seems plausible.308 This scarcity further denotes a market failure; under 
Among Workers with Disabilities, 41 INDUS. REL. 430, 433 (2002) (analyzing empirically the 
assumption of mobility among workers with disabilities). 
302. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
303. Joel M. Levy et al., Attitudes of Executives in Fortune 500 Corporations Towards the 
Employability of Persons with Severe Disabilities: Industrial and Service Corporations, 24 J. 
APPLIED REHABILITATION COUNSELING 19, 19-31 (1994). 
304. A 1995 survey of senior corporate executives found that 89 percent supported plans to 
increase the number of workers with disabilities their companies employed. THE 
N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY ON EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 24 (1995). 
305. In a 1991 survey, 68 percent of those polled said they would support policies that 
increase the number of disabled workers, 65 percent responded that they would not have any 
problems with disabled coworkers, and 77 percent said they would not be concerned if their 
boss was a seriously disabled person. LOUIS HARRIS & Assocs., PuB. ATTITUDES TowARDS 
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 23-28 (1991). 
306. If anything, the data demonstrates moderate decreases, as reported by the studies of 
Acemoglu and Angrist, and DeLe ire, set forth supra note 221. 
307. /d. Alternatively, one could imagine a corporation in which the leadership polled feel 
positively about employing disabled workers, but the human resource managers engaged in the 
actual hiring processes feel differently. 
308. SHEILA H. AKABAS ET AL., DISABILITY MANAGEMENT 248-49 (1992) ("The attitude 
of employers often interferes with bringing workers with disabilities into the workplace."). But 
see THE ADA AT WORK: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS OF THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A STUDY BY THE SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. 5 
(1999) (finding that 82 percent of organizations make existing facilities accessible to disabled 
employees, 79 percent are flexible in the application of HR policies, and 67 percent restructure 
jobs or modify work hours); Serbrenia J. Sims & Ronald R. Sims, ADA and the Role of Human 
Resource Management in Managing the Diverse Workforce of the 1990s, in HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 149, 157 (1995) ("Human rights, 
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a neoclassical economic model, companies with access to this 
information would act on whatever favorable economic incentives 
existed (through generated extemalities,309 including tax breaks)310 and 
employ greater numbers of disabled workers. 
Next, contrary to the neoclassical labor market account, empirical 
studies conducted both before and after passage of the ADA clearly 
demonstrate the persistence of employment discrimination as an 
obstacle to labor market opportunities for workers with disabilities.311 In 
analyzing the effects of employer practices, these studies, which assume 
information asymmetry in the labor market, distinguish the effects of 
economically rational behavior from the effects of prejudicial 
behavior.312 In other words, they distinguish between decisions arising 
from the use of indicators that substitute reliable generalizations about 
group characteristics from those which either wrongly assume or 
overestimate the existence of those characteristics.313 Although 
assertions of prejudice have long been raised by members of the 
social justice, and diversity are increasingly valued in the workplace, as they are in society at 
large."). 
309. See supra Part II.A.2. 
310. See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
311. See generally Marjorie L. Baldwin et al., Gender Differences in Wage Losses from 
Impairments: Estimates from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 29 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 865, 873-84 (1994); Marjorie L. Baldwin, Estimating Wage Discrimination Against 
Workers With Disabilities, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 276, 276--90 (1994); Marjorie L. 
Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Men with Disabilities in 
the Year of the ADA, 66 S. ECON. J. 548, 556--62 (2000); Marjorie L. Baldwin & William G. 
Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Women with Disabilities, 34 INDUS. REL. 555, 
569-76 (1995); Marjorie L. Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination 
Against Men with Disabilities, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1, 6--15 (1994); William G. Johnson & 
James Lambrinos, Wage Discrimination Against Handicapped Men and Women, 20 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 264,270-76 (1985). 
312. See, e.g., Baldwin & Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Men with 
Disabilities, supra note 311, at 2 (noting that discrimination may result from "prejudice, 
differential information concerning the average productivity of majority and minority workers, 
or exploitation of workers"); Johnson & Lambrinos, supra note 311, at 265--66 (distinguishing 
prejudice from discrimination that arises when employers believe disabled persons to be "less 
productive" and "more costly to hire"). 
313. For example, Baldwin & Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Women with 
Disabilities, supra note 311, at 555-77, examined the extent of wage discrimination and its 
attendant employment effects against disabled women. They found, among other results, that 
although the absolute wage differential between women with and without disabilities is small, 
more than one-half of the wage differential was directly attributable to discrimination against 
the disabled cohort. I d. at 572. 
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disability rights community/14 and were documented by Congress in the 
legislative findings section that it included in the ADA,315 recognition of 
these asseverations, even when backed by the sort of empirical studies 
cited above,316 has by and large eluded those commentators analyzing 
the ADA's accommodation mandates.317 
In the case of workers with disabilities, estimates of indicators that 
are meant to signal appraisals of productivity and accommodation cost 
are swayed by existing misconceptions about disabled workers that 
substitute for less easily obtainable, accurate information. This is 
because, excluding instances of purposeful prejudice, discrimination 
may also occur when a decisionmaker who lacks perfect information 
about the characteristics of the members of a given group bases her 
assessment on inaccurate "indicators" that she believes can evaluate 
those individuals' present or future performance.318 Additionally, even 
if economically efficient indicators were substituted for empirically 
incorrect ones, a market failure would continue because employers' 
discriminatory behavior would be rewarded as efficient. Conversely, a 
system requiring economically empowered employers, rather than 
economically disempowered employees, to bear cost differentials 
incurred by disregarding rational economic discrimination may arguably 
be more efficient from a social welfare standpoint. Thus, although the 
baseline assumption that employers act in an efficient manner seeking 
to maximize their own profits usually appears correct, from at least one 
point of view, it is empirically invalid. 
Moreover, the neoclassical economic model asserts that once 
discriminatory practices are observed, employers who exercise 
distaste are disciplined by market forces that reduce their profit 
margins while increasing those of their nondiscriminatory 
314. For one of the earlier, as well as more elegant, assertions of prejudice, see Jacobus 
tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Tons, 
54 CAL. L. REV. 809 (1966). 
315. These findings are detailed in Burgdorf, supra note 51, at 422-27. 
316. See supra Part II. 
317. This is true to the degree that the empirical studies, which one would think central to 
economic analyses-even if ultimately rejected by them after consideration-are cited in only a 
handful of law review articles. 
318. Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, An Equality Paradigm for Preventing Genetic 
Discrimination, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1341, 1382 (2002). Specific instances of statistical inaccuracies 
exist when excluding people from employment on the basis of genetic identity. See id. (noting 
that genetically atypical individuals with asymptomatic conditions may never exhibit 'symptoms 
for a particular illness, yet will remain excluded from some employment opportunities). General 
policy misassessments are described in Silvers & Stein, supra note 29, at 102. 
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competitors.319 As with the first premise, this theory has not been 
empirically demonstrated. Indeed, logical application of the 
neoclassical economic paradigm would recount that prior to 1964,320 
when federal antidiscrimination laws injected inefficiency into the 
dynamics governing private employment relationships,321 
discriminatory firms were either penalized or driven from 
competition. I am unaware of any empirical evidence that supports 
this position.322 To the contrary, United States markets have 
historically evinced (and continue to evidence) various forms of 
discrimination.323 
Finally, the assertion of market failure within the neoclassically 
governed employment market is not unique. Claims that imperfect 
information undermines the efficiency of hiring decisions have arisen 
f . 324 • 325 d . .1 · h 326 Add' · 11 rom econometnc, econormc, an CIVI ng ts sources. ttlona y, 
319. BECKER, supra note 266, at 39-45. 
320. That year heralded the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 
Stat. 241, which prohibited employment and other forms of discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, and national origin. 
321. See generally THOMAS SOWELL, MARKETS AND MINORITIES (1981) (examining how 
economic forces and government intervention impact the success· of racial and ethnic 
minorities). 
322. In fact, if the work of one Nobel Prize-winning economist and his three colleagues is 
believed, even Title VII's promulgation did not eradicate disparities in wage and employment 
effects relative to race by itself. Instead, it was protracted governmental enforcement of that 
statute. Richard Butler & James J. Heckman, The Government's Impact on the Labor Market 
Status of Black Americans: A Critical Review, in EQUAL RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
235, 252 (Leonard J. Hausman et al. eds., 1977); John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, 
Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status 
of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603, 1637-40 (1991); James J. Heckman & Brook S. 
Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of 
Blacks: A Study of South Carolina, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 138, 167-73 (1989). 
323. If needed, contemporary empirical proof as to the pervasiveness of minority-based 
prejudice is presented in IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? (2001 ). 
324. See, e.g., Baldwin & Johnson, Labor Market Discrimination Against Men with 
Disabilities, supra note 311, at 14 ("The extent to which the remaining ·employment differential 
reflects. . . employers' lack of knowledge concerning the productivity of persons with 
impairments is an open question."); Johnson & Lambrinos, supra note 311, at 265 ("Employers 
may believe that handicapped workers are less productive and more costly to hire and train than 
the nonhandicapped."). 
325. See, e.g., DAVID NEUMARK, LABOR MARKET INFORMATION AND WAGE 
DIFFERENTIALS BY RACE AND SEX (Nat' I Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6573, 
1998) (positing that employer misinformation about minorities and women account for wage 
discrimination); Sunstein, supra note 288 (arguing that competitive markets, far from 
eliminating discrimination, actually work to extend it). 
326. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE 
OF RACISM 55 (1992) (critiquing civil rights laws and federal policy); Richard Delgado, 
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the issue of whether and when to characterize decisions made in the 
context of imperfect information based on indicators believed to 
accurately evaluate future performance as statistically efficienf27 or 
empirically unpredictive328 is at the heart of a longstanding debate.329 
There are also examples of employers failing to capitalize on other 
economically beneficial actions,330 which run contrary to what the 
neoclassical economic labor market model would suggest.331 
Consequently, although general acceptance of the neoclassical 
economic model is a valid departure point from which to begin an 
evaluation of the general labor market, unfettered belief in the self-
corrective force of competitive market pressures within the labor field 
is, despite its popular currency, unproven. 
2. Disabled Worker Productivity. A second systemic shortfall in 
the current neoclassical economic account is the tripartite assumption 
that (1) disabled employees require accommodations; (2) these 
accommodations are inherently costly; and (3) by nature, disabled 
workers are less productive than their nondisabled counterparts. 
Empirical studies have not established the prevalence of the need for 
accommodation among disabled workers across the labor market. It is 
Rodrigo's Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for Eradicating Discrimination a Blind Alley?, 
93 Nw. U. L. REV. 215, 231-42 (1998) (challenging the law and economics assertion that. free 
markets will correct discrimination because there are motivators of human behavior, specifically 
racist behavior, that are not economic in basis and that cause people to make economically 
disadvantageous decisions). 
327. See generally Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of Discrimination in 
Labor Markets, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 175 (1976). 
328. Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title Vll, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 
516 (1987); Peter Norman, Statistical Discrimination and Efficiency (2000) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
329. See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 
228, 229 (1986) (examining the effect of statistical discrimination on allocative efficiency and 
arguing that it can reduce efficiency). 
330. For instance, high-efficiency electrical equipment is available through negawatt 
acquisition programs. Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets 
and Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1354 
(1993). 
331. For additional examples of alleged market failure, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Market 
Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 728 
(1984); Sherry A. Glied, Health Insurance and Market Failure Since Arrow, 26 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL'Y & L. 957, 957 (2001); Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A 
Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1574 
(1995); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 
985 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, 
and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 618 (1995). 
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reasonable to assume that some percentage of employees with 
disabilities will require accommodations. The size of this group, 
however, depends upon the individual circumstances of present or 
prospective employees, the degree to which an employer's worksite 
and processes already are accessible, and how the term "disabled" is 
conceived332 or measured.333 There is, however, no reason to suspect 
that every employee with a disability requires an accommodation, as 
counterexamples to any such broad generalization are abundant.334 
Nor is it accurate to assume that disabled workers are by nature 
less productive than their counterparts who are free of disabilities. This 
may be true for some individuals with disabilities, just as certain 
nondisabled workers are less productive than the majority of disabled 
ones. Ultimately, individual productivity is a product of ability, aptitude, 
and attitude. Hence, Mr. Rogers might be more productively employed 
by a state motor vehicle office than by a time-sensitive, oil-changing 
garage. In terms of ADA protection, a disabled worker is not 
considered "qualified" under Title I unless she can perform the essential 
job functions of her chosen occupation, either with or without 
accommodation.335 A disabled employee who satisfies the requirements 
of her position (by reaching the average level of required 
productivity)336 without accommodation is clearly as productive as her 
nondisabled peers. When accommodations are needed to accomplish 
integral activities, the existence and degree of relatively lower net 
productivity is affected by the ability of that disabled worker to 
accomplish nonessential job functions, as well as the value of those 
supplementary services to her employer.337 
Two points, however, bear noting. First, as an. empirical matter, 
forty years of pre-ADA empirical studies indicate comparable overall 
332. The definition of disability still has not been resolved more than a dozen years after the 
ADA's passage. Michael Ashley Stein, Foreword: Disability and Identity, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 907,908--09 (2003). 
333. This is an old and important debate which has yet to be resolved. See generally THE 
DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY PUZZLE (Richard V. 
Burkhauser & David C. Stapleton eds., 2003); Alberto Martini, Why Estimates of the Number of 
Persons with Disabilities Who Want to Work Diverge So Widely (Mathematica Policy Research 
Paper No. 7984-001, 1991); Saad z. Nagi, The Concept and Measurement of Disability, in 
DISABILITY POLICIES AND GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 1, 14 (Edward D. Berkowitz ed., 1979). 
334. Consider, for a moment, the political effect of making parallel assertions in respect to 
people based upon their sex or race. 
335. 42 u.s.c. § 12,111(8) (2000). 
336. See infra Part III.C.3. 
337. This, of course, begs the question of what functions are or are not essential. 
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productivity levels between disabled and nondisabled workers.338 For 
example, statistics from the U.S. Office of Vocational Rehabilitation 
indicate that 91 percent of disabled workers were rated either "average" 
or "better than average," matching the rating given to nondisabled 
workers.339 Of course, as with the accommodations studies critiqued 
above, the accuracy of these studies' findings can be called into question 
on the grounds of sample size, contextuality, and inappropriateness for 
extrapolation.340 This last limitation is especially true in the case of these 
productivity studies because they tend to be examinations of how 
individuals with particular disabilities fare in certain employment 
circumstances, mostly having to do with mentally disabled individuals 
performing janitorial services.341 Additionally, the studies predate the 
ADA, and mostly analyze efficiency in the context of the federal 
government as an employer.342 Thus, extending these findings 
ecumenically across the broad spectrum of people with disabilities raises 
strong econometric-based reservations.343 At the same time, these 
studies have some probative value as the only (currently) available 
empirical evidence.344 
The second issue to note345 is that these studies fail to address 
directly the . circumstance of a disabled worker whose 
nonaccommodated productivity is lower than average, despite the 
subject's occasional overlap with accommodation analysis. This 
confluence is important, especially in the semi-efficient phase of the 
accommodation cost continuum, because it raises instances in which 
application of the ADA creates a contrary result from applying 
338. A good review of the literature is provided by Reed Greenwood & Virginia Anne 
Johnson, Employer Perspectives on Workers with Disabilities, J. REHABILITATION, July-Sept. 
1987, at 37. 
339. Lester & Caudill, supra note 170, at 50--51; George E. Stevens, Exploding the Myths 
About Hiring the Handicapped, 63 PERSONNEL 57, 58 (1986). 
340. See supra Part II.A.3. 
341. See Adams-Shollenberger & Mitchell, supra note 170, at 56; Lester & Caudill, supra 
note 170, at 50-51; Martinet al., supra note 170, at 146; Ondusko, supra note 170, at 19-24. 
341. Presumably, or at least feasibly, with less concern about efficiency due to the resources 
available. 
342. The literature is reviewed in Greenwood & Johnson, supra note 338. 
343. See supra Part II.A.3. 
344. Stein, Empirical Implications, supra note 22, at 1672. 
345. This Article addresses disability accommodations as opposed to the even larger question of 
disability employment. For a discussion of that issue, see generally Bob Dole, Are We Keeping 
America's Promises to People with Disabilities? Commentary on Blanck, 79 IOWA L. REV. 925 
(1994); Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment 
Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123 (1998). 
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classical economic principles.· Although the point will be adumbrated 
in further detail below,346 for now it suffices to point out that, from an 
economic viewpoint, there is no discernable difference between the 
equivalent lower net products generated by (1) a worker with a 
disability who does not require an accommodation but who is less 
productive than a nondisabled peer; (2) the equally productive 
disabled worker provided with a reasonable accommodation; or (3) 
.the comparatively hyperproductive worker with a disability provided 
with a proportionately hyperreasonable accommodation expense.347 
From the ADA's viewpoint, however, the first worker is never 
protected (because she is unable to perform the essential job 
functions),348 the second worker always is (because she was able to 
perform the essential job functions),349 and the third may be 
protected, depending upon the total resources of the providing 
employer.350 
Therefore, although some disabled workers will ultimately be less 
productive than their nondisabled peers, others may be more 
productive. Some will indeed require accommodations, and others will 
not. The assumption that any of these particular circumstances is always 
the case is empirically unfounded. Instead, a proper treatment assessing 
disability productivity should account for both positive and negative 
value fluctuations.351 
3. Equity of the Status Quo. Another deviation from the 
wholehearted utilization of neoclassical economic principles in my 
model is normative. The traditional paradigm operates on the 
assumption that the labor market effectively disciplines irrational 
prejudicial behavior (in this instance, excluding equally productive 
workers), and thus maintains a nondiscriminatory equilibrium.352 
Consequently, the baseline assumption is that the labor market is an 
equitable one, and that deviations from its normal operation due to 
regulatory mandates are economically inefficient. 
346. See infra Part IV.B.l. 
347. See infra Part IV.B.l. 
348. 42 u.s.c. § 12,111(8) (2000). 
349. /d. 
350. /d. § 12,111(10)(8). The standard is discussed supra Part LA. 
351. This is a point to which I will soon turn. See infra Part III.C.2. 
352. CLARK, supra note 264, at 196. 
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However, the baseline of the neoclassical economic paradigm of 
the labor market is a status quo designed by an empowered majority 
that has already absorbed existing prejudices and made them 
endogenous to future decisionmaking.353 The existence of artificial 
barriers (in contrast to natural barriers),354 whether physical or 
administrative,355 to workplace participation, and their acceptance as 
natural, is a classic example of this inculcated bias.356 To illustrate, recall 
the example of the wheelchair-using shop assistant. Suppose now that 
the shop, which sells various articles for religious usage, is modeled after 
St. Patrick's Cathedral, with numerous stairs at its entrance. From a 
purely economic perspective, installing an elevator next to the stairs is 
an inefficient expense solely related to hiring the disabled worker 
because an equivalent worker without a disability would not require this 
accommodation; it is irrelevant whether the employer (or the previous 
building owner) should have installed an elevator upon construction, 
despite the public accommodation overlap noted above.357 But it should 
be recognized as well that such a conclusion operates on an assumption 
that validates the existence of the artificial barrier; in this case, the 
mobility-impairing stairs. By contrast, the expenses involved in 
eliminating a parallel artificial exclusion, say a racially restrictive 
covenant,358 would not be deemed a validly cognizable cost, because the 
latter is viewed as an irrational distaste (although the existence of the 
covenant would also, at least initially, be recognized as a cost).359 
Hence, any analysis that assumes market neutrality (or 
equitability) has reflexively erected obstacles to antidiscrimination 
principles that are entrenched in the same stereotypes the ADA and 
353. Stein, supra note 286, at 200--01. 
354. Some workers with disabilities will have impairments that even reasonable 
accommodations will be unable to ameliorate. Although some disability rights advocates assert 
that all exclusions from the workplace are artificial, I do not. 
355. The ADA covers both types of barriers. 42 U.S.C. § 12,1!2. 
356. Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: 
PERSPECfiVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHJCS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13, 20 (James P. Sterba & 
Rosemarie Tong eds., 1998). 
357. See Gruson, supra note 49, at B3 (listing modifications totaling $1.8 million accepted by 
the manager of the Empire State Building as part of a settlement with the Justice Department). 
358. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1948) (holding that state enforcement of 
racially restrictive covenants violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
359. RICHARD 0. ZERBE, JR., ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 272-75 
(2001). 
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other civil rights statutes seek to alter.360 Whether embracing these 
• • 361 • • 362 • 363 
stereotypes IS an unconscious, semiconscious, conscious, or 
cognitively biased364 decision remains hotly debated, as does the issue of 
whether preferences are fixed365 or malleable.366 For now, however, it is 
sufficient to say that totally accepting the neoclassical economic model's 
view that the existing prejudicial preferences built into the marketplace 
are neutral will only serve to continue those stereotypes.367 
Whether an emendation to the labor market's status quo in the 
form of the provision of an accommodation is an equalizing measure or 
a measure which goes beyond equality is a contentious issue. Some 
disability rights advocates advance the theory that the provision of 
accommodations serves to ameliorate artificial exclusions from the 
workplace. They analogize, for example, designing workplaces with 
stairs to designing workplaces without restrooms for both sexes.368 In 
contrast, nearly every academic who takes an economic approach to 
analyzing the ADA maintains that Title I abludes from more traditional 
360. Another example would be the expenses engendered by extending benefits normally 
reserved to heterosexual couples to same-sex couples. If the initial departure point is the 
provision of benefits to all individuals with life partners, then the types of relationship (and the 
sex identities) are irrelevant. 
361. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence Ill, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3I7, 322 (I987) (offering two different 
psychological explanations for unconscious racism). 
362. See, e.g., Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1331 
(1988) (arguing that, in addition to unconscious thought, racism forms a hegemonic force in 
American society, one in which blacks have been created as a subordinated "other"). 
363. See, e.g., Alan David Freemen, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 
1051 (1978) (asserting that civil rights statutes are actually used by the white majority to 
legitimate the very racial inequality and oppression they were meant to remedy). 
364. An especially perceptive approach is found in Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of 
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995), where Professor Krieger argues that many 
prejudiced, employment-based decisions result from categorization-related decision errors, not 
intentionally discriminatory motivations. 
365. See George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. 
ECON. REV. 76, 76 (1977) (arguing that preferences are "stable over time"). 
366. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARDS A NEW ECONOMICS 31-32 
(1988) (arguing that preferences change "as the constraints under which [people] 'implement' 
them change"). 
367. For an application of this theory in another context, see generally William M. Landes, 
The Economics of Fair Employment Laws, 76 J. POL. ECON. 507 (1968). 
368. The philosophical underpinnings of this theory are well stated in Silvers, supra note 
356. 
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forms of antidiscrimination (typically, Title VI1).369 Consequently, they 
view the provision of accommodations as going beyond what Professor 
Kelman describes as "simple" discrirnination/70 and passing into 
redistribution or even, in extreme circumstances, affirmative action.371 
The disagreement over whether the ADA achieves an 
antidiscrimination medium, supersedes it, or achieves some 
combination of both, is more than merely academic.372 Where a 
policymaker believes that the equality line falls, and hence where it is 
irrational behavior that is averted, will inform where she draws the lines 
between cost bearers. If accommodations effectuate equality, then it 
will seem appropriate to lay the costs for those accommodations at the 
feet of employers. On the other hand, if reasonable accommodations 
are really redistributive devices, however laudable, then it would be 
more apposite to have the general tax base bear those costs.373 
Additionally, this issue is relevant to the debate over the undervaluation 
of disabled workers' services. Just as was found when examining the 
nature of accommodations, the closer to the equality paradigm one gets, 
the less fitting it is to allow an equally valuable worker (who also 
happens to have a disability) to undervalue her services as the price of 
369. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2000) (barring employment discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin); see also John J. Donohue III, 
Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: Three Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
2583, 2585-86 (1994) (documenting the evolution of the notion of equality over the twentieth 
century); Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can 
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 307, 314-15 (2001) (noting that the ADA requires similarly situated individuals to be 
treated differently rather than more traditional requirements, exemplified by Title VII, that 
similarly situated individuals be treated similarly); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 3, at 3 
("[U]n.der the civil rights statutes ... plaintiffs ... cannot insist upon discrimination in their 
favor; disabled individuals often can."); Kelman, supra note 35, at 834-35, 851 (arguing that the 
law should prohibit "simple discrimination," which is the focus of Title VII, without limit, but 
that accommodation requirements should also be limited when accommodation resources could 
be better spent on other societal priorities). 
370. Kelman, supra note 35, at 840. 
371. /d. at 852. As a normative matter, Kelman is agnostic about whether or not such 
redistribution is good or ill. MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE? THE CHOICE 
BETWEEN REGULATION AND TAXATION 81-93 (1999). 
372. In Erickson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities for Northeastern 
Illinois University, 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000), to give one example, Judge Easterbrook 
contrasted the ADA with "real anti-discrimination law[s]." Id. at 951. For an assessment of judicial 
attitudes toward the ADA and their implications, see Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, 
Better Angels, and Unprincipled Neutrality Claims, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1285 (2003), and 
Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
1279, 1328 (2000). 
373. See infra Part IV.C. 
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gaining entry to the labor market; such underbidding would simply 
compound preexisting societal prejudices.374 
C. Measuring Variables 
In this Part, I set forth the variables used to measure the 
weighted factors in the proposed framework. Respectively, these are 
willingness to pay, disabled profit, average profit, and societal 
efficiency gains. 
1. Willingness to Pay. Measuring and weighing the effect of 
variables under a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) involves monetizing 
the outcomes of proffered policy changes.375 These calculations are 
frequently performed through the balancing of a "willingness to pay" 
(WTP) standard as against a "willingness to accept" (WT A) 
standard.376 The compensating variables (CV) test, developed by 
Professor Hicks,377 measures the efficiency of two welfare positions, 
normally, the status quo as against the resulting policy change. To 
determine an individual's CV, her WTP for positive change is 
compared to her WTA for negative change. If the sum of all CVs for 
a policy change is positive, then the policy is considered efficient.378 To 
illustrate: suppose the person living in apartment A would be willing 
to pay his next-door neighbor in apartment B as much as $500 not to 
play Lawrence Welk music for a year, while neighbor B is unwilling 
to accept less then $2,000 for the same omission.379 Polka-averse 
neighbor A has a $500 CV; polka-loving neighbor B's CV is $2,000. 
374. For example, Epstein, supra note 269, and others like Schwab and Willbom, supra note 16, 
claim that workers with disabilities could either underbid the value of their services or forego health 
insurance benefits as a way of capturing accorrunodation costs. Also, working for lower 
remuneration or benefits might indeed be an inducement for nondiscriminatory employers to 
engage workers with disabilities. However, it would also reinforce the devaluation of those 
individuals beset by unfounded stereotypes, and so continue market failure. Acceding to employers' 
tastes by bribing them through reduced compensation also reduces whatever social good and 
external benefits can arise from equal pay and occupational dignity. In addition, because the 
prospects of recovering the cost of education and training are influenced by prevailing market 
conditions; utility will be lost as a result of reduced willingness among the disabled to invest in their 
own human capital. 
375. ZERBE, supra note 359, at 7. 
376. /d. 
377. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 189, at 177-80. 
378. ZERBE, supra note 359, at 7. 
379. See generally COYNE STEVEN SANDERS & GINNY WEISSMAN, CHAMPAGNE MUSIC: 
THE LAWRENCE WELK SHOW (1985) (describing the pre-elevator music of this former mainstay 
of Saturday night television). 
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Although A would like a law passed to restrict B's musical taste, 
because B's net CV is $1500 greater than that of A, no law would be 
passed in respect to A's preference. However, if ten other mutual 
neighbors (or anti-polka activists) felt the same way as A does, the 
collective CV would be $5,000. In that circumstance, a noise pollution 
ordinance would then be efficient under the CV test since the 
collective CVs exceed neighbor B's CV by $3,000.380 
When measuring the reasonableness of accommodations, the 
operative CV is that of WTP, rather than WTA, for the practical 
reason that the ADA does not allow ·workers with disabilities to 
contribute toward the cost of their accommodations. This is for two 
inflexible, statutory reasons. First, the operative notion is that the 
accommodation requested is reasonable if it is expedient. Thus, 
accepting a lower-costing accommodation would be accepting an 
unreasonable accommodation.381 Second, the cost of a reasonable 
accommodation cannot be borne by disabled employees through a 
reduction in their wages.382 Both options are certainly plausible from 
an economic perspective, but fall outside the ADA, which prohibits 
wage reduction,383 and thus my analysis.384 Moreover, a vast 
quantitative gulf empirically divides WTP from WT A.385 For instance, 
in the context of environmental rights, researchers discovered that 
380. If all this smells "Coasean," it should. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (applying this form of analysis in the context of negligence 
law). Coase's concept of transaction costs is discussed in greater detail infra Part IV.A.2. 
381. VandeZande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995). 
382. However, Epstein and Schwab and Willborn suggest exactly this. See EPSTEIN, supra 
note 269, at 484; Schwab & Willborn, supra note 16, at 1279. 
383. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(4) (2000) (including the denial of "equal jobs or benefits" in 
the construction of "discriminate"). 
384. It does, however, raise the important issue of whether restrictions on wage reduction 
(or, to be more accurate, mandates of wage equality), act as a disincentive for employers hiring 
disabled workers. This argument was initially articulated by EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 361, but 
elaborated upon by Jolls, supra note 15, at 255-61. Combining their assertions (Epstein's was 
strictly theoretical; Jolls's contained an empirical model), the thrust of the argument is that 
employers may have already hired disabled workers--or, more likely, some of their able-bodied 
workers may have become disabled-in which case they are required by a well-enforced law to 
continue their wage equality. At the same time, these same employers, wishing to avoid taking 
on accommodation costs, will avoid hiring new employees with visibly detectable disabilities. 
This is especially so when the laws enforcing hiring decisions are as impotent as detailed above, 
see supra Part LA and accompanying text. 
385. See, e.g., Daniel Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? 
Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 493, 506-15 (1994) (noting that in the context of environmental goods, the divergence 
might be significant). 
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WT A valuations ranged from three to nineteen times higher than 
WTP valuations.386 This type of deviation is exacerbated when the 
right in question is considered unique by the person valuing WT A, as 
might well be the case in employment.387 
2. Disabled Profit. To properly capture the range of disabled 
workers, both those who will require accommodations and those who 
will not, I utilize a variable for disabled profit (DP). This variable 
reflects the total employer net profit on any given employee with a 
disability, calculated as the total profit gains produced by that 
individual disabled worker (DG), plus any quantifiable external 
benefits that accrue due to the provision of accommodation (QB), 
minus the disabled worker's salary (WS), her accommodation costs 
(AC), and any quantifiable costs (QC). Thus, algebraically: DP = DG 
+ QB-(WS+AC+ QC). 
DP, therefore, reflects the net benefit conferred upon the 
employer through the employment transaction and accounts for the 
possibility of the disabled employee capturing any amount of 
quantifiable external benefits, from negative to positive. In instances 
where no external benefit is engendered, QB has no value (so that 
QB = 0). This is also true where there are no external costs involved, 
(AC = 0). For the purposes of manageable hypotheticals, this Article 
assumes both QB and AC have zero values. In the real world, 
however, assessable external benefits and costs388 can both range from 
zero onwards, so that in reality (QB ~ 0) and (AC ~ 0). The DP 
variable is neutral, thereby accounting for high, low, and no 
accommodation costs, contingent upon what workplace alterations 
are requested in each individual circumstance. Thus, as a variable, DP 
allows for inclusion in the calculus the entire range of quantifiable 
accommodation costs, which will vary from employee to employee. 
3. Average Profit. One weakness of the DP variable is that it is 
difficult to disaggregate the productivity of any given employee.389 
386. Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & Linda J. Graham, The Role of Rights in Benefit Cost 
Methodology: The Example of Salmon and Hydroelectric Dams, 74 WASH. L. REV. 763, 769 
(1999). 
387. /d. 
388. See supra Part II.A. 
389. Parenthetically, because my model assumes that employees are of equal value as they 
enter a given employment, DP does not capture two variables within the full range of 
"opportunity cost." Specifically, assuming profit maximization and a diminishing marginal 
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People frequently work in tandem with others, and their productivity 
is affected by this synergy/90 as well as by a myriad assortment of 
other considerations.391 Unless a real life scenario mirrors a 
hypothetical one in which employees manufacture a particular item, 
say a widget, and the level of acceptable productivity is absolutely 
known, e.g., fifty widgets a day, it is difficult to accurately measure 
individual productivity.392 
One way to address the issue of absolutely quantifying individual 
productivity is to assign a value for an employer's average yearly 
profit from each employee (AP). Doing so takes into account two 
realities of the workplace: first, that some employees are consistently 
product of labor, a firm will hire workers until marginal cost (MC) is equal to the marginal 
benefit (MB). Assume that such a firm hires a disabled worker while MB is still greater than 
MC for every worker and that the marginal benefit of hiring a disabled worker (MBd) is less 
than that of a nondisabled worker (MBnd). Such a hire would be net profitable. The hiring of 
more workers, however, affects previously hired workers. At the point when MC = MBnd 
(profit maximization), MC > MBd. This simply illustrates that in reality the net profitability 
standard effectively requires employers to endure extra costs. Secondly, it is conceivable that 
hiring an individual disabled worker could force a corresponding nondisablcd worker onto 
public assistance, hence evoking a negative externality. 
390. Much like any team (sports or otherwise), the total working group can exceed the sum 
of its parts and is affected by numerous, interconnected factors. See generally MURRAY 
AINSWORTH, MANAGING PERFORMANCE, MANAGING PEOPLE: UNDERSTANDING AND 
IMPROVING TEAM PERFORMANCE (2002) (examining factors relevant to workplace 
performance); BRIAN DIVE, THE HEALTHY ORGANIZATION: A REVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 
TO PEOPLE & MANAGEMENT (2002) (discussing how to develop a healthy organization); 
RONALD R. SIMS, ORGANIZATIONAL SUCCESS THROUGH EFFECTIVE HUMAN RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT (2002) (explaining that management of human resources is the key to success). 
391. What, exactly, makes people at work more productive remains both a mystery as well 
as a holy grail for human resource scholars. The theories paraded about, some of which seem 
more plausible than others, have an amazing range. See, e.g., John Philip Bachner, Eliminate 
Those Glaring Errors: Adjust Quality, Not Quantity, of Light to Improve Worker Productivity 
and Reap Bottom-Line Benefits, 43 MANAGING OFF. TECH. 16 (1998) (illuminating in more 
effective ways); James T. Berger, Flower Power: Beyond Pure Aesthetics, Scientific Studies Show 
Interior Landscaping Cleans the Air and Provides a Catalyst for Worker Productivity, 67 J. PROP. 
MGMT. 25 (2002) (providing interior plants); Shari Caudron, Humor is Healthy in the 
Workplace, 71 PERSONNEL}. 63 (1992) (increasing mirth); Elizabeth Danziger, Minimize Office 
Gossip, 67 PERSONNEL J. 31 (1988) (opening formal lines of communication); Terri Gutierrez & 
R. John Freese, Dress-Down Days: Benefit or Burden?, 69 CPA J. 32 (1999) (informalizing 
work-wear); Daniel McGinn, No Place to Hide Stuff: Can Funky New Furniture Make Us More 
Productive?, NEWSWEEK, May 26, 1997, at 50 (modernizing interior design). 
392. Although this is precisely what law professors and economists, especially law and 
economics professors, do. On rare occasions, employers also do so. See Fisher v. Transco Servs.-
Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 124!-42 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing how the defendant used a 
"Measured Day Work Program" in its grocery warehouse to ensure that employees actively 
worked for four hundred seven of the four hundred eighty minutes in each workday). 
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more productive than others;393 and second, that even within the 
group of more productive employees, those workers are human.394 
Using an average yearly net profit amount (in lieu of daily or weekly 
ones) as a variable recognizes that employers either have an overall 
fixed production objective to extract from its workforce that can then 
be divided by the number of its employees, and/or that employers 
seek a certain net productivity margin from any given employee that 
may vary from day to day, but will in the end average·out to a certain 
level. Thus, the employer's AP is equal to the average productivity of 
employees less their average salary. This variable may thus be used as 
a baseline. An employer expects to get an average employee who will 
have average productivity and profitability. In the end, some will be 
better widget producers than others, but on average the absolute 
number of widgets can be calculated, minus the average salary for 
widget makers. The figure also assumes there are no accommodation 
costs or benefits associated with hiring or retaining the average 
nondisabled worker, which in all likelihood is an illusory 
• 395 
assumption. 
4. Social Benefit Gain. Social Benefit Gain (SBG) is the total 
assessable benefit reaped by society in having an economically viable 
disabled worker employed instead of receiving social benefits. The 
utility inuring to society, called the SBG, is measured as the 
equivalent of the disabled worker's salary (WS), plus all quantifiable 
benefits (QB), including the savings of public assistance costs that 
would be engendered by having that worker excluded from the labor 
market, less the accommodation cost (AC) and any quantifiable 
negative externalities (QC). Algebraically, this can be stated as: SBG 
= (WS + QB)- (AC + QC). To illustrate, compare two instances, the 
first involving an employable worker with a disability, and the second, 
an unemployable disabled worker. 
393. Within the legal academy, one has only to look at the hundreds of dazzling articles and 
many books published by scholars Cass Sunstein and Richard Posner to grasp this point about 
human variation (and also feel humbled). 
394. Put colloquially, everyone has good and bad days. See generally JON R. KATZENBACH, 
PEAK PERFORMANCE: ALIGNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF YOUR EMPLOYEES (2000) 
(arguing that worker satisfaction is critical to successful businesses). 
395. Accommodation costs could include myriad circumstances, including allowing a worker 
to watch his daughter's soccer game. As to benefits, these can mirror those cited above with 
respect to hiring and retaining disabled employees. See supra Part li.A.2. 
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First, take the case of Sally, a severely hard-of-hearing worker. 
To perform the essential job functions of an office manager, a job that 
pays a $50,000 salary, Sally requires a part-time American Sign 
Language (ASL) interpreter at an annual cost of $10,000. If Sally 
does not obtain this job, she will receive public assistance at a yearly 
cost of $12,000 (QB);396 if Sally is employed, she will contribute taxes 
at a rate that can be represented by the fraction (WS/1).397 Depending 
on the size and resources of an employer, accommodating Sally may 
or may not be reasonable, and thus the economic efficiency of 
employing her as an office manager will be contextually specific to 
,that employer. From a societal perspective, however, the efficiency 
gains of having Sally in the workplace will produce a significant SBG 
value. Sally has a SBG of $52,000 + $50,000/T; that is, her salary of 
$50,000 (WS) + ($12,000 (QB) + $50,000/T (QB))- ($10,000 (AC) + 
$0 (QC)). Otherwise, in the case of unemployment, Sally has a SBG 
of -$12,000 + $Orr; because $0(WS) + ($0(QB) + $0(f(QB)) -
($O(AC) + $12,000(QC)). Under this analysis, it is in society's 
interests that Sally be employed, and that her requested 
accommodation be paid for. 
Sally's hypothetical also raises a tangential issue that is likewise 
not directly addressed by the ADA, but is pertinent to this inquiry.398 
Suppose that Sally can perform all the essential job functions as a 
proofreader without an accommodation, and could earn a salary of 
$20,000. From a private employer's perspective, Sally is as 
economically efficient as a non-hearing impaired employee. But is the 
statute's purpose "merely" to place a worker with a disability in any 
achievable position of employment, or is it designed to maximize that 
particular individual's utility, as in the case of being an office 
396. This is not, unfortunately, a far-fetched possibility. See Louis Uchitelle, Laid-Off 
Workers Swelling the Cost of Disability Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, at Al (discussing the 
recent surge in Social Security disability rolls). For more empirically-based estimates of transfer 
populations, see infra note 538 and accompanying text. 
397. The denominator variable, T, can vary depending on the graduated tax rate. In the 
scenario presented in the text that follows, it is possible (although not necessarily true) that the 
graduated tax rate will differ between two jobs which pay different salaries. The point to be 
taken away, however, is that a variable is provided which accounts for contributions back to the 
public fisc. 
398. Professor Verkerke's article on "matching" also neglects this point, although it would 
seem that a basic tenet of matching would be how productive an employee ought to be. See 
Verkerke, supra note 14. To be fair, Verkerke's analysis still functions (albeit in a bit of a 
vacuum from reality) so that an answer to this question is not really necessary (but would have 
been helpful as well as stimulating). 
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manager? The framework that I propose allows for both 
alternatives.399 Where the private employer bears the reasonable 
accommodation costs, it is more likely (contingent upon the economy 
of the ~mployer) that the disabled worker will have been ADA-
matched as a proofreader. Where the employer is either a private 
employer and the calculus falls within Kaldor-Hicks welfare 
efficiency, or the employer is a state entity that can in turn 
redistribute costs, the disabled worker might have the option of being 
an office manager. Note that the circumstances wherein greater 
accommodation costs are borne by any provider dovetail with 
increasing social utility.400 
In cases where the disabled worker is unemployable, the wholly 
inefficient SBG will equal zero or less (because any amount greater 
than zero is still a positive gain). In this circumstance, the only 
economically viable option is to exclude those individuals from 
workplace opportunity.401 To achieve this status, a disabled individual 
would be unable to hold any position, even with the provision of an 
accommodation, and still produce a net social gain of $1. As a result, 
this individual would receive payments from the government as a 
means of compensating her exclusion from the labor market. 
An admitted shortcoming of this variable is that it limits itself to 
quantifiable benefits, whereas society also gains benefits that cannot 
be easily quantified (what Blanck called "ripple effects"402). When an 
unemployed disabled person is able to hold a job due to the provision 
of an accommodation, or an employed disabled person is able to find 
399. I therefore agree with some of the arguments made by Paulette M. Caldwell. See 
Paulette M. Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate Effects Standard of Liability in Title VII 
Litigation, 46 U. PITI. L. REv. 555, 579-83 (1985) (arguing that Title VII enhances workplace 
efficiency by increasing the pool of qualified applicants of members of the protected class 
through the elimination of employment discrimination). 
400. See generally John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An 
Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337 (1989) (supporting antidiscrimination legislation 
from an economic perspective). 
401. Although some might argue that, regardless of economic manifestations, workers with 
disabilities have a right to work and thus be productive (or at least active) members of society. 
E.g., Kavka, supra note 185, at 274. See also Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, supra note 
251 (arguing an interesting variation on this theme, that not only should individuals capable of 
any gainful employment be required to work, but that society has a duty to so assist them). I 
discuss Wax's proposal within the context of Socially Efficient, Kaldor-Hicks Welfare 
Enhancing, infra Part IV.B. 
402. Berven & Blanck, supra note 178, at 89. 
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and keep a better job, society gains in several intangible ways, 
including increased investment in human capital.403 
IV. THE ACCOMMODATION COST CONTINUUM 
The proposed law and economics model for assessing the 
reasonableness of disability-related accommodations spans a 
continuum of accommodation costs. These run the gamut from 
Wholly Efficient Accommodations (some of which are provided 
voluntarily and others that would be provided voluntarily absent a 
market failure), to Socially Efficient Accommodations (including 
Semi-Efficient Accommodations coerced through ADA litigation 
because they extract a differential cost from employers, and Social 
Benefit Gain Efficient Accommodations, where individual workers 
and general society benefit, but employers do not), to Wholly 
Inefficient Accommodations (wherein excluding workers with 
disabilities is the only economically feasible option). The 
accommodation cost continuum may be diagrammed as: 
Voluntarily Quasi-Voluntary Semi-Efficient Social Benefit Wholly 
Made Accommodations Accommodations Gain Efficient Inefficient 
Accommodations Accommodations Accommodations 
~ ~ ' ' 
More Profit 100+ 100 0 0- Less Profit 
DP~AP DP~AP AP>DP>O SBG>O SBG<O 
The accommodation cost continuum can also be conceived of 
schematically as covering a range of economic effects, from Pareto 
Efficient Accommodations (wherein both disabled employees and 
their employers benefit without loss) to Kaldor-Hicks Efficient 
Accommodations (encompassing an area of semi-efficient 
accommodations in which both disabled workers and their employers 
benefit but employers benefit less than if they discriminate against 
disabled workers, and SBG accommodations where disabled workers 
and society benefit, but not employers), to Wholly Inefficient 
Accommodations (wherein disabled workers benefit, but gains are 
403. See infra Part lV.B. 
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not achieved by either employers or society at large). The 
accommodation cost continuum may be presented in chart form as: 
Wholly Efficient Accommodations PARETO OPTIMAL lA a. 
Voluntarily Made Accommodations Greater 
Quasi-Voluntary Accommodations 
Semi-Efficient Accommodations KALDOR-HICKS 
(AD A Accommodations) WELFARE ENHANCING Profit 
Socially Efficient Accommodations KALDOR-HICKS 
(SBG Accommodations) WELFARE ENHANCING 
Wholly Inefficient Accommodations WHOLLY INEFFICIENT Lesser 
MANDATES lv 
The following subsections discuss each phase of the continuum in 
turn, beginning with wholly efficient accommodations and proceeding 
through wholly inefficient accommodations. 
A. Wholly Efficient (Pareto Optimal) Accommodations 
1. Voluntarily Made Accommodations. The section of the 
continuum entitled "Voluntarily Made Accommodations" reflects 
instances in which employers voluntarily hire, retain, and 
accommodate disabled employees at their· own expense.404 The 
reasons why an employer chooses to accommodate a worker can be 
fairly complex, including reasons that are typically considered to be 
economically inefficient:405 a strong relationship exists between an 
employer and an able-bodied employee406 prior to the 
404. The same incentives that operate for the provision of accommodations in this section 
also apply to the hiring and retention of equally disabled workers who do not require 
accommodations. 
405. Epstein characterizes these motivations as arising from "pity," EPSTEIN, supra note 
269, at 486, but they need not. 
406. The transmogrification of able-bodied individuals into people with disabilities is, 
among minority groups, an almost unique phenomenon (the exceptions being those people of 
color who had previously "passed" as white or did not know their identities, see, e.g., Trina 
Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000), and those few 
individuals who change their sex), and contributes to reducing the sense of "otherness." It is for 
this reason that I have opposed proposals to narrow Title l's definition of disability to the 
"seriously" disabled, even though to date the largest category of people asserting Title I claims 
are able-bodied individuals who conceive back-related maladies. Although grounded in 
anecdote, I believe that when a known and valued able-bodied employee transmogrifies into a 
known and valued employee with a disability, the disabled community as a whole benefits. 
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manifestation407 of the latter's disability;408 individual employers' 
motivations related to social justice and/or diversity;409 previously 
positive experiences with hiring disabled workers;410 or simply 
employers' or human resource managers' good-natured willingness 
to give a member of a marginalized group a chance to demonstrate 
their abilities.411 For purposes of the economic analysis herein 
Michael Ashley Stein, Employing People with Disabilities: Some Cautionary Thoughts for a 
Second Generation Civil Rights Statute, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES IN LAW, PUBLIC POLICY, AND RESEARCH 51, 55 (Peter David 
Blanck ed., 2000) (publishing a speech given in 1997 at the University of Iowa). 
407. Disabilities can manifest for a number of reasons. See generally Chung-Yi Li, Longest 
Held Occupation in a Lifetime and Risk of Disability in Activities of Daily Living, 57 
OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 550 (2000) (examining "the association between the longest 
held occupation in a lifetime and the risk of disability in activities of daily living ... among 
elderly people ... in Taiwan"); Catherine A. Sarkisian et al., Correlates of Attributing New 
Disability to Old Age, 49 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y. 134 (2001) (documenting the attribution to 
old age of disability among women); Judith A. Turner et al., Predictors of Chronic Disability in 
Injured Workers: A Systematic Literature Synthesis, 38 AM. J. INDus: MED. 707 (2000) 
(analyzing a variety of factors associated with chronic low-back injuries). As reported by the 
1991-1992 Survey of Income and Program Participation, the average rates of disability by age 
are 18-44 years: 13.6 percent; 4~4 years: 29.2 percent; 65-74 years: 44.6 percent; 75-84 years: 
63.7 percent; 85 years and over: 84.2 percent. John McNeil, Disability, in POPULATION PROFILE 
OF THE UNITED STATES 32 (1995), at http://landview.census.gov/prod/l/pop/profile/95/ 
14_ps.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Additional census data is available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disability .html (last visited Aug. 21, 2003) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal). 
408. See generally Morley Gunderson & Douglas Hyatt, Do Injured Workers Pay for 
Reasonable Accommodation?, 50 lNDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 92 (1996) (finding that newly 
disabled workers at large firms received accomodations under Canada's similar law); Nancy R. 
Mudrick, Employment Discrimination Laws for Disability: Utilization and Outcome, 549 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 53 (1997) (finding the same for American workers under 
the ADA). 
409. Voluntarily provided accommodations are, unfortunately, the least reported aspect of 
the disability·related employment story. Although Blanck has examined the corporate cultures 
of a few large organizations, see The Law, Health Policy, and Disability Center at the University 
of Iowa Website, http://disability.law.uiowa.edu/lhpdc/civilrights/ada.htrnl (last visited Sept. 25, 
2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal), it stands to reason that this phenomenon occurs in 
other businesses. It certainly seems to have motivated the exceedingly patient Wisconsin in 
Vande Zande, see supra Part I.C.l. For anecdotal examples, see David Nicklaus, Three Trainees' 
Stories: Applicants with Disabilities Find Success, Challenges, in Seeking Jobs, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, July 9, 2000, at B5; Joan Fleischer Tamen & Damian P. Gregory, Meeting the 
Challenges: Many Employers Are Discovering the Rewards of Hiring Disabled Workers, SUN-
SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, FL), July 3, 2000, at 14. 
410. This was one of the factors reported in Peter David Blanck et al., The Emerging 
Workforce of Entrepreneurs with Disabilities: Preliminary Study of Entrepreneurship in Iowa, 85 
IOWA L. REv. 1583 (2000) ("[I]nvestigating the composition, quality, and competitiveness of the 
emerging workforce of persons with disabilities."). 
411. The late disability-rights advocate, Paul Hearne, emphasized this strategy, first as 
president and founder of JOB (Just One Break), see http:/lwww.justonebreak.com, (last visited 
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engaged, however, motivations beyond the strictly economically 
efficient are not addressed.412 Consequently, as stipulated under the 
neoclassical economic model of the labor market, employers act in 
their own interests and want to maximize their individual profits. In 
the normal course of events, they respond to economic pressures 
which stimulate them to either hire, retain, and/or accommodate 
disabled employees because Voluntarily Made Accommodations are 
wholly efficient (from both a net profit and a Pareto perspective) for 
the providing employer.413 
The primary reason for an employer to voluntarily hire, retain, 
and perhaps provide an accommodation to an employee with an 
immediately discernable disability (or one that is either revealed or 
manifests after a job offer has been extendedt4 is that that employee 
Aug. 19, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal), and afterwards as president of another 
organization with similar goals: the Dole Foundation for Employment of People with 
Disabilities. 
412. These motivations, although laudable, are not predictable and thus not useful for 
building an economic model capable of repetition and certainty. 
413. Sometimes employers also respond to a combination of incentives, for instance, hiring 
mentally retarded people to perform menial, low-paid tasks. The studies cited, see supra Part 
II.A.l., present the positive results of these actions, but there are also less happy endings. See 
EEOC v. CEC Entm't, Inc., No. 98-C-698-X, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934 (W.O. Wis. Mar. 14, 
2000) (ordering CEC to rehire a mentally disabled former employee); EEOC v. Hertz Corp., 
No. 96-72421, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 1998) (upholding the dismissal of 
two mentally disabled, job-coached workers on the grounds that making an accommodation 
does not concede reasonableness). 
414. Pursuant to Title I, employers cannot inquire into the history, existence, or extent of a 
person's disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(4)(A) (2000); see Chai Feldblum, Medical 
Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A View from the Inside, 
64 TEMP. L. REV. 521,531 (1991) (analyzing "the medical examinations and inquiries section of 
the employment title of the ADA" using legislative history). Conversely, when a person has a 
disability that is not readily ascertainable and does not disclose to her employer the existence of 
her disability, she will not be protected under the ADA's auspices. I d. Much as, under Title VII, 
if a person's religious convictions prevent her from performing her employment, she is not 
protected unless she had previously disclosed that limitation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Angelica Unif. 
Group, Inc., 762 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1985) (denying recourse to an employee who was terminated 
for missing work on religious holidays because she had not informed her employer of the 
holidays). This raises a very interesting (but secondary) issue relating to individuals without 
discemable disabilities that I have not seen addressed in the literature. Professor Verkerke's 
article analyzes the circumstance of a not-readily knowable disability in the context of what 
happens when that nondiscemable impairment prevents the employee from fulfilling her 
essential job functions ("mismatching"), and discusses the implications for her firing 
("churning") and possible exclusion from similar future employment ("scarring"). Verkerke, 
supra note 14. Not addressed was the flip side of this issue. First, for the purposes of attempting 
to enculturate within a firm and avoid prejudice, when should a person with a nonvisible 
disability disclose that disability? This is an especially pertinent question if the disability in 
question is an episodic one and/or a mental disability that is likely to encounter strong prejudice. 
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is considered to be equally as productive as, or more productive than 
(and hence net profitable), an alternatively available employee 
without a disability. Recall from the discussion above that to be 
protected under its auspices, the ADA stipulates that employees with 
disabilities must be qualified,415 meaning that they are as productive as 
an equivalent, nondisabled employee either with or without the 
provision of a reasonable accommodation416 (i.e., DP must always 
equal or exceed AP). Workers with disabilities can be at least as 
profitable as nondisabled workers and bring about Voluntarily Made 
Accommodations through three typical circumstances: (1) the 
disabled employee can be one who is hyperproductive and does not 
require an accommodation; (2) the worker with a disability can be 
hyperproductive to the extent that his higher-than-average 
productivity balances out or exceeds the cost of an accommodation; 
or (3) the employee with a disability can be of average productivity 
and not need a workplace accommodation. Note that only the second 
instance raises the prospect of an ADA accommodation. 
Returning to the earlier example of widget production as a 
means of absolutely measuring and defining acceptable levels of 
production,417 assume that Gidget, a person with the condition spina 
bifida,418 applies for a job at Worldwide Widget Works (WWW). 
Assume further that the average output for any given employee at 
WWW is fifty widgets a day (AP = 50). Accordingly, any widget 
worker who will, at year's end, have achieved an AP of 50 or higher 
will be considered an acceptable laborer. Finally, for simplicity's sake, 
suppose that employing Gidget does not engender, either positively 
See generally SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES (2002) (examining the implications of the ADA for 
persons with mental disabilities). Second, does the notion of constructive notice, which is not 
universally accepted as case law in the Title VII context, extend to disability discrimination? 
415. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(8). 
416. /d. 
417. See supra Part III.C.3. 
418. Medically defined as an "embryologic failure of fusion of one or more vertebral 
arches," STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 115, at 1671, spina bifida can manifest 
a wide variety of functional limitations, and therefore presents a disabling condition especially 
conducive to the changing hypothetical utilized in this section. See generally Birgitte M. Blatter 
et al., Heterogeneity of Spina Bifida, 55 TERATOLOGY 224 (1997) (documenting the association 
of specific types of spina bifida with general risk factors for the disease); lneke M. Pit-ten Cate 
et al., Disability and Quality of Life in Spina Bifida and Hydrocephalus, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL 
MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 317 (2002) (discussing "the impact of severity and type of 
condition and family resources on quality of life in chlldren with spina bifida and 
hydrocepahlus"). 
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or negatively, any externalities peculiar to her hiring (we assumed 
above the equally fictional circumstance of nondisabled workers also 
not engendering externalities) such that both (QB = 0) and (QC = 0). 
In hypothetical (1), Gidget the widget-maker can produce on 
average some number higher than fifty widgets a day (DG >50) and 
also does not require an accommodation (AC = 0). Thus her DP value 
is higher than fifty because (DP >50) = (DG > 50)- (AC = 0). By 
producing a DP net of fifty-plus widgets, Gidget is, ·all in all, an 
exceptional WWW employee. This is because, regardless of her 
ultimate gross production value, Gidget's net profitability is greater 
than that of the average widget-maker, i.e., DP > AP. In hypothetical 
(2), Gidget is still hyperproductive. Assume that she generates fifty-
five widgets a day (DG = 55), but requires an accommodation from 
WWW to do so. If the accommodation cost (AC) is six or more 
widgets a day, then Gidget will no longer fit the profile of a 
voluntarily accommodated worker at WWW. This is due to Gidget's 
net profit being lower than that of the average widget-maker, 
regardless of whether the accommodation costs six or any number 
higher than six. Mathematically, this is because (DP < 50) = (DG = 
55) - (AC > 6); hence, since AP = 50, AP > DP.419 Finally, in 
hypothetical (3), Gidget's productivity is average, such that DG = AP 
= 50, and she does not require WWW to provide her with any 
accommodation, so that A C = 0. In this circumstance, where D P = 
AP, Gidget is considered to be fungible with her nondisabled peers 
and should, all things considered, be voluntarily hired or retained.420 
Although both positive and negative externalities have been 
assumed away, each of these possible scenarios can incorporate the 
type of externalities described above.421 For instance, positive benefits 
could include increased productivity and lower job turnover rates. 
Negative externalities could include the accommodation, whether 
engendering hard or soft costs. Additionally, the negative costs 
419. On the other hand, using this baseline, any accommodation that costs five or fewer 
widgets a day will place Gidget's economic production back under the first hypothetical of 
hyperproductivity. 
420. Idiosyncratic occurrences-e.g., Gidget wore a bright orange shirt to her interview and 
the human resource manager has an aversion to the color orange and anyone who would wear a 
garment of that color-are discounted both in economic and in rights-based assessments due to 
their unlikely capability of repetition. For a discussion of why this is so, see Mark Kelman, Does 
Disability Status Matter?, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 91, 94 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers 
eds., 2000); Kelman, supra note 35, at 863-64. 
421. See supra Part Il.A.2. 
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related to litigation avoidance422-whether realistically in response to 
assessed nuisance value settlements423 or, alternatively, from fears of 
potentialliability,424 including loss of reputation or good will-could 
tip the efficiency balance in favor of hiring or retaining a disabled 
employee.425 When viewed in light of the empirical data 
demonstrating the extent to which employers overwhelmingly win 
Title I cases,426 this argument would seem to carry less probative 
value. It does, however, bear noting.427 
422. See Thornton H. Brooks et a!., Second Generation Problems Facing Employers in 
Employment Discrimination Cases: Continuing Violations, Pendent State Claims, and Double 
Attorneys' Fees, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25,43-51 (Autumn 1986) (discussing the prospect 
of increased employment discrimination litigation). 
423. See generally D. Rosenberg & S. Shaven, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their 
Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985) (considering "a model of the legal dispute 
allowing for the occurrence of ... nuisance suits"). 
424. This is usually a standard argument in other civil rights contexts, despite changes in 
litigation incentives due to the manner in which the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
provision of attorneys' fees in Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985) (interpreting Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 68 to include attorney's fees among the costs that can be shifted back to 
defendants when plaintiffs obtain a judgment that is less than that proffered pretrial where the 
statute under which they have litigated would have permitted plaintiff attorney fees). See 
generally Roy D. Simon, Jr., Rule 68 at the Crossroads: The Relationship Between Offers of 
Judgment and Statutory Attorneys Fees, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 889 (1984) (analyzing the case before 
the Supreme Court in Marek v. Chesney and its possible ramifications). This has affected other 
types of cases as well. See Jean R. Sternlight, The Supreme Court's Denial of Reasonable 
Attorney's Fees to Prevailing Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 538 
(1990) ("[M]any civil rights plaintiffs with colorable claims cannot find attorneys willing to 
represent them. The shortage of competent civil rights attorneys has reached crisis proportions, 
a fact which has been recognized by several state and federal courts."). 
425. It could also be one reason (among many, including better workplace relations) that 
the option of undergoing mediation through the EEOC has been a popular way of addressing 
Title 1 disputes. The last EEOC Report to Congress represented that "[a]n overwhelming 
majority of the participants (91 percent of charging parties and 96 percent of respondents) 
indicated that they would be willing to participate in the mediation program again if they were a 
party to an EEOC charge." E. Patrick McDermott et a!., An Evaluation of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission Mediation Program (Sept. 20, 2000), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/report/summary.htrnl (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Some 
commentators are (pleasantly) surprised that the EEOC can be at all effective in light of its 
dearth of resources. E.g., Kathryn Moss, Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the 
Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
426. See supra Part I.B. 
427. There is another type of market failure that could be raised, one which might be called 
"the externality of public assistance." Even if both employer and potential employee are fully 
informed and bargaining costs are zero, it may be that the employer will fail to hire, retain, or 
accommodate an individual despite such a decision increasing overall welfare. And, absent the 
hire, the individual may go on public assistance, as is described infra Part IV.B. Both of these 
steps might be seen as an "externality" in that these nonhiring/retaining firms do not internalize 
costs when making employment decisions. There is some precedent for treating such factors as 
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Consequently, this section of the accommodation cost continuum 
reflects instances when the provision of accommodations (as well as 
the hiring and retaining of disabled workers who do not require 
accommodations) is wholly efficient and brings about a state of 
Pareto optimality. In this dynamic, both the disabled employees and 
their employers gain, and no one loses. 
2. Quasi-Voluntary Accommodations. This next phase of the 
accommodation cost continuum covers workplace decisions wherein 
an employer chooses not to employ or retain a disabled worker, even 
though that worker (whether or not needing an accommodation) is at 
least as profitable as an alternative nondisabled worker. Assuming 
once more that all positive and negative externalities have been 
accounted for (in this instance, both posited at zero), the disabled 
worker's productivity would encompass the same three possibilities as 
those in the previous continuum section on Voluntarily Made 
Accommodations. To reiterate, (1) the disabled employee can be one 
who is hyperproductive and does not require an accommodation 
(Gidget is both super-productive and cost-free); (2) the worker with a 
disability can be hyperproductive to the extent that her higher-than-
average productivity balances out or exceeds the cost of an 
accommodation (Gidget needs an accommodation but makes up for 
its cost); or (3) the employee with a disability can be of average 
productivity and not require an accommodation (Gidget is an average 
worker). 
Accordingly, this section of the accommodation cost continuum 
is concerned with market failure. This is because the Quasi-Voluntary 
part of the continuum captures cases wherein hiring or retaining 
disabled employees would achieve a wholly efficient, net profitable, 
Pareto optimal e·quilibrium wherein everyone gains and no one loses. 
externalities to the employer. In fact, one justification for refusal to enforce contracts "in 
restraint of trade" at common law was that such contracts deprived individuals bound by them 
of the ability to work and support themselves and thus forced such individuals to tum to the 
state for their livelihood. The paradigm case was one in which an individual sold a business and 
then agreed not to pursue his chosen field in the whole kingdom or jurisdiction. Courts said that 
such an agreement would harm society by causing individuals to leave the jurisdiction or turn to 
the state to support themselves. Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 
B.U. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1999). One could therefore make similar arguments in the ADA context: 
that is, that by failing to hire someone an employer imposes some costs on the State that would 
not otherwise be there. I have not included such an expense in this section of the 
accommodation cost continuum since I do not believe that it makes sense to speak of a "public 
assistance externality" so far as employers are concerned. 
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Nonetheless, these workplace opportunities do not manifest. In 
consequence, lawsuits and other remedial actions to remedy exclusion 
from the type of workplace participation raised in this part of the 
continuum seek to correct this market failure. In other words, 
abrogating individual employers' decisions, and thus their autonomy, 
in this part of the continuum corrects those employers who were 
previously inefficient. The ADA itself only briefly addresses the 
notion of market correction. While it characterizes the denial of 
reasonable accommodations to qualified workers with disabilities as a 
form of discrimination,428 and authorizes subsequent private and 
public action,429 it does not go any further. Although I agree with the 
statute's estimation, simply labeling these employers' activities as 
discriminatory does not bring one any closer to understanding and 
remedying, at least from an economically based, theoretical 
. h . 430 perspective, t e1r source. 
Employers usually respond to the standard motivation posited in 
the neoclassical economic model of the labor market. When they do 
not, and as a result create a market failure, it is for three main 
reasons. In order of increasing likelihood these are (1) an employer's 
distaste for hiring or retaining disabled workers; (2) subjective 
ignorance of the true costs and benefits of such actions; and, relatedly, 
(3) reliance upon seemingly objective proxies in making these 
determinations that turn out to be empirically inaccurate. 
An employer may have a "taste" for discrimination. 431 Thus, 
despite knowing that the potential or current employee with a 
disability (depending upon circumstances, either with or without 
an accommodation) will be at least as profitable as an 
alternative, nondisabled employee, the employer nonetheless 
hires or retains nondisabled workers. As with race or sex, the 
employer may wish to discriminate.432 This systemic 
428. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (defining discrimination as, among other 
actions, "not making reasonable accommodations" absent the showing of an undue hardship). 
429. The public action begins with filing a complaint with the EEOC, then in proceeding to 
court. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1640-1641 (2002); MICHAEL FAILLACE, DISABILITY LAW DESKBOOK: THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN THE WORKPLACE 2-13 (2003). 
430. Nonetheless, successfully litigating these occurrences should bring about that 
information exchange. As seen above, supra Part I.B., the likelihood of victory is slight. 
431. BECKER, supra note 266, at 39-45. 
432. /d.; see also William M. Landes, The Economics of Fair Employment Laws, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 507, 508 (1968) (investigating whether "fair employment laws improved the economic 
position of racial and religious minorities"); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism 
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discrimination433 (which in a doctrinal analysis would fall under 
disparate treatment)434 can arise from the employer's own 
aversion to people with disabilities, or can result from similar 
feelings among the employer's clients or existing workers. It is 
irrelevane35 whether the source of such negative preferences is 
based in animus ("I don't like people with cerebral palsy"),436 
discomfort ("I personally have nothing against people with 
cerebral palsy, but they give me the creeps"),437 or rational 
and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV., June 1972, at 659 (arguing that statistical analysis can be a 
basis for discrimination). 
433. Systematic discrimination need not be intentional. This is because the employer's 
action is either "a formal, facially discriminatory policy" or one that identifies individuals within 
a particular protected group who are then excluded informally. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 
U.S. 604, 610 (1993). This is true even when the motivation is itself unconscious because of 
stereotyping, social norms, or cognitive categories. Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I 
See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 
953 (1993) (arguing that racism can be a result of whites not recognizing that some things which 
are uniquely white are not universal); Krieger, supra note 364, at 1161 (questioning "the 
premise that discrimination necessarily manifests intent or motive"); Lawrence, supra note 361, 
at 322 (arguing that "[tlraditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about 
racial matters are influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as neither 
intentional ... nor unintentional"); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 
141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 899 (1993) ("demonstrat[ingl that much employment discrimination is 
the result of tortious acts that are most appropriately described as neglige.nt"). For precisely this 
reason, one commentator has argued from an economic perspective that such categories ought 
to be eliminated. See generally Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 
(1999) (concluding that combating unconscious bias with a scheme modeled on Title VII is 
unlikely to be effective). A robust rebuttal to this proposal is provided by Michael Selmi, 
Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233 (1999). 
434. This theory is demonstrated through the use of circumstantial evidence, as provided in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,804 (1973), and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228 (1989). Which test is used depends upon the circumstances involved. See generally 
Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination 
Litigation, 30 GA. L. REv. 563, 564 (1996) (arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1991, along with 
several Supreme Court decisions, has "begun the development of a new, uniform structure for 
disparate treatment discrimination which will eliminate much of the complexity and confusion 
presently existing"). 
435. By this 1 mean that it is irrelevant from a doctrinal point of view. From an academic 
perspective, 1 have argued elsewhere that disability-based discrimination stems in greater measure 
from pity and paternalism than from animus, and so is more analogous to sex than to race. See 
Silvers & Stein, supra note 29. 
436. Several examples of this perspective were compiled by Congress during the legislative 
hearings on the ADA in S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6-7 (1989). The more compelling anecdotal 
evidence included testimony by a wheelchair-using future undersecretary of the Department of 
Education who was removed from an auction house for being reckoned "disgusting to look at." 
/d. 
437. See, e.g., id. (relating how an academically competitive and nondisruptive child was 
barred from attending public school because of a teacher's allegation that his physical 
appearance "produced a nauseating effect" upon classmates). 
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economic preference ("I actually like people with cerebral palsy, 
but my workers and clients do not"). This situation is, 
interestingly enough, just the one that Epstein described in 
Forbidden Grounds .438 And although most economists would 
disagree with Epstein in so far as holding that such preferences 
should not, and normally are not, validated in a proper cost-
benefit analysis, Epstein is absolutely correct in recognizing that 
such feelings exist.439 In sociological terms, this dynamic is 
described as one arising from "existential anxiety."440 
Second, employers are sometimes personally ignorant of the 
actual costs and benefits of accommodations.441 An employer may 
overestimate the costs of an accommodation, may not be familiar with 
the potential benefits and costs that can be associated with providing 
accommodations, or may include unsubstantiated costs (or benefits) 
when calculating productivity.442 
This form of market failure is caused by informational 
asymmetry.443 The basic point that should be recollected here is that 
438. EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 487. 
439. Justice Kennedy recently recognized this fact. See Bd. of Treasurers of Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 375 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[P]ersons with mental or physical 
impairments are confronted with prejudice which can stem from indifference or insecurity as 
well as from malicious ill will."). 
440. The term originates with Professor Harlan Hahn, a political scientist at the University 
of Southern California and one of the founders of the Disability Studies movement, who 
asserted that repugnance to disabled bodily difference combined with fear of also attaining such 
variation in the future, results in a sociological desire to segregate people with disabilities from 
the mainstream. Harlan Hahn, Antidiscrimination Laws and Social Research on Disability: The 
Minority Group Perspective, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 41,45 (1996); Harlan Hahn, Toward a Politics 
of Disability: Definitions, Disciplines, and Policies, 22 Soc. SCI. J. 87, 93-96, 100 (1985). 
441. See generally John F. Newman & Roxan E. Dinwoodie, Impact of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act on Private Sector Employers, 20 J. REHABILITATION ADMIN. 3 (1996) 
(reporting on a study of 20,000 private sector employers in Georgia, which found that employers 
lacked information about both the ADA and workers with disabilities). 
442. An example from the academic realm is provided by Verkerke, supra note 14, who 
believes that the reasonableness of an accommodation will vary depending on wheti).er the job 
in question is high- or low-risk. !d. at 941--43. His argument necessarily assumes that people with 
disabilities are at greater risk of danger and are also less capable of protecting themselves from 
those hazards. This is a proposition without any basis in empirical fact, although one could 
plausibly interpret the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 
73 (2002), to be in harmony with this presupposition. See id. at 76 (holding that a prospective 
employee who is a threat to his own safety may be denied an employment opportunity under 
the ADA). 
443. Since the 1960s, economists have recognized the importance of information when 
modifying pre-existing economic models. The seminal article is by George J. Stigler, The 
Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961) (analyzing economic organization in 
light of the search for information). 
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information itself also costs something to acquire. As such, real-world 
results might differ from those academic economists would observe 
under a perfect competition framework, such as that put forward in 
the neoclassical model, precisely because information costs something 
to acquire.444 Hence, business practices that may seem inexplicable in 
a world with perfect competition assumptions suddenly become 
explicable.445 In other words, a model that expressly makes room for 
information costs would come out differently from one that assumes 
perfect information symmetry. Consequently, when considering how 
to cure market failure due to informational asymmetry, it is crucial to 
consider as well the costs of the suggested corrective devices.446 
The presence of information costs can also lead to a third type of 
market failure ansmg from statistical discrimination.447 When 
information costs are present, a firm might rely upon proxies, e.g., a 
college degree or past experience, when making employment 
decisions, instead of inquiring directly into a disabled person's skills. 
In this circumstance, the disabled employee may be part of a group of 
individuals that on average are either less productive, or are 
444. Moreover, the perfect competition model (and its assumptions) is better reserved for 
addressing a firm's pricing and output decisions instead of their input-purchasing decisions. 
There also are some departures from perfect competition, e.g., product differentiation, that 
really have no impact on this analysis. 
445. RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 13-15 (1988). 
446. One such problem is that the information costs to determine the true productivity of an 
individual with a disability may make that disabled worker less productive than an equivalent 
nondisabled worker, even if the disabled worker was hyperproductive to begin with. Thus, 
although originally DP ;e: AP, information cost has now altered the equation so that DP < AP. 
When this happens, the disabled worker may drop from the Quasi-Voluntary phase of the 
continuum, where mandated solutions are still wholly efficient and Pareto optimal, to either the 
Semi-Efficient, or even in extreme cases, the Social Benefit Gain Efficient portions of the 
Kaldor-Hicks Welfare Enhancing phase where the employment option is only efficient from a 
social view. A similar problem occurs in lending policy. There, information asymmetry and/or 
statistical discrimination may cause minorities to underinvest in their own human capital and 
develop a credit history (in anticipation of being denied credit on account of their race). 
Nonetheless, just as banning statistical discrimination may force creditors to expend resources 
to try to distinguish between debtors, so too does eliding a parallel transaction cost argument in 
this context. 
447. "Statistical discrimination occurs when two groups vary on average in terms of some 
relevant characteristic, and an employer treats all members of each group as if they all possess 
that average characteristic." Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: 
Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
519, 599 (2001). For example, if employers assume women will have short job tenure, and treat 
all women on the basis of that belief, then employers will avoid hiring women for jobs requiring 
longevity. This type of discrimination was best evidenced in the internal labor markets of the 
twentieth century. ld. at 599. 
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perceived to be less productive, than the average worker without a 
disability.448 The employer could investigate whether a particular 
applicant has productivity above or below that of the rest of the 
disabled category. That employer could also look into whether the 
worker with a disability requires an accommodation, and if so, of 
what type and expense. Yet the employer does not do so to avoid 
information costs. Thus, the employer uses the signal of disability, 
because he ends up believing, incorrectly, that an individual employee 
is also less productive than she really is. This is an event that that 
should be banned, because it is inefficient.449 
Most commentators consider statistical discrimination to be a 
market failure and an inefficient event:450 in the absence of complete 
information about the characteristics of a particular group (whether 
related to race, sex, disability, or other observable characteristics),451 
an employer will utilize certain stereotypes as proxies of 
productivity.452 When those signals do not accurately correlate with 
448. See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Economic Defense of Disability Discrimination Law 20-21 
(University of Virginia School of Law Legal Studies Working Paper No. 99-14, June 1999), 
available at http:l/papers.ssrn.com (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that employers 
who rely on signals or proxies for gauging productivity run the risk of relying on information 
which may be wrong or may be a generally accurate statistical inference that is often wrong in 
particular cases). 
449. Perhaps there are other steps one can take to produce information that makes reliance 
on proxies less attractive. Or, maybe because of path dependence, firms will continue to rely on 
proxies even if it does not make a lot of sense to do so now. Alternatively, maybe the proxies, 
although perfectly rational, still create externalities because firms do not consider the full social 
cost of what they are doing. 
450. See, e.g., David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tournaments, and 
Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for "High-Level Jobs", 33 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 63-66 (1998) (arguing that statistical discrimination results in inefficient 
job assignments and reduces incentives for its victims to acquire human capital); Mark Kelman, 
Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1158 (1991); 
Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production 
and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1074--78 (1995) (pointing out that the 
deadweight loss of race discrimination consists of material sacrifices made by the original 
discriminators to lower the status of the victim and the investments made by the original 
discriminators). Not all commentators, however, agree with this position. Professor Peter 
Norman, for example, argues from the perspective of "a utilitarian social planner" that potential 
efficiency gains can extend from statistical discrimination in so far as reducing the "mismatch" 
between workers and jobs. By generating more precise information about specific workers, he 
argues, discrimination can result in a Pareto improvement when compared to a regulated state 
in which statistical discrimination is eliminated. Norman, supra note 328, at 1. 
451. Religious observance may or may not be readily observable. 
452. Although the word has taken on a pejorative tone, these stereotypes need not all be 
negative. Consider, for example, an employer who believes that Samoans make the best 
workers. When this happens, as in the case of word-of-mouth reputational hiring, members of 
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empirical reality, equally productive workers are shut out of 
workplace opportunity.453 As a result, those workers will then 
underinvest in their own human capital. Like other self-fulfilling 
prophecies, this is because of a Catch-22: certain workers are 
disadvantaged in the workplace because they are believed to have 
lower net productivity values. In turn, those workers invest less in 
their own human capital because they believe that they will be 
disadvantaged in the workplace.454 
To address a market failure problem of the type represented in 
the Quasi-Voluntary phase of the accommodation cost continuum, 
one must first begin by defining a "perfect world," and what results 
such a world would produce in the labor market. In this situation, a 
perfect world would be the one posited by the neoclassical regime, 
one with no transaction costs.455 In this transaction-cost-free world, 
private bargains move resources to their highest-valued use and thus 
maximize the wealth that can be obtained from society's existing 
resources.
456 In such a perfect world, employment practices would 
the excluded group may nonetheless have a cause of action. See, e.g., EEOC v. Joe's Stone 
Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1286--87 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that a plaintiff may establish a 
pattern or practice claim under Title VII "through a combination of strong statistical evidence 
of disparate impact coupled with anecdotal evidence of the employer's intent to treat the 
protected class unequally" (quoting Mozee v. Am. Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 
1051 (7th Cir. 1991))). 
453. Technically, those who are similarly situated. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, The 
Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS 3, 24 (Orley Ashenfelter & 
Albert Rees eds., 1973) (noting that "[s]kin color and sex are cheap sources of information" for 
distinguishing between different groups of workers); Stephen Coate & Glen C. Loury, Will 
Affirmative Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1220, 1224 
(1993) (suggesting that "negative prior beliefs will bias the [work] assignment process"); cf 
Glenn C. Loury, Why Should We Care About Group Inequality?, 5 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 249, 263 
(1987) (pointing out "the danger that reliance on affirmative action ... can have a decidedly 
negative impact on the esteem of the [beneficiary J groups, because it can lead to the general 
presumption that members of the beneficiary groups would not be able to qualify for such 
positions without the help of special preference"). 
454. See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in 
Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1640 (1991) ("[S]tatistical discrimination encourages minorities 
to underinvest in human capital, which in tum makes statistical discrimination rational."). 
455. This is true because "in classical economics, the market actors are viewed as having 
access to perfect information. All parties understand the benefits and detriments of the bargain 
and neither is under compulsion or duress." Christopher K. Braun, A Semiotics of Economics, in 
LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 435, 443 (Robin Paul Malloy & 
Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995). 
456. See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules: A 
Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67,68 (1968) ("[I]f one assumes rationality, no transaction costs and 
no legal impediments to bargaining, all misallocations of resources would be fully cured in the 
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begin with an individualized determination of each potential 
employee's productivity, costs, and benefits (whether or not that 
person had a disability).457 
The real (economic) world is not, however, wholly bereft of 
transaction costs in this sense-even Professor Ronald Coase458 didn't 
think so.459 Instead, in the real world, there are all sorts of transaction 
costs-generally bargaining costs and information costs-that prevent 
resources from moving to their highest use and ensure that social 
welfare is lower than it would be in a world with no such transaction 
costs.460 Put another way, in the real world, some or many markets fail 
in the sense that they do not replicate the allocation of resources (e.g., 
who works where, and for how much) that would occur in a 
transaction-cost-free world. Yet "market failure" is not an abstract or 
a permanent condition. It is, instead, a symptom of transaction costs 
which themselves are not necessarily natural, exogenous, or given.461 
market by bargains."). Note, though, that this is the same allocation of resources that would 
occur under perfect competition. /d. 
457. /d. 
458. Author of the pathbreaking article The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1960), which introduced the "Coase theorem," Ronald H. Coase won the Nobel Prize in 
Economics, and in the process contributed to the founding of law and economics as a discipline. 
See generally STEVEN G. MEDEMA, COASEAN ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE 
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS xi (Steven G. Medema ed., 1997). And, although the Coase 
theorem has been questioned (at times with great charm), e.g., A.W. Brian Simpson, Coase v. 
Pigou Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (1996), it remains the fundamental pillar of that area 
of scholarship. 
459. As explained by Epstein, "one of Coase's great achievements was to stress the 
importance of thinking about zero transactions costs settings, not because we ever encounter 
these in our ordinary lives, but because thinking about them sets up a useful foil for thinking 
about the positive transactions cost world that is inescapably ours." Richard A. Epstein, 
Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & 
ECON. 553, 555 (1993). 
460. The most obvious example is the so-called "monopolistic competition" model, built in 
the 1930s, and applied ad nauseam by economists and others ever since. Although this model 
employs some of the assumptions of the perfect competition model, e.g., no barriers to entry, it 
also departs from perfect competition in other ways, e.g., it assumes that consumers have 
varying preferences, with the result that each firm responding to these preferences produces a 
slightly different product, thus leading each firm to obtain a modicum of market power, another 
departure from the perfect competition model. Another example is the theory of monopoly, 
which often assumes that monopolists reduce output below the competitive level. Note, 
however, that if the monopolist had perfect information about the preferences of all consumers, 
and if arbitrage were not possible, it could engage in price discrimination, and thus increase its 
output to the same level that would occur in a world of perfect competition. 
461. As Professor Kenneth Arrow has said: "[M]arket failure is not absolute; it is better to 
consider a broader category, that of transaction costs, which in general impede and in particular 
cases completely block the formation of markets." Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of 
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One implication is that by eliminating or attenuating transaction 
costs, one can sometimes cure a market failure, instead of 
"regulating" it in a more traditional sense.462 Another implication-
and this one is more important given the ADA-is the extent that a 
market failure is both defined and constrained by the sort of 
transaction costs at issue. Thus, if one sees a market failure, she needs 
to figure out what sort of transaction costs are causing it in order to 
determine the right remedy and limits of intervention.463 
The ADA provides for three avenues through which to cure the 
information asymmetry causing individual employers to suffer from 
market failures, and to install a quasi-voluntary, wholly efficient, 
Pareto optimal equilibrium. First, as part of assessing the 
reasonableness of accommodations, employers are required to engage 
in an "interactive process" with disabled workers requesting those 
workplace alterations.464 Second, assuming that the interactive process 
does not result in a mutually acceptable solution, employees with 
disabilities can file disability discrimination charges with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and, afterwards, 
engage in EEOC-sponsored mediation with their employers.465 Third, 
those same disabled workers, if the mediation process has not proven 
Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Non-Market Allocation, in 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS 59, 60 (Robert H. Haveman & Julius Margolis 
eds., 1970). 
462. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Regulation of Franchisor Opportunism and Production of the 
Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly or Competition Between the States, 23 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 61, 78 (1999) (establishing that Sherman Act regulation of purported opportunism 
is unnecessary if "Sherman Act intervention depends upon the presence of transaction costs, 
and if states are capable of reducing such costs by changing the rules that make up the 
institutional framework"). 
463. Or, to put things more technically, the "Institutional Structure of Production" needs to 
be changed to make sure that the resulting "play of the game" (contracting/production by 
private parties) produces the allocation of resources that would be produced in a low/zero 
transaction-cost world. See, e.g., Ronald Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, in THE 
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 1, 27-28 (Ronald H. Coase ed., 1988) (showing that change 
in background rules can lower or increase transaction costs and thus affect the content of 
bargains people enter); Ronald Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. 
REV. 713, 714 (1992) (describing how change in background rules can affect or alter the 
contracts that parties enter as well as the resulting allocation of resources); Alan J. Meese, Price 
Theory, Competition, and The Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) 
(manuscript at 78-82, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting that antitrust regulation alters 
the institutional framework so as to replicate the result that maximizes social welfare); Meese, 
supra note 462, at 70-77 (stating that change in background rules can alter transaction costs and 
thus eliminate market failures). 
464. See infra notes 467-76 and accompanying text. 
465. See infra notes 477-82 and accompanying text. 
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satisfactory (or even transpired, because it is voluntary), can sue their 
employers.466 Each of these measures in tum carries increasingly 
heavy transaction costs, but they are designed to correct information 
asymmetry through the coerced exchange of information. They can 
do so, but with varying success and cost. Each of these avenues is 
explored in greater detail below. 
When faced with an accommodation request from a worker with 
a disability, the employer is required by the ADA to engage in an 
"interactive process" with that worker.467 This procedure is one that, 
in theory, should generate the information necessary to cure an 
informational asymmetry caused by market failure. During this 
process, employers and employees meet and exchange not only 
formal requests but, equally important, trade information and 
perspectives about the accommodation at issue. As a result, disabled 
workers inform their employers what accommodations, soft or hard, 
they feel they require to perform the essential job functions of their 
particular employment. In tum, employers can accede to these 
requests or explain to those workers why the accommodations 
requested would engender an undue hardship because of either hard 
or soft costs.468 
One w_ould think that profit-maximizing employers acting in their 
own self-interest would have already expended resources to find out 
general information on positive and negative externalities. Nonetheless, 
although employers might have general information on these effects, 
they may not have particular information related to individuals with 
disabilities because of lack of experience with, or exposure to, those 
workers.469 And, as was shown above, relying on statistical information 
as proxy has the potential to create false measures. Further, the disabled 
worker has information about himself or herself that may not be readily 
available or knowable by the employer, and thus an exchange of 
information during the interactive process can add to the employer's 
calculus. At the same time, the employer has greater familiarity and 
knowledge about the workplace and its operation and may be able to 
466. See infra notes 483--88 and accompanying text. 
467. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)(3), 1630.9 (2002). 
468. See generally Alysa M. Barancik, Determining Reasonable Accommodations Under the 
ADA: Why Couns Should Require Employers to Participate in an "Interactive Process", 30 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 513, 542-45 (1999); Amy Renee Brown, Mental Disabilities Under the ADA: The 
Role of Employees and Employers in the Interactive Process, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 341, 352-
68 (2002). 
469. Blanck et al., supra note 410, at 1593. 
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suggest less costly alternatives or other avenues toward achieving a 
mutually agreeable position. Note that this interactive process is 
intended to be a cooperative, informational exchange rather than a 
f . 1 470 con rontat10na process. 
Nor must individual employees and their employers go through 
the interactive process blindly or in a vacuum. Well financed, 
federally funded centers facilitate the interactive process by providing 
concrete accommodation options and suggestions, and informing 
employers about existing federal and state tax incentives and 
credits.471 These government-supported facilitators include the ten 
regionally located offices of the Job Accommodation Network,472 as 
well as the Pre:;ident's Committee on Employment of People with 
Disabilities473 and the Social Security Administration's Employment 
Support Program.474 There also exist state-level equivalents.475 As each 
of these organizations facilitate the interactive process for free, very 
little transaction costs are invoked in their usage.476 
In the event, however, that the interactive process fails to bring 
about satisfactory results, employees with disabilities (both those who 
were denied requested accommodations and those who feel aggrieved 
for other reasonst77 can file disability discrimination complaints with 
470. See Sam Silverman, The ADA Interactive Process: The Employer and Employee's Duty 
to Work Together to Identify a Reasonable Accommodation Is More Than a Game of Five Card 
Stud, 77 NEB. L. REV. 281, 288 (1998) ("[B]oth parties can benefit if they are willing to place all 
their cards on the table in an effort to determine if a reasonable accommodation can be 
identified."). 
471. Nor is it necessary to be physically present to engage this process. The Job 
Accommodation Network, see infra note 472, will facilitate the interactive process by telephone, 
mail, email, teleconference, or through the Internet. 
472. The Job Accommodation Network, at http://janweb.icdi.wvu.edu (last visited Sept. 6, 
2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
473. The Office of Disability Employment Policy, at http://www.dol.gov/odep (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
474. The Social Security Administration's Employment Support Program, at 
http://www.ssa.gov/work (last visited Sept. 6, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
475. For instance, the Florida Governor's Alliance for Employment of Citizens with 
Disabilities provides an online job bank for disabled job seekers and potential employers, 
including a free CD-ROM generated by the privately funded Able Trust that profiles some 1200 
college students with disabilities who are seeking internships or jobs upon graduation. The Able 
Trust, at http://www.abletrust.org (last visited Sept. 6, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal); The Florida Alliance for Assistive Services and Teclmology, at http://www.faast.org 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
476. The qualification reflects the fact that time, as well as the gathering of information to 
be exchanged, are, even if minimal, still transaction costs. 
477. For instance, disability harassment is a cause of action recently recognized by the 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits. See, e.g., Flowers v. S. Reg. Physician Servs., 247 F.3d 229, 232 (5th 
162 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:79 
local EEOC offices.478 Subsequently, either the employer or the 
employee can request mediation of their differences.479 The ADA 
does not require, but strongly advises mediation.480 Nevertheless, 
studies, including the EEOC's own internal report to Congress, have 
evidenced that mediation is an excellent vehicle through which to 
have employers and employees exchange information and 
perspectives.481 Mediation as a process also engenders less psychic cost 
and emotional damage to the employment relationship than the third 
option, litigation (although the filing of a discrimination complaint is 
also unlikely to resound very well with employers). The possible 
souring of employer-employee relations is an important point to 
emphasize as job reinstatement is one of the primary remedies sought 
by Title I plaintiffs.482 
Commencing a Title I lawsuit is the third, and certainly least 
efficient or effective, means of curing employers' market failure. In 
theory, the litigation of such claims should, in the course of events, 
provide the means by which to correct flawed assumptions held by 
both employers and employees as to the real costs of 
accommodations. As was shown earlier, however, as a practical 
Cir. 2001) ("[T]he ADA embraces claims of disability-based harassment."); Fox v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he ADA, like Title VII, creates a cause of action 
for hostile work environment harassment."). See generally Lisa Eichorn, Hostile Environment 
Actions, Title VII, and the ADA: The Limits of the Copy-and-Paste Function, 77 WASH. L. REV. 
575, 577 (2002) ("[T]he circuit courts began their examinations of whether hostile environment 
harassment could be actionable under the ADA by noting that the statute explicitly prohibits 
discrimination related to the 'terms, conditions, and privileges' of employment."); Holland M. 
Tahvonen, Disability-Based Harassment: Standing and Standards for a "New" Cause of Action, 
44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1489, 1494 (2003) ("[D]isability harassment as a cause of action is 
modeled after the Title Vli harassment claim."). 
478. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5) (1964); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.6-1601.8 (2002) (establishing the 
guidelines for this process). 
479. /d. 
480. 42 u.s.c. § 12,212 (2000). 
481. See McDermott eta!., supra note 425 (finding "a high degree of participant satisfaction 
with the EEOC mediation program"); Philip Zimmerman, The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission's Mediation Program, 71 CPA J. 66, 66 (2001) (acknowledging that the first year of 
the EEOC's voluntary mediation pilot program was "highly successful"). EEOC mediation has 
continued in spite of inadequate funding; although the EEOC's workload increased by over 40 
percent due to the addition of ADA disputes, its budget remained the same. Moss, supra note 
425, at 19. Nonetheless, the current EEOC chair has aggressively pursued increased mediation 
through a "proactive prevention" program. See EEOC Chair Offers Updated Plan to Combat 
Discrimination, 3 EMP. DISCRIMINATION L. UPDATE 6 (2002). 
482. Cf Ivan E. Bodensteiner & Rosalie B. Levinson, Litigating Age and Disability Claims 
Against State and Local Government Employers in the New "Federalism" Era, 22 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 99, 100 (2001) (explaining the difficulty of bringing civil rights claims). 
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matter, this result is precluded by the overwhelming rate of defendant 
victories, and especially those victories at the pre-jury stage.483 
Parenthetically, it bears noting that in the circumstance of actually 
going before a jury, the circuit courts of appeals are divided as to 
which party bears the further burden of proving the reasonableness of 
a given accommodation. For example, the D.C. Circuit places both 
the burden of production and of persuasion on the plaintife84 ln 
contrast, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits place the burdens of proving 
both the unavailability of a reasonable accommodation, as well as the 
undue hardship that one would cause, on defendants.485 The Second 
Circuit, as exemplified in Borkowski, takes a middle ground that 
alternates burdens.486 In doing so, its reasoning is persuasive. 
Although the disabled plaintiff may have personal knowledge of her 
own disability (and is therefore put under the initial burden of 
persuasion),487 in turn "the employer has far greater access to 
information" regarding "its own organization and, equally 
importantly, about the practices and structure of the industry as a 
whole."488 This compromise steers a wise course between the 
intercircuit poles in that it duplicates, through coerced circumstances, 
the type of informational exchange that should have happened during 
the earlier stages of the interactive process. 
Title I suits are not a random subset of ADA actions. Litigated 
cases may represent particularly strong or particularly weak cases for 
disability accommodations. The fact that the courts are so skeptical of 
these claims would seem to suggest that the latter may be true, and 
this introduces an interesting puzzle: why do plaintiffs bring so many 
losing accommodations claims?489 The Priest-Klein model of litigatio_n 
483. See supra Part I.B. These results are substantiated in the smaller sample size of the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Louis S. Rulli, Employment Discrimination Litigation Under 
the ADA from the Perspective of the Poor: Can the Promise of Title I Be Fulfilled for Low-
Income Workers in the Next Decade?, 9 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 345,365--66 (2000). 
484. Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
485. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1985); Prewitt v. United States 
Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir. 1981). 
486. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1995). 
487. This parallels the duty of a Title VII plaintiff after McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) ("The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden 
under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrirninatio~."). This symmetry 
was intentional. See Burgdorf, supra note 51 passim (describing which portions of the ADA 
were modeled after existing civil rights provisions). 
488. Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 137. 
489. See Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA 5 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that the definition of disability is 
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suggests that about half of all litigated claims should be valid ones,490 
but that theory then explores reasons why a different percentage may 
be valid.491 Although a full explanation is beyond the scope of this 
Article, a few possible reasons are worth noting.492 Several 
commentators from the disability rights community squarely lay the 
results at the feet of judicial resistance to the statute493 or toward 
itself at least partially to blame, and proposing an amendment to the scope of coverage so that 
the protected class more closely resembles the type of minority classifications utilized in other 
civil rights areas); see also Gregory Todd Jones, Testing for Structural Change in Legal Doctrine: 
An Empirical Look at the Plaintiffs Decision to Litigate Employment Disputes a Decade After 
the Civil Rights Act of I99l, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 997 (2002) (generally helpful on the subject 
·of civil rights claims, but not on the ADA because the author does not differentiate his 
statistics). 
490. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1984). Of course, as with any theory, it is not universally embraced. See, e.g., 
Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2000) (noting that, 
because people do not always act rationally in their litigation choices, results outside the Priest-
. Klein theory can result); Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is Possible, 
25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 495-501 (1996) (providing an econometric challenge to the Priest-Klein 
hypothesis). 
491. Priest & Klein, supra note 490, at 52-54. The subsequent literature operates from 
within the Priest-Klein paradigm. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, A Note on Trend-Spotting in the 
Case Law, 40 B.C. L. REV. 891, 894 (1999) (modifying the Priest-Klein model to "explain[] the 
patterns of non-neutral evolution actually observed"); Daniel Kessler et a!., Explaining 
Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for 
Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 234 (1996) (noting that "a 'multimodal' approach to the 
selection of cases for litigation can reconcile the validity of the selection hypothesis ... with 
observed plaintiff win rates of less than 50 percent"); Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, 
Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes: New Evidence Through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model, 28 
J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 103-104 (1999) (comparing independent evidence gathered from the 
mode's three parameters with a stmctural estimate of the model from data for six types of 
federal cases); Robert E. Thomas, The Trial Selection Hypothesis Without the 50 Percent Rule: 
Some Experimental Evidence, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 212 (1995) (using experimental data to 
extend "the [Priest-Klein] selection hypothesis ... [to] explain[] why we should expect to 
observe a variety of plaintiff win rates when examining trial data"). 
492. Not raised in the specific circumstance of Title I litigation, but perhaps informative, is 
Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue 111, The Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes 
for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 427 (1995), which argues that the effect of the business cycle is as determinative as any 
other factor in assessing in advance the likelihood of trial outcomes. /d. at 432-51. When the 
economy is weak, they argue, cases brought forward to a jury determination are less likely to 
win. !d. at446-51. 
493. To quote one example: "[M]any, perhaps most, courts are not enforcing the law, but 
instead are finding incredibly inventive means of interpreting the ADA to achieve the opposite 
result that the Act was intended to achieve." Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA's Revolving 
Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 338 (2001). Tucker's 
assertion is endorsed by many, although not all, of the articles in the following symposia: 
Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice 
Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2000), and Defining the Parameters of Coverage 
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people with disabilities.494 Also at work may be unfamiliarity with 
disabled people as a group495 and/or schemas that cause judges (as 
well as society at large )496 to react in particular ways to them as a 
class.497 Additionally, those workers with disabilities denied 
accommodations may feel particularly strongly about that denial and 
may therefore pursue claims even when they are not winners by the 
standards that the courts apply.498 Yet additional reasons could 
include the following: that there is a misunderstanding of how the 
courts will address Title I claims such that accommodation-related 
suits are an example of "negative expected value" litigation that is 
brought in the hope that the defendants will settle rather than 
litigate;499 that informational asymmetry clouds the litigation decision 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Who is 'An Individual with a Disability?', 42 VILL. L. 
REV. 327 (1997). 
494. This is a line of argument that is well argued, often entertainingly, by Professor Soifer. 
See Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, supra note 372, at 
1328; Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better Angels, and Unprincipled Neutrality Claims, 
supra note 372, at 1287. 
495. This is a unique civil rights chronology. See generally JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: 
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 323-32 (1993) 
(recognizing that disabled people as a group were legally empowered prior to the emergence of 
a general social consciousness as to why such empowerment was needed). 
496. RUTH O'BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY 
IN THE WORKPLACE 137-61 (2000). In sum, Professor O'Brien argues that modern disability 
employment practices are influenced by vocational rehabilitation policies that only integrate 
disabled workers who have fully adapted themselves to the workplace. One consequence of this 
normative schema, which O'Brien avers influences judicial attitudes towards people with 
disabilities, is Supreme Court resistance to disability rights-especially the ADA's employment 
provisions. !d. See also id. at 205 (claiming that the "justices have rendered a narrow 
interpretation of Title I because, like many employers, they perceive disabled people as 
threatening"); Stein, supra note 104, at 619-26. 
497. The judicial backlash explanations, however, seem to beg the question of why litigants 
do not anticipate that hostility in deciding whether to sue. If anything, one would expect those 
who have previously suffered discrimination to overestimate the chance of discrimination from 
other actors, such as courts. Perhaps this suggests that the Priest-Klein model does not do a very 
good job of predicting which disability-related suits are filed. 
498. Some commentators assert that the standard, even if correctly applied, may not be the 
right one to begin with. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 489, at 5. 
499. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 537-76 (1997) 
(explaining negative expected value litigation); see also Samuellssacharoff, The Content of Our 
Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get Litigated?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265, 1266 (2002) (explaining 
the limitations of "the Law and Economics model of why cases are litigated"); Russell 
Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 61 (2002) ("[Alspirations have an 
indirect causal effect on settlement outcomes by directly affecting the 'settlement levers' 
recognized as relevant by the standard model of settlement."). 
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making process;500 that poor lawyering may be at the root of some of 
these losses;501 or that mediocre expert testimony contributes to the 
stilted win-loss rate.502 Finally, the broad assertions made by media 
pundits like Walter Olson, namely, that ADA claimants are whingers, 
not even "really" disabled, or both,503 may have some plausibility.504 
If one, as an economic policymaker, was to step beyond the 
confines cf the ADA and engage in a thought experiment, it is also 
possible that information revelation mechanisms could be helpful in 
the circumstance of this kind of market failure. Disability 
accommodation claims are a context in which employers and 
employees probably each have good information (or at least much 
better information than courts) about tp.e cost of accommodations 
and their likely benefits. Further, it is much easier for a court to 
estimate ex post whether a disability accommodation was successful 
than to guess ex ante. One way to harness that information, while also 
limiting courts to ex post analysis, would involve the following 
scheme: one allowed an employee to force the employer to make an 
accommodation, but then gave the employer the right to sue the 
employee afterwards to recover the difference between costs and 
benefits if the employer felt that the costs were higher. This would 
give the employee some incentive to request only those 
500. See Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in 
Litigation, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75, 76 (1993) (demonstrating "the unique effects 
that the asymmetric information model has on selection bias"); Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling 
Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation, 41 J.L. & ECON. 
451, 451 (1998) (noting that asymmetric information provides a possible explanation for why 
"parties fail to settle their cases and instead proceed to costly trials"). 
501. See Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra note 74, at 517 ("Many ADA cases founder because 
counsel for plaintiffs have not prepared the minimum factual record necessary to provide the 
jury with a basis to conclude that the ADA protects their clients."); Wendy Wilkerson, 
Judicially Crafted Barriers to Bringing Suit Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 38 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 907, 908 (1997) ("(M]any cases have been poorly pleaded."). 
502. The latter was certainly central to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 
(2002), a Title 1 case in which accommodation was not at issue, and in which summary judgment 
was ignominiously granted. /d. at 87. 
503. See WALTER K. OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: HOW EMPLOYMENT LAW IS 
PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 114 (1997) ("Employers' biggest accommodation 
challenge may arise less from the gravely disabled, who are relatively few in number and often 
far from keen on forcing their services on reluctant hirers, than from the general working 
population ... "). 
504. However waugh the presentation. See Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the 
Meaning and Function of the Category of Disability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & 
POL'Y REV. 1, 3-34 (1999) (arguing that the Supreme Court's Sutton trilogy served to sift out 
people not "truly" disabled). 
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accommodations she was confident would be successful. There would 
be some complications-perhaps a requirement that the employee 
bond herself to avoid the judgment-proofing problem-but this 
scenario might produce a regime that could produce positive 
incentives. At the same time, one might allow negotiation, so that the 
employer could buy out the employee instead of making the 
accommodation. Instead of the employer having the property right 
and the employee having the right to sue, the employee would have 
the property right and the employer would have the right to sue. 
As a second thought experiment, consider the possibility of 
creating a governmentally funded, private firm that was responsible 
for all disability accommodations nationally or, alternatively, in a 
particular geographic or industry-specific area. As a result, an 
employer and employee would apply jointly to that firm, requesting 
that it pay for the accommodation. If the firm refused, then litigation 
would ensue. Under this system, the employer-employee relationship 
would be less adversarial due to their common interest. Of course, the 
accommodation firm would have an incentive to maximize its profit, 
but this is no different a system than that found in many other areas 
of the economy, such as insurance companies, where private firms 
have an incentive not to pay but ordinarily will pay where they are 
legally required to do so. 
B. Socially Efficient (Kaldor-Hicks Welfare Enhancing) 
Accommodations 
The next phase of the continuum, Socially Efficient, Kaldor-
Hicks Welfare Enhancing Accommodations, contains two parts. The 
first is Semi-Efficient Accommodations, which extract a differential 
cost from employers. Under this part, although both disabled workers 
and their employers benefit, those employers benefit less than if they 
were able to choose equivalent nondisabled workers. The second 
part, Social Benefit Gain Efficient Accommodations, involves 
disability-related accommodations that exceed ADA reasonableness. 
Because individual workers and general society benefit, but 
employers do not, this is an area appropriate for state subsidization. 
1. Semi-Efficient (ADA) Accommodations. This part of the 
continuum, that of Semi-Efficient (ADA) Accommodations, is one 
wherein both disabled workers and their employers benefit, but 
employers benefit less than if they were able to choose equivalent 
nondisabled workers. The Semi-Efficient part, therefore, is stillnet 
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profitable for employers to the extent that employers will continue to 
profit from the presence of accommodated workers with disabilities.505 
It is, however, in degrees less efficient and less profitable than the 
wholly efficient, completely profitable portion of the continuum that 
preceded it. This is because Semi-Efficient modifies the absolute 
nature of the Pareto principle (and its limitations) pursuant to the 
ADA's totality of the employer's financial circumstances formulation. 
As a result, an accommodation would fall within the Semi-
Efficient segment of the continuum if both the disabled worker and 
the employer benefit, but the employer's benefits are less than the 
optimal ones captured under a Pareto regime. In this regard, the 
Semi-Efficient segment is similar to Pareto in that the involved 
parties gain more than zero and are placed in net positive positions. 
The Semi-Efficient phase of the continuum differs from a Pareto 
position, however, in that a Pareto optimal state ensures that 
employers receive as much benefit by employing disabled workers as 
they would in employing fungible, equivalent, nondisabled workers. 
In a Semi-Efficient state the employer still achieves a net positive 
profit position, but his profits are less than they would be had he 
employed an equivalent, nondisabled employee.506 Hence, within the 
Semi-Efficient phase of the continuum, there exists a range of profit-
capturing transactions, from slightly less than full profit to slightly 
more than no profit. Moving away from a straight cost-benefit 
analysis, within the Semi-Efficient phase, there are areas of 
contingent reasonableness in which the same accommodation can be 
reasonable for some employers, but not for others. Related to the 
issue of where to draw the line on reasonableness are two issues: first, 
the extent to which (if at all) accommodations effectuate equality, 
rather than redistribution; and second, the cross-dynamic of an 
505. I stress accommodations because the ADA does not cover unaccommodated 
hypoproductive workers, even though standard economic analysis does not differentiate those 
individuals from other equivalently net profitable workers, including accommodated hyper and 
average productive workers with disabilities (as well as those without disabilities). See supra 
Part I.A. 
506. For this reason, the Semi-Efficient state also differs from the state known as Pareto 
superior, because in that latter category no one is made worse off. By contrast, in the Semi-
Efficient state, employers are made worse off to the extent that they are not left in a position 
equal to the equilibrium that would exist in Pareto optimality. Arguably, they are not worse off 
in the sense that their net profits, even when the margin has been reduced to one unit, are still 
profitable, but the difference between some profit and no profit, when both are less than full 
profit, is one of degree rather than of kind. See generally JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 32-33 (1995) (discussing Pareto superior allocations). 
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employer repeatedly providing accommodations, and how this affects 
the extent to which profitability ought to be compromised. As will be 
seen below, the Semi-Efficient phase of the continuum is uniquely 
modulated to the ADA and captures what the statute usually intends 
as reasonable accommodations. 
Further, there is another way in which the Semi-Efficient 
segment of the continuum, by applying the ADA, does not 
necessarily dovetail well with classic economic analysis. Among the 
range of productivity levels there will be workers with disabilities 
whose productivity will be lower than that of their nondisabled 
equivalents. This would seem evident because there will also be 
nondisabled workers with lower productivity than their disabled 
counterparts, a point that will arise in the hypotheticals presented. 
Nonetheless, the ADA only considers as qualified those individuals 
with disabilities who, either with or without the provision of a 
reasonable accommodation, are able to perform essential job 
functions. In other words, to be protected under the statute's aegis, 
disabled workers' gross productivity must equal that of their 
nondisabled peers. By contrast, from an economic viewpoint, there is 
no difference between the equivalent lower net products generated 
by (1) a worker with a disability who does not require an 
accommodation but who is less productive than a nondisabled peer; 
or (2) the equally productive disabled worker provided with a 
reasonable accommodation; or (3) the comparatively 
hyperproductive worker with a disability whose extra-reasonable 
accommodation expense is such that his net productivity is less than 
that of the average worker. 
To illustrate: Barry, an individual with muscular dystrophy whose 
condition limits the facility of his movements,507 applies for a position 
as a hamburger chef at Cholesterol City Burgers (CCB). The essential 
job functions of such a position at CCB are to fry 40 burgers an hour 
and place them in a heated pan from which CCB burger associates 
will later dress them with condiments, wrap them in CCB 's trademark 
fuchsia wrappers, and prepare them for distribution by CCB sales 
associates. Thus, the average hourly productivity level is 40 units (AP 
= 40). Other than having muscular dystrophy, assume that Barry is no 
different than other applicants for the position of hamburger chef and 
carries neither costs nor benefits related to his disability, i.e., as 
before, both QB and QC are zero. Without an accommodation, Barry 
507. See generally STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 115, at 558. 
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can fry and place 35 burgers an hour, and is therefore not qualified 
under the ADA (because where DP = 35, it is less than AP = 40; and 
so AP > DP). From an economic point of view, Barry is also not 
equally net profitable, and given a choice CCB would not hire him. 
However, with the accommodation of a specially designed spatula 
more conducive to his physiology and costing the equivalent of 5 
burgers per hour (AC = 5), Barry can flip 40 burgers. Thus DP = 35 
(because DP = DG + (QB(40+0) - AC(5))). If the provision of the 
spatula is considered reasonable in light of the employer's total 
financial circumstances, then Barry is a qualified individual with a 
disability and protected by the ADA. At the same time, from an 
economic point of view, Barry's net productivity has not changed in 
CCB's eyes. Because DP = 35 in both cases, Barry is still not an 
equally productive burger flipper, and another hamburger chef would 
be sought out. If Barry was hyperproductive, flipping an amazing 60 
burgers per hour (DG = 60), but required the extra-reasonable 
accommodation of a titanium spatula to achieve that level (AC = 25), 
he would not be ADA protected (due to the unreasonable nature of 
the accommodation), and would also be economically inefficient 
(because he achieved a net product lower than AP = 35). Thus, 
although the ADA protects Barry in the second example, an 
employer would view all three circumstances (with the same net 
product) as equally inefficient.508 
Additionally, because the Semi-Efficient segment of the 
continuum is specially calibrated to capture scenarios arising from 
"typical" ADA accommodations, wherein an accommodated worker 
with a disability exacts a reasonable cost from her employer, two 
ADA-specific issues arise: the relative reasonableness of 
accommodations as antidiscrimination measures, and the effect upon 
individual firms subject to repeat accommodation mandates. 
To begin with, in the Semi-Efficient stage, accommodation costs 
are relative rather than absolute. Consequently, if the same person 
with a disability requested identical accommodations from two 
different employers, the ADA might consider the first request 
reasonable (most likely if it was directed at an employer with greater 
resources) but not consider the second one to be so (especially if that 
employer had fewer resources). This is a calculus unique to the ADA 
508. Assume, arguendo, that the 25 unit spatula was reasonable in light of the employer's 
total financial circumstances. In this situation, the ADA protects Barry under the second and 
third examples, while an employer would still view all three as equivalently inefficient. 
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and is caused by the statute's requirement that accommodations be 
reasonable as measured by the totality of a given employer's financial 
circumstances.509 By contrast, Title VII suits view as irrelevant the 
relative costs of bringing about a nondiscriminatory equilibrium.510 In 
addition, the notion of relative reasonability, and the inconsistent 
results that it can engender, is economically counterintuitive unless 
the relative scale makes sense from (a) an administrative point of 
view, in that it is less costly for an employer rather than for the state 
to administer accommodations,511 and/or (b) a cost-spreading 
perspective, because the larger the financial resources of a firm, the 
easier it is for it to pass on accommodation costs to the public at 
large.512 Finally, because valid accommodation costs can vary 
according to the fiscal resources of providing firms, it is possible that 
an accommodation can diminish a given employer's profit margin in a 
worker with a disability down to almost no profit.513 In other words, 
on a profit scale ranging from one unit to one hundred units of profit, 
where an employer expects to capture one hundred units of profit per 
employee, an accommodation could conceivably reduce the profit 
509. 42 U.S.C. § 121I1(10)(B) (2000); see supra Part I.A. 
510. Title VII suits might, however, consider the absolute cost of a remedy by inference 
when an employer raises either business necessity as a defense or rebuts a claimant's assertion 
about the existence of an alternative business practice. See generally Thomas A. Cunniff, Note, 
The Price of Equal Opportunity: The Efficiency of Title VII After Hicks, 45 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 507 (I995) (suggesting that although courts have shifted the burdens in Title VII cases to 
make it more difficult for the plaintiff, this may be an efficient outcome as discrimination 
decreases over time); John J. Donohue III, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination 
Legislation: A Reply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 523 (1987) (employing a cost-benefit 
analysis to test the efficiency of Title VII). 
5Il. This argument is a standard one for those commentators who favor regulation over 
subsidies. See, e.g., Wax, supra note 20, at 1424--26. The tension between regulation and subsidy 
has invoked an ongoing and interesting debate. For recent contributions, see KELMAN, supra 
note 371, at 92-93; Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment 
Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 967 (1999); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor 
the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 82I (2000); and Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as 
Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000). 
512. This is a standard argument in torts scholarship. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Individual 
Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 
237-44 (1996) (arguing that collectivization meets both the deterrence and compensation goals 
of tort liability); John A. Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 1820, 1864 (1987) ("[T]ort rules are only capable of forcing manufacturers to 
behave somewhat efficiently, some of the time, under some conditions."). 
513. In the event an accommodation drives an employer's profit margin into a net loss 
position, such that the disabled workers gains but the employer loses, that circumstance will fall 
within the next section of the continuum, Kaldor-Hicks Welfare Enhancing Efficiency, if the 
social benefit still outweighs the social cost. See infra Appendix, Section D. 
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margin of an individual disabled worker to one unit and still be 
considered (contextually) reasonable.514 This is because, so long as the 
employer reaps some profit from that worker, the provision of 
accommodation (given appropriate circumstances) could still fall 
within the Semi-Efficient portion of the continuum. 
The second issue raised uniquely in the ADA context is a 
corollary to the idea that accommodation costs are relative. That is, 
will firms who either voluntarily provide accommodations or are 
coerced to do so in either the Quasi-Voluntary or the Semi-Efficient 
part of the continuum become magnets for attracting additional 
disabled workers who fit the Semi-Efficient profile,515 and if so, is that 
circumstance one to be favored? According to Professor Epstein, the 
prospect of having workers with disabilities employed by the same 
firm is a positive event.516 Rather than "handicap ghettoization," the 
concentration of workers with disabilities at particular sites, according 
to Epstein, increases the likelihood that physical plant or equipment 
accommodations will see repeated usage.517 Hence, it is an efficient 
mechanism by which to increase disabled employment.518 . Similarly, 
Professor Verkerke argues that employees ideally should be matched 
with a job in which they would be most efficient.519 This goal can be 
achieved, in part, by placing a disabled worker with a company 
capable of minimizing accommodation costs.520 A larger sized 
employer, in his view, is more likely to have the ability to duplicate 
accommodations, for an economy of scale would ultimately bring 
down the cost of accommodation even if such an initial 
accommodation would appear sizeable in comparison to the 
profitability of the individual worker.521 In contrast to these views, 
Professor Samuel Issacharoff and Mr. Justin Nelson argue that 
514. Congress originally considered and then rejected a proposal during the ADA debate 
which would have defined undue hardship as threatening an employer's continued existence. 
Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 
923, 927 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on 
Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. 90 (1989)). 
515. When workers fit within the Wholly Efficient part of the continuum, whether as 
recipients of voluntary or semi-voluntary action, this is viewed as a positive effect; it is the less 
profitable, semi-efficient workers only who raise the question of desirability. 
516. EPSTEIN, supra note 269, at 492-94. 
517. /d. at 493-94. 
518. /d. at 494. 
519. Verkerke, supra note 14, at 948. 
520. /d. at 949-50. 
521. /d. 
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forcing employers repeatedly to accommodate workers with 
disabilities is a deleterious policy.522 Because multiple 
accommodations have the potential of driving down gross profits, 
they argue that foisting disabled workers onto a particular employer 
can harm that entity.523 As a result, having more of those workers 
imposed onto their workforce might instead penalize employers who 
should be socially lauded for having previously accommodated a 
disabled worker.524 
Overall, I agree with the view of social efficiency taken by 
Epstein and Verkerke.525 Recall that the reasonableness of ADA 
accommodations is determined by the totality of an employer's 
financial circumstances.526 Thus, on the positive side, an economy of 
scale should lessen the impact upon (and might even increase the 
overall) profits of an individual employer over the long haul. And, 
although repeatedly imposing disability accommodations on a single 
providing employer may well reduce its profit margin per worker on 
each occasion, and so will cause that employer to bear an unwanted 
financial obligation, whatever total reductions ensue will in the end 
be curbed by a standard of reasonableness.527 Accordingly, the costs of 
522. Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 369, at 344-47. 
523. /d. 
524. /d. at 350-51. 
525. An important point that is tangential to this Article bears noting. When advocating in 
favor of the efficiency of repeated accommodations, Epstein and Verkerke each support, by 
inference, the notion of directed placements, meaning that they favor specific vocational 
placements for workers with disabilities who evidence certain skills. See EPSTEIN, supra note 
269, at 493-94; Verkerke, supra note 14, at 937-38. To the extent that this policy either limits the 
development of disabled workers or shunts them into certain careers, 1 very strongly disagree 
with it and point to the parallel history among women. See generally Dawn Michelle Baunach, 
Trends in Occupational Sex Segregation and Inequality, 1950 to /990, 31 Soc. SCI. RES. 77 
(2002); Jo Anne Preston, Occupational Gender Segregation: Trends and Explanations, 39 Q. 
REV. ECON. & FIN. 611 (1999). For disabled people, these type of measures, even when well 
intentioned, have historically resulted in sheltered workshops and make-work that demean and 
isolate those individuals. See generally Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A 
Post-Integrationist Examination, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 889 (2000) (cataloging and analyzing 
welfare law's past treatment of disabled persons). However, to the extent that such a policy 
duplicates some of the gains made in the past through vocational rehabilitation that afforded the 
recipients job support and options, I would endorse it. See O'BRIEN, supra note 496, at 87 
(chronicling the success of 1950s rehabilitation programs). For a more global view, see David A. 
Gerber, Disabled Veterans and Public Welfare Policy: Comparative and Transnational 
Perspectives on Western States in the Twentieth Century, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 77 (2001). 
526. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2000). 
527. This situation raises the possibility of intradisability conflicts, i.e., the disabled person 
requesting the accommodation that will push an employer's profit margin near enough to the 
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repeat accommodations should not result in "ruinous" economic 
losses for any given individual employer.528 
To reiterate, in a Semi-Efficient equilibrium, both workers and 
employers benefit, but the employers profit less than if they were 
unregulated. Modulated specifically to the ADA, the Semi-Efficient 
portion of the accommodation cost continuum includes a range of 
accommodations that · are contextually reasonable and allow 
employers to capture variant profit margins. Semi-Efficient 
Accommodations also raise the potential situation of individual 
employers becoming the focus of repeat accommodation requests. 
This phenomenon, should it arise, is prevented from engendering an 
undue hardship on those individual employers because of the ADA's 
intervening standard of reasonableness. 
2. Social Benefit Gain Efficient Accommodations. The next 
section of the accommodation cost continuum, and still within the 
scheme of Kaldor-Hicks Welfare Enhancement, is that of Social 
Benefit Gain Efficient Accommodations. 
In this phase, the profit to an employer is zero (or carries a 
negative cost), but the social benefit gain in having a less productive 
disabled worker employed exceeds the cost of compensating an 
employer for doing so. Thus, this area raises a circumstance in which 
both the individual worker with a disability and society in general 
benefit, but the employers lose. This portion of the continuum 
operates outside the boundaries of the ADA because the 
accommodations at issue are no longer reasonable.529 Accordingly, 
undue hardship category so that no further workers can be accorrunodated has an interest 
adverse both to putative employees, as well as to currently able-bodied colleagues who might 
become disabled. For two thoughtful treatments on the implications of intragroup conflict 
within the context of gay and lesbian civil rights, see William B. Rubenstein, Divided We 
Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 
106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997), and Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards· Equal 
Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989). 
528. This reasonableness limitation remains despite complaints in the popular media that 
the ADA will bring American business to rack and ruin. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 503, at 
102-18 (arguing that costs of accorrunodation are higher than the acknowledged projections of 
the ADA's supporters); Peter J. Riga, Employers' Litigation Horror Stories, L.A. DAILY J., 
Dec. 19, 1994, at 6 (lamenting that, although the ADA was a good idea, it has been prone to 
abuse and has become a "lawyers' employment service"). 
529. The arguments made in this Section apply equally to circumstances of hypoproductive, 
non-accommodated disabled workers whose net output is the same as those disabled workers 
with average or hyperproductivity who engender accommodation costs. 
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this is an area where the state has the potential to compensate losing 
employers and should do so out of self-interest.530 
When an employer cannot profit from retaining a worker with a 
disability due to her accommodation cost, there still may be reason to 
compel that employer to accommodate the disabled worker on the 
ground that society in general may benefit. In the preceding area of 
the continuum, that of Semi-Efficient Kaldor-Hicks 
Accommodations, it was assumed that a firm still benefited from 
employing the individual worker with a disability even if it was forced 
to take only one out of the potential one-hundred units of profit from 
that transaction.531 When that profit is zero or less, i.e., when 
employing a person with a disability engenders no profit or even a 
negative cost, societal benefits may still be used as an additional 
reason to employ that individual because of Kaldor-Hicks concerns. 
Recall that under a Kaldor-Hicks regime, a policy is efficient so long 
as the winners can in theory, even if not in reality, compensate the 
losers.532 Moreover, as the prime vehicle for assessing the costs and 
benefits of public policy choices, Kaldor-Hicks allows for involuntary 
transfers in the name of efficiency while not requiring that everyone 
affected by an action be agreeable to its consequences.533 The key to 
utilizing a Kaldor-Hicks model is that, assuming the benefits of a 
proposed program outweigh its costs, the policy will be upheld as 
valid if it will increase societal well-being.534 
As used in the accommodation cost continuum, a Kaldor-Hicks 
welfare enhancing policy-as defined by the limits of Pareto 
optimality and semi-efficiency-will employ disabled workers who 
530. I acknowledge that, from an economic perspective, a plausible argument could be made 
that the state ought to similarly compensate employers providing semi-efficient 
accommodations who reap less than full profits from their disabled workers. That may be so, 
although I argue elsewhere that there are reasons for resisting the reach of subsidies. Stein, 
Empirical Implications, supra note 22, at 1668-69. In any case, that assertion goes beyond the 
province of both the ADA and this Article. 
531. In VandeZande, Judge Posner opined that forcing an employer to bear a marginal loss 
could also be reasonable. VandeZande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995) 
("It would not follow ... that an accomodation would have to be deemed unreasonable if the 
cost exceeded the benefit however slightly."). Posner may well be correct, but I have chosen to 
draw the line at no profit for prudential reasons. 
532. See infra Appendix, Section D. See also Allan M. Feldman, Kaldor-Hicks 
Compensation, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICfiONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra 
note 259, at417. 
533. /d. 
534. DIANA FUGUITT & SHANTON H. WILCOX, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC 
SECfOR DECISION-MAKERS 39 (1999); HARRISON, supra note 506, at 34. 
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are inefficient for private employers, but who are still socially 
efficient. In this circumstance, social efficiency is measured by any net 
positive gain to society. Specifically captured by this policy are 
disabled workers who can perform productive work through the 
provision of unreasonable (or, extra-reasonable) accommodations.535 
Many of these individuals are from the group referred to in the 
economic literature as members of the "transfer" population, 
meaning that they are functionally capable of work (and thus 
avoiding welfare dependence), but do not have that opportunity.536 
This argument is made more persuasive in light of what Bagenstos has 
pointed out, namely that disability policy, qua ADA, was motivated by 
the notion of dependence avoidance.537 
A Kaldor-Hicks efficient equilibrium posits that the winners be 
capable of compensating the loser, but does not require that this 
eventuality actually transpire. Nonetheless, as I have briefly argued 
elsewhere, the point at which accommodating people with disabilities 
is no longer reasonable, but still socially beneficial, is an appropriate 
departure point from which to consider state-funded employment 
535. This section of the continuum is. in essence, a type of disability accommodation that 
both Bagenstos and Wax would advocate, but with a significant variation from the arguments 
that each presents. Because he operates within the ADA, Bagenstos does not address 
unreasonable accommodations, although his arguments for dependence-avoidance are still 
meaningful in this phase of the continuum and I believe he would agree with it. See Bagenstos, 
supra note 18, at 1022-26. Wax, on the other hand, does endorse unreasonable accommodations. 
However, at least partly as the result of framing her arguments within the ADA, Wax argues for 
employers bearing these costs. Wax, supra note 20, at 1425. I diverge from Wax by maintaining 
that unreasonable yet socially beneficial accommodation costs ought to be borne by the state, 
although given the chance to respond, she might very well agree with that option. 
536. See generally John Bound & Richard V. Burkhauser, Economic Analysis of Transfer 
Programs Targeted on People with Disabilities, in 3C HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 3417 
(Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999); Richard V. Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly, 
Disability and Work: The Experiences of American and German Men, 2 FED. RES. BANK S.F. 
ECON. REV. 17 (1998) (comparing patterns of employment, transfer receipt, and economic well-
being of ruen with disabilities in the United States and Germany); Matthew Diller, Dissonant 
Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal 
Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003 (1998) (contrasting the divergent policies and 
assumptions about the employability of the disabled that underlie the ADA and other federal 
disability programs). 
537. See THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATILE 
OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 95 (2002) ("[T]he ADA was sold as a way to reduce 
governmental expenditures by getting people with disabilities off welfare."); Bagenstos, supra 
note 18, at 1002 ("[l]n the campaign to enact the ADA .... the adoption of an independent 
living/welfare reform frame served a number of purposes for disability rights leaders."). 
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opportunities through the payment of subsidies to employers.538 By so 
advocating, I diverge from other legal commentators who have 
endorsed the notion of subsidies, because they do so for the funding of 
reasonable accommodations rather than for unreasonable ones.539 
Although there are rights-based reasons that can be raised for holding 
this position,540 there is also an economic justification (beyond those of 
administrative efficacy and cost spreadmgt' that suggests that utilizing 
regulation instead of tax-and-spend subsidies in the 
antidiscrimination field can be more efficient.542 At best, subsidies can 
balance out existing market inefficiencies by improving the labor 
market participation of a targeted group to a nondiscriminatory 
equilibrium. Subsidies will not, however, change the ingrained 
negative prejudices that caused those inequities, nor preclude 
similarly inefficient practices from repeating in the event that the 
subsidies are discontinued.543 
Thus, Socially Efficient, Kaldor-Hicks Welfare Enhancing 
Accommodations capture circumstances in which the employer will 
not profit from hiring a worker with a disability, but both that worker 
and society will. When the societal gain in having a less productive 
disabled worker employed exceeds the cost of compensating an 
employer for doing so, this section of the continuum will govern 
disability accommodations. 
538. Stein, Empirical Implications, supra note 22, at 1684 ("Providing extra-reasonable 
accommodations could overcome existing market inequities borne by the most stigmatized 
among the disabled."). 
539. Scott A. Moss & Daniel A Malin, Public Funding for Disability Accommodations: A 
Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 197 (1998); Sue A. Krenek, Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEX. L. 
REV. 1969, 2009-13 (1994). For an appraisal of subsidy programs run previously under the 
Rehabilitation Act, see Alberto Martini & Sharon Arnold, Programs Providing Subsidized 
Employment to Disadvantaged Workers: A Review of their Effectiveness (Mathematica Policy 
Research Paper No. 7725-400, Feb. 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). 
540. Briefly stated, funding all disability accommodations by subsidies rather than through 
private employers both detracts from the notion of people with disabilities being entitled, as equally 
valued human beings, to civil rights, and/or renders those subsidies vulnerable in the future to the 
political process. The latter point is underscored within the context of learning disabilities in MARK 
KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE 195-226 (1997). 
541. See KELMAN, supra note 371, at 93 (concluding that an ordinary income or excise tax 
would be a more efficient means of funding ADA accommodations); Wax, supra note 20, at 
1451 ("When putting more disabled persons to work makes economic sense, it may be better to 
try to find ways to help employers defray the costs of accomplishing that goal."). 
542. Stein, Empirical Implications, supra note 22, at 1684. 
543. /d. at 1683-84. 
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C. Wholly Inefficient Accommodations 
This last section of the accommodation cost continuum, that of 
Wholly Inefficient Accommodations, is merely the inverse of the 
preceding Kaldor-Hicks Social Welfare Enhancing Accommodations. 
When an employee with a disability is unprofitable to the extent that 
the social benefit of accommodating her is outweighed by all the 
weighted and quantifiable costs of maintaining her in the workplace, 
then she should be excluded from the labor market. In this 
circumstance, applying a Kaldor-Hicks framework of analysis reaches 
the conclusion that general social welfare would be diminished by 
employing and/or accommodating this worker. Instead, that person is 
an appropriate candidate to be excluded from the workplace through 
the receipt of disability-based welfare benefits. Once the costs of 
accommodation outweigh the benefits to society, then society would 
be made worse off by employing the worker in any capacity. Thus, 
even if the worker herself may still be made better off through her 
employment, because neither the employer nor society will benefit 
financially, the only viable economic option is to exclude her from 
workplace opportunity by providing her with social welfare benefits. 
Whether society ought to look beyond economics and instead be 
motivated by concerns for human dignity and well-being is an 
argument that goes beyond the scope of this Article, although one I 
would endorse.544 
CONCLUSION 
To fully pursue further discourse on disability accommodations, 
additional empirical research and theoretical thought need to be 
given to at least three inquiries. Initially, it is crucial to decide which 
people are, or ought to be, considered "disabled" under the ADA. 
Although the Supreme Court has decided fourteen ADA cases over 
the last four years, the scope of the ADA's coverage remains unclear. 
Knowing who is included in the protected class is fundamental to the 
expectations that those individuals, their employers, the judiciary, and 
general society will have regarding the duty to provide 
accommodations. A clearer understanding of group identity would 
544. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, Liberalism, Individuality, and Identity, 27 CRITICAL 
INQUIRY 305, 331-32 (2001) (asserting that the historical example of people with severe 
disabilities demonstrates the need "to find a reasonable middle way between demeaning 
handouts and forced labor"). 
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also improve the cohort that economists target when studying post-
ADA employment effects, as well as the actual costs of 
accommodations. Without common ground for analysis, econometric 
findings lack a basis for meaningful comparison. Second, further 
research needs to be conducted into the actual cost of 
accommodations. Although reservations should be held about the 
results of the handful of existing studies, their findings indicate that 
there is a larger story to be investigated. So far, the analyses have 
focused on the hard costs of providing or amending the physical work 
environment, without also assessing the soft costs incurred by altering 
job requirements or methods of administration. At the same time, 
very little research has examined the potential benefits that 
employers can receive from hiring disabled workers. Regardless of 
the effect that these analyses will have on whether accommodations 
are viewed as economically net productive for employers, they will 
render a more balanced and appropriate calculus. Additionally, a 
great deal more thought needs to be given to the problem of how 
better to disseminate information about workers with disabilities. 
Because employers are not familiar with disabled workers, they may 
rely on statistical proxies of productivity that are inaccurate. 
Moreover, employers have not generally utilized the existing tax 
credits and incentives that could balance out or even exceed 
accommodation costs. Properly addressing this information 
asymmetry, however, requires engaging the attendant issue of what 
transaction costs are incurred in obtaining that information. Doing so 
requires that extralegal alternatives also be considered. 
The ADA mandates that employers provide "reasonable" 
accommodations to "qualified" disabled workers, but it gives little 
guidance on how to determine reasonableness. To date, neither 
courts nor commentators have articulated a systematic economic 
model for analyzing employer-funded ADA accommodation claims. 
Similarly, very little has been written on what (if any) 
accommodations and/or subsidies society, rather than employers, 
ought to support for disabled workers beyond the ADA's boundaries. 
This Article offers an initial law and economics framework for 
analyzing both these inquiries by demonstrating how disability-
related accommodations span a cost continuum ranging from the 
Wholly Efficient Accommodations (where barring market failure 
accommodations are voluntarily provided by employers) to the 
Wholly Inefficient Accommodations (where the only economically 
feasible option is labor market exclusion and no one ought to provide 
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these accommodations). It illustrates how disability-related 
accommodations can be thematically organized into areas of 
economically viable Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks Semi-Efficient 
Accommodations (to be funded by employers) and Social Benefit 
Gain Kaldor-Hicks Efficient Accommodations (where the costs 
should be borne by the public fisc), delineates the boundaries 
between each category, and explains why the entities designated 
should bear the costs assigned to them. Finally, this Article explores 
when disability-related accommodations are totally inefficient and 
therefore not viable from even a social benefits perspective. 
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APPENDIX: VALUE ASSUMPTIONS 
This Appendix sets forth the values used in measuring and 
weighting efficiency as part of the accommodation cost continuum 
described above.545 Respectively, these are: efficiency, cost-benefit 
analysis, Pareto optimality, Kaldor-Hicks welfare enhancement, and 
wholly inefficient mandates. 
A. Efficiency 
A common theme in the law and economics discipline, and one 
that is also utilized in this Article, is the focus on achieving the most 
"efficient" or optimal outcome, meaning the one having the greatest 
utility.546 However, it is in large part differences about how to 
determine what solutions are efficient that separates the various 
approaches within law and economics.547 Thus, the discipline 
encompasses several distinct strands of thought, including 
traditionally utilized wealth-maximizing law and economics, and the 
historically lesser used, but recently more controversial, welfare 
economics.548 It also includes several developing areas of enquiry 
within what may be loosely termed "progressive" law and 
economics,549 meaning branches of the field that question some of the 
accepted underlying assumptions of the discipline550 and seek 
545. See supra Part IV. 
546. For a general overview of efficiency mechanisms, see RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 1.2 (5th ed. 1998). 
547. Professors Duncan Kennedy and Mario Rizzo push this assertion further, contending 
that methodological approaches can be maneuvered to yield desired outcomes. See Duncan 
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387,388-
89 (1981); Mario Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641,642-43 (1980). 
548. See generally Allan M. Feldman, Welfare Economics, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: THE 
WORLD OF ECONOMICS, supra note 259, at 889; WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS 
AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE (2d ed. 1965). Welfare economics has become controversial 
due to the work of Professors Louis Kaplow and Steven Shaven, as briefly discussed infra note 574. 
549. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Comment, Progressive Law and Economics-And the New 
Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 341-42 (1988) (urging "the development of a reformist 
law and economics, closely linked to administrative law and based on public finance theory, 
public policy analysis, and social choice theory"). This perspective of law and economics 
includes Duncan Kennedy's scholarship, as well as the "liberal" law and economics of 
Professors Richard Markovits and Bruce Ackerman that Kennedy criticizes. See Kennedy, 
supra note 547 (articulating the weakness of efficiency as a reformist justification). 
550. An early, and typically brilliant, take is by (Nobel Prize winner) Amartya Sen, Rational 
Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 
(1977). See also Jeffrey Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law 
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alternative ways for understanding economic rationality m 
human behavior.551 
How each branch confronts a given inquiry will depend upon the 
relevance and weight that it places on particular preferences as 
criteria.552 Thus, Judge Posner's study of gender implications in the 
and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1314-25 (1986) (analyzing the validity of the economics 
assumptions of self-interest and observable preferences); see generally Nicholas Mercuro & 
Steven Medema, Schools of Thought in Law and Economics: A Kuhnian Competition, in LAw 
AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECfiVES, supra note 455, at 65 (arguing that law is 
no longer an autonomous discipline but is influenced by a variety of disciplines). 
551. These fields include feminist law and economics, notably the work of Professor Gillian 
Hadfield, cited infra note 554, as well as those works featured in the publication FEMINIST 
ECONOMICS, available at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-femec/contents.html (last visited Sept. 7, 
2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal), and environmental law and economics, see generally 
Daniel H. Cole, Environmental Protection and Economic Growth: Lessons from Socialist 
Europe, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECfiVES, supra note 455, at 295 
(tracing the comparative failure of environmental protection in socialist Europe); Jeff L. Lewin, 
Toward a New Ecological Law & Economics, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL 
PERSPECfiVES, supra note 455, at 250 (suggesting "the emergence of a new 'ecological law and 
economics' that will address such issues as ecological scarcity and environmental equity from a 
perspective that overcomes the limitations of the neoclassical approach"). Adding to this 
scholarship are the interesting and developing fields of behavioral law and economics (which 
questions some of the rationality assumptions underlying the traditional discipline). See generally 
Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998) (describing the 
role of law in the development of social norms, and socioeconomic law and economics (which 
seeks to inject psychological and social factors related to wealth and race into otherwise "neutral" 
economic analyses)); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 35 (2002) (developing a "belief change" theory of law's effect on social norms and 
preferences); Christine Jolls et a!., A Behavioral Approach to Law & Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471 (1998) (envisioning how law and economics analysis may be improved by attention to 
insight about actual human behavior); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of 
Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000) (suggesting that law may be alternatively 
conceptualized for its expressive, as well as its traditionally acknowledged enforcement, 
functions); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 
(2000) (highlighting the power of the approval or disapproval of law in shaping behavior); 
Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, 
and the Law, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1495, 1583-1788 (1998) (analyzing the impact on contract 
negotiations of negotiator biases for the status quo and inaction, as well as expressive law and 
economics (which examines how legal norms can alter social norms)). Referring to themselves as 
"the radical middle," these last scholars are represented by their own section in the American 
Association of Law Schools organization and contribute to the publication of the Journal of 
Socio-Economics, available at http://www.jrlse.org (last visited Sept. 7, 2003) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal). 
552. That this is the case has also led to criticisms of the discipline discussed below. 
Conversely, one commentator argues that this flexibility of weighting assumptions can lead to a 
more democratic process, at least in the context of administrative agency determinations, when 
regulators enunciate their preferences. Michael Abramowicz, Toward a Jurisprudence of Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1708, 1720 (2002). Abramowicz's critique was in response 
to the position of Cass R. Sunstein, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULA TORY 
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workplace553 is considered deficient by Professor Gillian Hadfield for 
not adequately inquiring into the impact on women's role 
determinations of regulating sexuality.554 Moreover, a recent and 
growing debate among law and economics practitioners555 has begun 
to parallel earlier critiques from those outside the discipline,556 
namely, whether morality or fairness (in contrast to pure efficiency) is 
at all relevant to economic analysis.557 
In presenting a law and economics model for assessing the 
reasonableness of ADA accommodations, I have elected to utilize a 
cost-benefit analysis and to frame the arguments in terms of 
efficiency. I weight all the relevant (and socially acceptable) external 
costs and values, while also questioning some of the received 
neoclassical assumptions, and so my analysis avoids many of the 
criticisms aimed at more traditional economic analyses. 
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Regardless of the particular approach taken within the available 
range of law and economics scholarship, each engages in some form 
of cost-benefit analysis. In such a framework, all the positive effects of 
any proposed scheme are balanced against all its potential (and 
socially acceptable) deficiencies.558 Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) itself 
has lately come under a good deal of self-evaluation,559 mostly due to 
PROTECfiON 25-29 (2002), that these determinations ought to be more fluid and less overt. /d. 
As such, Abramowicz's arguments parallel those in this Article. 
553. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992). 
554. Gillian K. Hadfield, Flining with Science: Richard Posner on the Bioeconomics of 
Sexual Man, 106 HARV. L. REV. 479, 502-03 (1992) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 553). In a 
similar vein, Hadfield takes to task the circular reasoning used by those law and economics 
scholars who explain gender wage differentials by reference to the historical household 
structure without also questioning the existence of this arrangement. Gillian K. Hadfield, 
Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 
89, 89-90 (1993). 
555. This is addressed, both in the context of cost-benefit analysis, infra Appendix, Section B, 
as well as in the discussion of the Semi-Efficient segment of the continuum, supra Part IV.B.l. 
556. See, e.g., supra note 189. It should be mentioned that those scholars outside the 
discipline also call into question the morality of the whole enterprise. 
557. For two strong examples of this analysis, see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of 
Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1007-08 (2000), 
and Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, in COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECfiVES, supra note 189, at 135. 
558. However, deficiencies which accord weight to socially unacceptable values are not 
included in the evaluations. See supra note 281. 
559. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 41-42 (2d 
ed. 1997); POSNER, supra note 546, at§ 1.2 (defining the economic concepts of value, utility and 
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its professed goal of wealth maximization.560 This is especially so 
because of its agnostic acceptance of efficiency as a leitmotif 
irrespective of moral determinants. In addition, there are three main 
objections to CBA: income distribution, discounting, and moral 
shortcomings.561 
One objection to CBA is that it weighs all money equally, 
whereas not every person does so.562 A very wealthy person, for 
instance, would value each additional dollar less due to diminishing 
returns. As a result, in CBA, the interests of the wealthy are arguably 
given greater preference than those people who are less wealthy.563 
The uneven nature of income distribution and its effects upon 
determining efficiency564 are particularly clear in instances involving 
"environmental justice."565 Although placing a toxic waste site in a 
wealthy neighborhood would engender a $20 million loss of property 
values, placing the same dump in a poor neighborhood might only 
cause a loss of $5 million. Although the waste dump poses an equal 
burden in the form of abrogating personal preferences to all citizens, 
according to CBA, placing it in the rich neighborhood is inefficient.566 
efficiency); ZERBE, supra note 359, at 14-33 (suggesting principles to provide an ethical basis 
for cost-benefit analysis); Robert Frank, Why is Cost Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, in 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra 
note 280, at 93-94 (utilizing moral theory to understand objections to cost-benefit analysis). 
560. See Laurence H .. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 596 (1985) ("Being 'assigned' a right on efficiency grounds ... hardly 
satisfies the particular human need that can be met only by a shared social and legal 
understanding that the right belongs to the individual because ... it [is] organically and 
historically a part of the person that she is .... "). 
561. Frank, supra note 559, at 77-81. 
562. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 
165, 224 (1999). 
563. This criticism of the compensating variable (CV) test provides much of the inspiration 
for the call that CV's, which are based on willingness to pay (WTP) calculations, be replaced 
with a measure of welfare equivalence (WE). /d.; Frank, supra note 559, at 80-81. 
564. Beyond wealth concerns, there are also (related) issues of power distribution. See 
generally Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 431 (1994) (recognizing the existence of distributional inequalities and suggesting 
administrative approaches in the context of environmental justice). 
565. See generally Vicki Been, Environmental Justice and Equity Issues, in ZONING AND 
LAND USE CONTROLS (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1995). 
566. Because the less wealthy individuals on the "losing" end of this equation frequently 
tend to be minorities, this phenomenon is also referred to by some advocates as "environmental 
racism." See, e.g., Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75, 119-
20 (1996) (arguing that the disproportionate land use in poor and minority communities stems 
from cultural conditions sustaining wealth inequalities). For a discussion of income disparity in 
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Thus, the optimal CBA result would be to locate toxic sites in poor 
neighborhoods, even if, to achieve this result, enough funds were 
transferred to the poor population to make such 
determination palatable.567 
A second criticism of CBA is that it values the present at the 
expense of the future by utilizing a discount rate.568 Money is worth 
less in the future than it is now due to inflation. The use of a discount 
rate (five percent is standard) can have profound effects. A $10 
million investment today to halt $1 billion in far-off future pollution 
damage would be considered uneconomical.569 The objection raised to 
CBA in this context is that it is fixated on the present, hence 
mortgaging future needs and benefits.570 But this need not always be 
the case. Suppose, for example, that the United States sold the Grand 
Canyon to Japan for $30 billion. Many might argue that in doing so 
the federal government has discounted the benefits that future 
generations would enjoy from having it under American control. But 
such an argument is highly dependent upon what is done with the 
proceeds. If they were dissipated through one long nationwide party, 
then that argument would hold true. On the other hand, if those funds 
were invested in biomedical research that ultimately finds cures for 
cancer, AIDS, or other feared maladies, then future generations 
might well be happy with. the decision to trade in one asset 
for another. 
economic analysis, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Entitlement and Contract, in LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 455, at 221. 
567. Of course, not everyone perceives this as a negative or undesirable result. See, e.g., Jill 
E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in Environmental Racism: Redefining the Concept of Intent, 40 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1219 (1998) (objecting to the inclusion of "environmental racism" in the 
environmental justice movement); Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Private Disparate 
Impact Suits (Environmental Racism), 34 GA. L. REV. 1155 (2000) ("Decisions that have 
disparate racial effects . . . unlike intentionally discriminatory decisions, are not always 
undesirable .... "). 
568. Frank, supra note 559, at 79-80; Derek Parfit, The Social Discount Rate, in POLITICS OF 
THE ENVIRONMENT 572-78 (Robert E. Goodwin ed., 1994); see also Richard L. Revesz, 
Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 941, 950-51 (1999) (chronicling the debate over discounting future lives saved 
with respect to asbestos regulation). 
569. If a billion dollar loss in today's monetary values will not occur for another one 
hundred years, then at a 5 percent discount rate society should not spend $10 million today to 
prevent it. 1 billion/ 1.05100 equals roughly $7.6 million. In Revesz's example, the OMB 
discounted the value of a human life saved in ten years to just over $22,000. !d. at 951. 
570. Carried out to its most extreme implication, the discount rate devalues future human 
lives saved. See Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L.J. 1911 (1999) (challenging the 
use of discounting in the valuation of future lives). 
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The third, and most significant criticism of CBA, is that in 
assessing efficiency it does not take into account questions of 
morality.571 As Judge Posner has pointed out with typical frankness, 
many socially undesirable results-for example, suicide pacts or baby 
selling-are not necessarily inefficient;572 Professor Steven Shavell has 
even explicated the logical efficacy of selling one's immediately 
unneeded organs.573 Thus, a typical CBA will not filter out those 
assumptions that are less fair than others. Nor does CBA itself 
provide normative guidance. The exclusion of any consideration of 
morality (expressed in terms of fairness) as a variable is at the center 
of Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell's controversial work.574 They 
argue that fairness should never trump social welfare (efficiency) 
when deciding upon legal rules, because utilizing a fairness 
justification may make everyone worse off.575 Kaplow and Shavell use 
the alternative tort liability theories of negligence and strict liability 
as an example which applies equally to everyone. Strict liability may 
increase social welfare, and yet due to concerns with fairness, 
1. . d 576 neg tgence 1s use . 
571. See generally Nussbaum, supra note 557. 
572. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Comment on Donohue, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 927,928 
(1988) ("Abrogating the laws against selling babies for adoption would reduce, not increase, the 
price that adoptive parents must pay to acquire a child."); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of 
the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 71-72 (1987) (noting that adoption today is "baby 
selling," and "the question of public policy is not whether baby selling should be forbidden or 
allowed but how extensively it should be regulated"). Always a fluid thinker, Judge Posner's 
more recent work has taken greater account of social norms. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Social 
Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553, 
564-65 (1998) (embracing a rational choice approach to norms as a component of law and 
economics). 
573. Steven Shavell, Why Not Sell Organs?, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1999, at A22. 
574. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
967-68 (2001) (published in book form as LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS 
VERSUS WELFARE (2002)) ("Notions of fairness ... should receive no independent weight in 
the assessment of legal rules."). The responses, sometimes emotional, arise from scholars who 
would not accept a legal regime lacking moral values. See, e.g., David Dolinko, The Perils of 
Welfare Economics, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 351, 393 (2002) (objecting that Kaplow and Shavell fail 
to "resolve this issue of whether the challenge arises from doubts about ... philosophical 
propriety " or issues arising from "government basing its special actions on those notions"); 
Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare Depends on Fairness: A Reply to Kaplow and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 847 (2002) (arguing that fairness ultimately determines policy outcomes, even if welfare 
economics is applied); Ward Farnsworth, The Taste for Fairness, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 
(2002) (advocating a role for fairness in setting the appropriate values for costs and benefits). 
575. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 574, at 1011. 
576. /d. at 967. 
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Since everyone is made worse off in certain circumstances, a 
proposition that flies against the Pareto principle, Kaplow and Shavell 
argue that fairness is not a useful policymaking tool.577 By contrast, 
Professor Howard Chang asserts that fairness and the Pareto 
principle are not mutually exclusive.578 A fairness theory can comply 
with the Pareto theory because weight can be given to individuals' 
preferences.579 Chang's argument makes sense because fairness is also 
something which can be valued in terms of well-being. Chang also 
indirectly addresses other strikes against CBA, arguing that people 
are not always able to measure utility due to the lack and cost of 
information.580 Fairness in such a case makes for an attractive 
decisionmaking tool.581 Of course it can be argued in reply, and 
Kaplow and Shavell do so, that there are innumerable theories of 
fairness that can be applied, whereas the notion of efficiency is much 
better defined, and hence predictable.582 
Ultimately, as Professors Mathew Adler and Eric Posner have 
pointed out, CBA is merely a tool and can include whatever values a 
policymaker chooses.583 As such, CBA can be applied to different 
circumstances and, depending upon the values sought by the person 
applying CBA, to many different ends.584 
C. Pareto Optimality 
Despite the growing debate about the role of fairness, the least 
controversial law and economics scheme is that of Pareto optimality, 
wherein no one can be made better off without anyone being made 
worse off.585 The Pareto measure, however, is rarely acceptable as a 
policymaker's lone decision making tool, because Pareto optimality 
577. See id. at 1015 ("[L]ogical consistency requires that one can give no weight in 
normative analysis to notions of fairness because doing so entails the contrary proposition that 
sometimes it is normatively desirable to adopt a policy that makes everyone worse off."). 
578. See generally Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, 
and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000). 
579. /d. at 233-34. 
580. /d. at 230-32. 
581. /d. at 230-31. 
582. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 574, at 1306-14. 
583. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When 
Preferences Are Distorted, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 280, at 270. 
584. See generally Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A 
Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001). 
585. See supra Part IV. A. 
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denies interpersonal connections of welfare, and thus involuntary 
transfers. For example, one rich individual's $100 loss could preclude 
vast wealth increases for a million starving destitutes. Because in 
reality, a proposed policy rarely has no economic losers, Pareto CBA 
is rarely the sole device used for social planning. 
D. Kaldor-Hicks Welfare Enhancement 
Under the Kaldor-Hicks test, a policy is efficient so long as the 
"winners" (meaning those benefiting from the policy change) could 
theoretically compensate the "losers" (i.e., those individuals for 
whom the policy change engenders a detriment).586 Kaldor-Hicks is 
the principal method of CBA, at least so far as public policy decisions 
are concerned, because it allows for involuntary transfers in the name 
of efficiency and also does not require that everyone affected by an 
action be agreeable to its consequences.587 Accordingly, Kaldor-Hicks 
welfare enhancing solutions are usually promulgated through 
governmental action, especially via administrative agencies.588 
Utilizing a Kaldor-Hicks model, the costs and benefits of a 
proposed program are weighed, and the policy is accepted if it will 
increase societal well-being.589 Achievement of this goal is determined 
by whether there has been "wealth-maximizing," meaning an increase 
in "wealth" or "value" as units of measuremene90 Because the 
desirability of results are critiqued on individuals' ability to pay (and 
586. See Feldman, supra note 532, at 417. 
587. For very different perspectives on the import of this loss of autonomy, compare 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 94-95 (1981), with Jules L. Coleman, 
Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 534-40.(1980). 
588. See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: A 
Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431, 441-45 (1996) 
(suggesting that rational choice theory, which dictates how much deference the Supreme Court 
gives to lower court administrative decisions, enables the Court to shape regulatory policy); 
Posner, supra note 584, at 1138 (demonstrating "a trend toward greater recognition of cost-
benefit analysis among the circuit courts as an appropriate and possibly even necessary part of 
the regulatory process"); see also Stephen M. Bundy, Commentary on "Understanding Pennzoil 
v. Texaco": Rational Bargaining and Agency Problems, 75 VA. L. REV. 335, 364 (1996) 
(proposing that, because agency problems often impede settlement for large corporations 
engaged in complex litigation, in-house counsel should intervene to help senior management 
control these problems). 
589. Thus, the significance of how CBA ought to be utilized is diseussed in the repartee 
between Sunstein and Abramowicz, supra note 552. 
590. Although from a technical point of view, Kaldor-Hicks and wealth maximization need 
not be the same. A very concise treatment of Kaldor-Hicks is provided in JEFFREY L. 
HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 33-35 (1995). 
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thus potentially compensate those who "lose"), Kaldor-Hicks has 
been criticized as an insufficient surrogate for utility, particularly 
when applied to individual, rather than to systemically-based, 
transactions.591 As used in the proposed framework, Kaldor-Hicks 
welfare enhancing policies have two variations. 
Under a Semi-Efficient scheme, an accommodation would bring 
about a Semi-Efficient state if both the disabled worker and the 
employer benefit, but, in this case, the employer's benefits are less 
than optimal. In this regard it is similar to Pareto in that both 
involved parties gain and are placed in net positive positions. 
However, it differs from Pareto in that, in a Pareto optimal state, the 
employer would receive as much benefit by employing the disabled 
worker as he would by employing a (fungible) nondisabled worker. 
With a Semi-Efficient Accommodation, the employer still achieves a 
net positive profit position, but his profits are less than they would be 
had he employed an equivalent nondisabled employee.592 Hence, 
within the Semi-Efficient state, there exists a range of profit-capturing 
transactions, from slightly less than full profit to slightly more than no 
profit. Related to the issue of where to draw the line on 
reasonableness are two issues: first, the extent to which (if at all) 
accommodations effectuate equality, rather than distribution; and 
second, the cross-dynamic of an employer repeatedly providing 
accommodations, and how this affects the extent to which 
profitability ought to be compromised. As shown in Part IV,593 the 
Semi-Efficient phase is uniquely modulated to ADA 
accommodations. 
The second part is Social Benefit Gain efficient, which operates 
outside the boundaries of the ADA as defined by the limits of Pareto 
and Semi-Efficiency, to employ disabled workers who are inefficient 
for private employers but still socially efficient.594 In this circumstance, 
591. /d. at 34. Harrison offers the following hypothetical: 
[S]uppose two individuals-one rich and one poor-both desire a gallon of mille The 
poor person wants it desperately and is willing to give his or her last dollar for the 
milk. On the other hand, the rich person does not care for the milk but thinks it 
would be fun to ... pour the milk into a storm drain and, therefore, is willing to pay 
$1.50 for the milk. Under wealth maximization principles, the efficient allocation is to 
the rich person. 
/d. 
592. Put another way, the Semi-Efficient phase of the continuum is neither Pareto optimal, 
wholly efficient, or Kaldor-Hicks, and therefore needs to be cataloged and dealt with separately. 
593. See supra Part IV.B.l. 
594. See supra Part IV.C. 
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social efficiency is measured by any net positive gain to society.595 
Captured by this policy are disabled workers who can perform 
productive work through the provision of unreasonable 
accommodations.596 
E. Wholly Inefficient Mandates 
When the costs of employing a worker with a disability exceed 
any net positive gain to society relative to the costs of providing for 
the worker through the social welfare system, these accommodations 
result in socially inefficient mandates. While an illustration of how a 
hypothetical worker with a disability would, in practice, fall within 
this sphere is provided below,597 it bears noting at this juncture that 
the phenomenon of disabled employment being socially inefficient 
raises two important issues. 
First, where does a policymaker draw the line between Kaldor-
Hicks welfare enhancement and a socially inefficient 
accommodation? As shown in Part II.B.3, two commentators portray 
disability-related employment as a means of avoiding dependence, 
although neither provide a formula for predicting when a given 
worker reaches this level or, because they operated from the ADA, 
how far society ought to go (if at all) in this respect. The formula 
provided for determining socially inefficient mandates offers one 
solution to this dilemma.598 
The second connected issue, and one that goes beyond the scope 
of summary mention, is one that has been raised in economic analyses 
led by Professors Marjorie Baldwin599 and Richard Burkhauser:600 
whether people with disabilities are expected to work after the ADA. 
Baldwin asserts that Title I is unlikely to bring about a substantial 
increase in the employment rates of workers with disabilities because 
the ADA does not adequately take into account the influence of 
595. See generally DIANA FUGUITT & SHANTON J. WILCOX, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR 
PuBLIC SECTOR DECISION MAKERS (1999). 
596. See infra Appendix, Section E. 
597. See supra Part IV.B. 
598. See supra Part IV.C. 
599. Marjorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve Its Employment Goals?, 549 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 37 (1997); William G. Johnson & Marjorie Baldwin, The Americans 
with Disabilities Act: Will It Make a Difference?, 21 POL'Y STUD. J. 775 (1993). 
600. Richard V. Burkhauser, Post-ADA: Are People with Disabilities Expected to Work?, 
549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 71 (1997). 
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prejudice.601 Burkhauser criticizes the ADA's lack of conjoined work 
initiatives by contrasting various European policies directed toward 
"transferring" people with disabilities from social welfare networks 
into the workforce.602 Burkhauser also points out that the success of 
these initiatives correlates directly to the degree that any given 
national policy provides incentives for, or harbors expectations about, 
participation in the workplace by individuals with disabilities.603 
Although their arguments bring into question issues that are also 
beyond the scope of this Article,604 the assertions they make will help 
lend insight into how far accommodations beyond the ADA's scope 
ought to go.605 
601. Marjorie L. Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Dispelling the Myths About Work 
Disability, in NEW APPROACHES TO DISABILITY IN THE WORKPLACE 39 (Terry Thomason et 
al. eds., 1998). 
602. Richard V. Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly, Disability and Work: The Experiences of 
American and German Men, 2 FED. RES. BANK S.F. EcoN. REV. 17 (1998); Richard V. 
Burkhauser & Petri Hirvonen, United States Disability Policy in a Time of Economic Crisis: A 
Comparison with Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany, 67 MILBANK Q. 166 (1989). 
603. Richard V. Burkhauser, Policies to Make Work Pay for People with Disabilities, in 
GROWTH IN DISABILITY BENEFITS: EXPLANATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (Kahnan 
Rupp &David C. Stapleton eds., 1998); Richard V. Burkhauser & Mary C. Daly, U.S. Disability 
Policy in a Changing Environment, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 213 (2002); Richard V. Burkhauser et 
al., How People with Disabilities Fare when Public Policies Change, 12 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & 
MGMT. 251 (1993). 
604. Most prominently, the impact that factors exogenous to the statute have on its efficacy. 
To give just a few examples, these include the absence of job training programs and incentives 
for those with disabilities comparable to those directed at other groups historically dependent 
on public assistance, the lack of Department of Justice or EEOC enforcement funding, and the 
absence (until 2000) of a health insurance provision. Stein, Empirical Implications, supra note 
22, at 1684-87. For detailed econometric studies demonstrating these effects, see generally 
Burkhauser & Stapleton, supra note 333. 
605. See supra Part IV.C. 
